740.00119 EW/3–1449: Telegram
The Acting United States Political Adviser for Germany (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State
382. For Murphy Eyes Only. Deptel 294, March 11.1 In reply to Army Department cable to CINCEUR W–85469 March 11,2 outlining reftel and suggesting OMGUS representation at London conversations, Clay sent following personal top secret cable for Voorhees March 12.
“It would appear late for me to comment on what is already a decision. However, I would fail in my duty if I did not say what I firmly believe, that in making these types of decisions we are playing into Communist hands. It does not stand to reason that in the years to come, Germany will not be permitted to build merchant ships because they are a risk to security in that the yards could be directed to other and war uses. Obviously this applies to any heavy industry and the pressure from British indicates the economic competitive fear which is involved other than security fear. Moreover we have provided for security inspection of all types to insure industry is used for peaceful purposes.
I must go on record as stating my fixed opinion that such limitations on production which seriously affect the ability of 65 million people to live, make not for security but rather to plant the seeds of hatred and distress which lead to war. Moreover, this was the most important factor at our disposal for a one package rather than a piecemeal solution. In trading this agreement for a few ECA plants, I think we should be clear in our own minds that we are in fact in the prohibited and restricted industries agreement placing further shackles on the German economy, which more than offset any economic benefits which will accrue from the comparatively small value plants to which ECA attaches so much importance to their retention in Germany.
In sheer economic value, the giving up of the ECA insistence on plant retentions in exchange for a very limited prohibited and restricted industry policy would make sense. I hope that the bargaining, if such it is to be and that appears to be what Ambassador Douglas has in mind, is based on obtaining minimum restrictions rather than maximum plant retentions. In any event, we are certainly knocking the pins down in one alley at the same time we set them up in another.
I would like to add further that with these same instructions, we might have reached agreement here. So again and for the fourth or fifth time during the past year, we are placed in a position to have been more unyielding than our government which of course means that our negotiating position here is once again undermined. It seems that the instructions which we receive are always only an interim [Page 565] government position. It has of consequence made the position of the American Military Governor here almost an impossible one for it is more and more apparent to his colleagues that he does not have government support.
I will advise later as to time required to complete small vessel program.
I have no one to send to London from here. In point of fact, we could contribute nothing since our views have already been made known and our representative would serve no useful purpose. Normally when they do go to these conferences they are not permitted to attend the actual meetings, I presume from fear of contamination.”