862.011/4–2249: Telegram
The Acting United States Political Adviser for Germany (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
577. Personal for Murphy. Eyes Only. Reurtel 452, April 21.1
I had not intended to imply that Foreign Ministers message2 in itself was likely to throw CDU into opposition. It is much more question of how this message would be used by the SPD. I am personally of opinion that even had it been communicated before SPD party meeting, the outcome would have been about the same for the political reasons given in my 570 of April 21.3 We would then have been left with nothing to suggest to Germans if they come with split recommendation on April 25. It must not be overlooked that SPD is seeking election advantage in this controversy even over basic law and [Page 249] has directly or indirectly been the beneficiary of UK support. We, on the other hand, have tried to maintain a neutral attitude. The fact that CDU position on constitution is much closer to London decisions than SPD is by accident and not by design.
Perhaps we have misinterpreted the intention of Foreign Ministers but their instructions to Military Governors seem clear. It was stated in opening paragraph that “it is left to Military Governors to determine the time they may consider it appropriate to communicate these views to the PC, but Foreign Ministers wish that they be transmitted before opinion in PC has crystallized.” I think the British have always interpreted this phrase “before opinion in PC has crystallized” to mean before opinion in SPD has crystallized, but that is not same thing. As reported in mytel 539, April 14,4 two of three Military Governors were opposed to communicating message at once and certainly Clay has believed since the message was received, that he had discretion on timing, taking into account all of political aspects here. These political aspects relate not only to internal German politics but to attitude of other Military Governors toward the Bonn proposals. In other words, this is a double negotiation in that the positions of three Military Governors must be aligned (which is one negotiation) to be followed by negotiations with Germans, who in turn are negotiating amongst themselves.
I am not certain Department fully appreciates how wide-spread in Germany is impression that SPD can hold out for whatever it wants on constitution and that UK will support its demands to fullest extent. Steel, for example, told me in Frankfurt last week SPD must have Finanzausgleich and British were behind this demand. I feel you should know that some SPD leaders are quoting George Kennan as having stated US would eventually swing to their support irrespective of former US positions. I have not been able to confirm who or when, but these rumors are spreading.
Last night in conversation with Steel he told me it was clearly understood in Washington that Foreign Ministers’ message should be delivered at once and that Bevin had never thought Military Governors had any real discretion. I replied that this was not what the instruction said and pointed out that Koenig obviously did not have this interpretation. I reminded Steel that as a result of our meeting with Germans on April 14 in Frankfurt, that message could be delivered on April 25th whether or not Germans came with agreed proposals and that Clay had urged earlier meeting be held if possible.
The basis of Clay’s strategy, as I see it, was to find a compromise within the London decisions thereby maintaining tripartite unity, [Page 250] observe a neutral attitude as far as German political party maneuvering was concerned and finally to avoid placing Military Governors in position where they would give appearance of being dictated to by Schumacher. To my mind, this was a justifiable position but I assume from Army telecons and messages today that Department now believes time has come to communicate Foreign Ministers’ message.
Robertson proposed this morning that message be communicated today through liaison officers and Clay will agree providing Army Department so authorizes in telecon which will take place in few minutes. He has been urged to communicate message in person but is opposed to that and in fact it would be physically difficult, even impossible, to arrange for today. I have just succeeded in obtaining French concurrence to communicate through liaison officers today providing US/UK Military Governors do likewise.
You will get Clay’s personal reaction to this in message which he will shortly send and so I shall not summarize it here.5
Although I have received copy of SPD version of constitution, have just learned it is an earlier draft and does not contain revisions made last night. Shall transmit authentic text as soon as received.6
- Not printed; in it Murphy had stated that he did not understand Riddleberger’s concern that delivery of the Foreign Ministers’ message might place the CDU in opposition and asked for clarification of the points that might antagonize it. (862.011/4–2149)↩
- Ante, p. 186.↩
- Ante, p. 216.↩
- Ante, p. 237.↩
- Clay’s message has not been found in Department of State files; but see Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 432, for an indication of Clay’s reaction.↩
- Regarding the abbreviated SPD draft constitution, see footnote 4 to telegram 570, p. 246.↩