Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Control (Germany)/12–1449

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Cheseldine) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

secret

[Washington,] December 14, 1949.

Subject: A Personal Opinion (No distribution)

It is perhaps fortunate that pressures build up only infrequently within me. When they do, I must find escape for them.

I am very worried about the “German problem.” I feel that our policy is so infirm that iron shots and vitamins will do it no good; or else it is so firm in the wrong direction that we owe it to the public to publish our retreat from realism so our people can be prepared.

First let me repeat that last March I opposed granting Western Germany a government; I stated my position in a meeting in Murphy’s office one night in the presence of Dorr, Voorhees, Murphy, you and several others. That is water over the dam. I continued against “too much, too soon” in a memo¹ to you before the Paris conference. That too, is history. I mention these things only to lend emphasis to my next alarm.

We do have a German government and it is hanging on by the skin of its teeth. We believe it is the best we could get and we want to keep it and make it strong so we come out of the dilemma of “unconditional surrender” with something of lasting value. Having a bull by the tail is not a pleasant diversion and since we can’t hang on forever, we must look for a soft spot on which to light as our hands continue to slip.

So what are we doing as a matter of international policy and diplomacy? As a government, we state our belief in “integration” of Western Europe; we offer dollars to help strengthen economies and try to use their emphasis to force “economic integration.” We offer an Atlantic Pact and Military Aid to strengthen European defenses, and try to use their emphasis to force “military integration.” Both of those attempts have inherent in their structure some loss of sovereignty by European nations. We use ERP, MAP, NAP, as a security background for the creation of a Western German government; we advance our security offers, which include also a Military Security Board and pious words about decartelization and deconcentration, as protection for Western Europe against a resurgent Germany. And we point with pride to the reserved powers in the Occupation Statute!

Thus we have a sufficient array of words and names and alphabetical agencies to permit any official spokesman to write or speak in such manlier as to make it appear that the peoples of other nations can safely hover beneath the benevolent wings of a gentle but powerful American Eagle.

Are we so naive as to believe that all other people are simple minded? What becomes of our “protection” when Johnson announces proudly a saving of two billion dollars in the Department of Defense—by reducing the size of the Army, Navy, Air Force? What becomes of our economic integration when returning Senators announce a cut in EBP aid next year? Why should Western Europe rely on us for protection and willingly give up sovereign rights for “political integration” when we have made no commitment as to what armed forces we will place or maintain in Europe, while at the same time our military leaders(?) feed the fire which would forge a German army? [And as sure as death and taxes, the Germans know that 5 German divisions (or 10 or 20!) will mean nothing as defense unless we provide 100 or 200 of our own and, therefore, as the talk builds up, pressure on Adenauer will force him more and more to insist upon a real German Army, and then where goes your assurance to France—and others? And don’t forget that ingrained in the German nationalist is the firm conviction held for centuries that Russian manpower and German know-how and leadership are invincible—that Der Tag will come!]² Why argue that France is our greatest problem in Europe when the French, living with the realities of history, have only words as defense and the evidence of an ever stronger Germany as a growing offense? [Whoever believed we could give Germany a government without sovereignty, and what is sovereignty today without the inherent means of military protection; and who can deny the cry of the Germans that they are menaced by the threat of advancing Russia; and who is bold enough to say that we do not intend to revise the occupation statute to relinquish more controls; and doesn’t the world know that we have done nothing of importance in decartelization and deconcentration and nothing in the field of the Military Security Board?]

We have two inherently strong powers in the world today, Russia and the United States. But Russia has immediate armed strength and knows it, and the world knows it. She can, therefore, afford to refrain from an overt act of war because she can revert to that at any time. The world wants protection against war and in all realism, might is still the greatest immediate and realistic protection against war—or for war! The Russians respect strength; the Germans respect strength. The longer we cling to the position of “world leader” into which we have been thrust by circumstance backed by might, while at the same time we flaunt our growing weaknesses in the face of the world, the more we destroy our chance of really leading the world.

This ranting is a composite of statements made to me in letters I have received and in many conversations with people who are as worried as I am as to our “policy.” They are not new; many will feel that they are much over-drawn. Sure, we have “contained” Communism in Western Europe—while it spreads throughout the Orient. True we have rebuilt Germany from ruins of war—while her people smirk at our naivete and eat our food. Yes, we have again demonstrated our sincerity of purpose to seek no territorial expansion, no gain from war, and our sincere open-handedness toward the needy of the world—while we talk openly of returning sovereignty to our recent enemies, East and West, in the same breath as we express surprise that the world does not accept our assurances of security from its former enemies of peace.

Can the world fail to note the juxtaposition of our intent to consider the ending of a state of war with Germany and the continued discussion of some German rearmament?

Yes, I am frankly confused. In the face of a definite and powerful aggressor nation, sitting literally across the top of the world, what is our policy? With two defeated enemies on our hands, what do we intend to do with them, the world situation being what it is? It sounds logical, perhaps, to argue that we cannot keep them in bondage, that we must get them on their feet and oriented toward “our side,” and set them free! But Japan has renounced war! The Adenauer government has pledged against a return of militarism. Who, then, protects the new sovereignty? Not we, who have no military! Not the NAP because we can’t assure the other nations of the extent of our participation. The MAP is still in chaos. Must we arm our former enemies and gamble on their choice of allies?

More specifically, accepting the present facts as to Germany and the job of Ger, what are we doing? Those who return from Germany deplore the “lack of continuity” in HICOG, the inadequacy of personnel, the inaptitude of some in higher echelons and the inability of the new staff to get under way, yet we apparently studiously avoid giving real help in the form of interpretation and advice because, I am told, McCloy was promised a “free hand” and we must “back him up.” Yet we argue among ourselves about a fiscal policy, about deficit financing, about investment policy, about trade controls, or lack of them, and still apparently have no clear concept about the terms of reference of Ruhr Control, its relation to Steel and Coal Controls, the competency and actual operation of the Military Security Board, and certainly are doing nothing to clarify our policy with respect to de-cartelization, deconcentration and removal of other restrictions to free enterprise, which should, of course, come first before we can embark on either public or private investment and fiscal programs. And as far as I know, although it was talked about weeks ago, nothing has been done of any consequence to develop an information program for the German people to secure cooperation for whatever “free enterprise” program we might have in mind. If Mr. Sawyer believes it is necessary to do a public orientation job in this country re monopoly and the limits within which industry can operate, wouldn’t you think it might be a good idea to let the Germans in on our secret?

I have attended several very interesting conferences with Reinstein since his return from Germany and I have learned a great deal. I think all the others have gained much from these discussions. But I am most impressed with the fact that we are still debating the interpretations of the articles of the Occupation Statute or the terms of reference of the multitudinous Control agencies or “what our policy is” with respect to decartelization. I have the feeling that although we realize we have a set of facts to deal with, i.e., a government in Germany and a set of reserved powers, none of us is clear enough about U.S. policy to have nerve enough to try to interpret that policy in terms of a given problem. Must we, then, sit and wait for McCloy to act in his role of independent operator and then rush to back him up, no matter what the cost?

It becomes clearer each day to me that we have permitted ourselves to get over the barrel. The new theory which was evidenced in our pre-conference policy discussion called “advance credit,” and which I tried to warn against, is now giving us the inevitable reaction. We did give Western Germany advance credit in the recent Paris conference. Sure, we said we were getting a quid pro quo from Adenauer and it appeared in the protocol of agreement between Adenauer and the High Commission, but what is happening now on two of the points: (a) although Adenauer agreed to resist the re-militarization of Western Germany, he is now openly demanding “equal rights” in European defense, (b) although he gave assurance of joining in the IAR, he now balks at formal adherence. Why? Well, he is now the Chancellor of a sovereign nation and he intends to act as such and to demand his rights. And we gave him the opportunity to do so!

You probably do not like this type of violent objection to our “policy,” to destructive criticism. Well, here’s a recommendation:

a. Let the Secretary go to the public with a frank statement of over-all policy, saying flatly that we are tired of Russian: lies and the apparent willingness of other nations to misunderstand us; that once and for all here is our position:

(1) We desire peace, but are prepared to fight to secure and maintain it.

(2) We will keep armed forces in Europe until we are convinced they are not necessary to maintain peace.

(3) We have given Germany all the authority we intend to give her and no further release of controls will be permitted until she proves her inherent strength; this includes no revision of the Occupation Statute.

(4) We intend to emphasize the activity of the MSB as a means of anticipating violations of the PRI agreement rather than waiting for commission of an overt act.

(5) We intend to enforce controls over foreign trade and to cause the German government to implement export controls.

(6) We intend to cooperate in every way in the development of a free-enterprise economy in Germany and to that end will continue a vigorous decartelization and deconcentration program.

(7) We do advocate admission of Germany into international organizations as a means of assumption of international responsibilities.

(8) We do not intend to permit any rearmament in Germany until such time as the Western Defense Organization shall voluntarily request such action.

(9) We do not intend to press for a peace treaty at this time nor for an end to the state of war, believing rather that the international political situation makes such policies unrealistic.

(10) We seek now a full economic integration of European nations because of the ever present threat to free enterprise, and realizing that such integration will mean the loss of some so-called sovereign powers, we are prepared to meet those sacrifices with whatever aid is required because we realize that a close union of free peoples is essential to resist the advance of communism, despite the cost.

(11) We realize that such a program will mean further sacrifices at home, but that is a price we must pay for peace and freedom.

Do I expect to hear such a statement? Of course not. We still have internal politics. But it would be refreshing to hear something other than double-talk and understatement. No, we will continue from one retreat to another in Europe, giving more and more to Germany because we have started a new government, it will demand its “rights” and because we fear it will fall, we can do nothing less than pay its black-mail price.

Again let me repeat that I am discouraged. I feel that our strength is ebbing daily, our power is slipping away; that we are living in fairyland believing in the sweetness of the reformed German who, in fact, is laughing at us and is making his own plans as he measures our weakness and the Russian strength. The aged Adenauer will soon pass; the younger German will come to power and in the insolence of that power will demand that which we have encouraged him to expect. Call me a reactionary if you will, but twice in my life-time the German has upset my life; I am not ready to accept him as my brother, not until he gives evidence which I can accept of his inner reformation. If there were no Russian threat, I could feel differently. Then I would have only the German to fear; now I have the unreformed German as a potential ally of Russia whose motives are clear. I feel strongly that we have gone too far, too soon, and that we are now faced with the irresistible glacial movement which we may be unable to combat—unless we are prepared to face facts and act with the leadership of courage. The daily evidences I have of the thinking of the people with whom I work indicate that they are willing only to deal with immediate problems in the frame-work of what they have accepted as “our policy” without relating each of those problems to the ultimate result. That way, in my opinion lies the danger of failure. I do not want to live in fairyland and rely upon Santa Claus. I refuse to shut my mind to facts; and constant “giving” to new German government is not making it stronger except as our ultimate opponent. I think it is time to put our policy under the microscope and look at it in its entirety; then when the stated policy seems sound, give prompt attention to the sincerity of its implementation. Somewhere in this Bureau there should be an over-all planning unit which is not harassed by the pin-pricks of hour-to-hour operating requirements.

R M C[heseldine]

Enclosure

2 news clippings³

1. The memorandum under reference here has not been identified further.
2. All brackets are in the source text.
3. Neither printed. The first considered the possibility of rearming Germany and concluded that this could be done safely only as part of an integrated European Legion, while the second, by Drew Middleton in title New York Times, December 15, 1949, reported that nationalism was the big peril facing the Federal Republic and the Occupying Powers.