The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State
2295. Eyes Only for the Secretary. While I do not feel qualified express views on specific issues on which McCloy requests expression Department’s thinking (Deptel 644, September 12, repeating Frankfurt’s 2178, September 81), venture for what it may be worth that timing approach arouses Embassy’s admittedly sensitive suspicions.
While ascription Soviet motives as further customary tactic create confusion in light current establishment West German Government, and during forthcoming GA, and as facet “peace offensive” may be unjustified on facts, it may be noted that since last CFM Soviets have hitherto apparently consistently stalled on substantive German negotiations unification, currency, etc., which would seem raise question why new high level approach this time. On other hand, I note from Moscow angle that since I have been here my admittedly primarily courtesy contacts with Vyshinski and Stalin have met cordial reception and, aside from continuing acid press treatment US and all its works, there have been no Soviet outright government level outbursts against US. Therefore possible that impact on Soviet thinking of determined US policy recent months evidenced Marshall [Page 378] Plan, Atlantic Pact, MAP, coupled failure Soviet expectations depression US, Soviet weakness home front vis-à-vis Tito, etc., may be reflected in this move, although I would hesitate go so far as suggest this indicates any important changes Soviet policy as yet.
In circumstances, believe willingness Soviets participate in private meeting four representatives may well be crux situation. If they agree Such privacy, would seem likely they might be willing make substantive contribution solution problems.
On general subject German developments Embassy had, prior receipt Deptel under reference, prepared telegram transmitted as my immediately following which supplements foregoing.2
Sent Department 2295, repeated Paris 327, London 238, Frankfurt 16.
- Telegram 2293, September 13, from Moscow, not printed (740.00119 Council/9–1349). In this cable Kirk speculated that the Soviet Union would probably urge another session of the Council of Foreign Ministers to support its worldwide peace offensive with the idea of lulling the Western world and undermining United States public and congressional support for the North Atlantic Pact and the military assistance program. In the projected session, however, the Soviet Union was unlikely to make any concessions on Germany and would not expect any from the West. In Berlin Kirk felt that as long as the Soviets continued to receive critical materials from the Western zones, they would not seriously interfere with the city’s communications, but at the same time they appeared uninterested in restoring political unity to the city, seeking only recognition of their puppet magistrat.↩