Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Mr. Gordon Dean, Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)
Dear Mr. Rusk: I am sure that during the past few weeks you have received and considered many different methods of applying a hypodermic to the United Nations’ debates in the field of international control of atomic energy and I trust that I am not presumptuous if I suggest a course of action which has occurred to me within the past few days as deserving of serious consideration.
I think the statements of Andrei Vishinsky during the past week have given the United States an opening to do something rather dramatic; and I am sure that you will agree that something dramatic is needed at this point. I refer specifically to his statements to the effect that the USSR has no objection to opening wide her doors to international inspection and his statements boasting of pretentious large-scale peace-time atomic energy projects behind the Iron Curtain. I think the United States could well afford at this time to invite representatives of all the UN countries, including Russia, to inspect our atomic energy plants upon the condition that the USSR provide the same type of inspection of her plants.
Such an inspection would exclude our purely military installations such as Los Alamos and Sandia, but it would include such American atomic energy installations as Oak Ridge, Hanford, the Argonne Laboratory and Brookhaven. Many of the complicated questions involved in establishing procedures for inspection cannot be settled in the abstract and without a preliminary view of our major installations here and the Russian installations beyond the Iron Curtain. Such a trip as proposed would furnish that preliminary view. I have thought that we might, in making such an offer, stress our interests in peace-time uses, spending considerable time on our principal peace-time achievement, namely the production of radioactive isotopes for use in the fields of biology and medicine, at the same time quite frankly showing them our production centers for uranium and plutonium.
If the Russians did not accept, we would have lost nothing and at least impressed the other countries of the world with our good intentions.
. . . . . . .
In thinking about this proposal I have visualized that the entire party could be accommodated in two or three airplanes, including a wide representation from the press of the world, and that they might spend approximately two days at each one of the four installations. At each installation they would be taken on a conducted tour but admitted [Page 225] to certain areas which are presently “classified”. Actually, little could be learned by even a competent technician which woud be of any real assistance to the improvement of an atomic energy program in any other country. Carefully prepared lectures at each installation, including displays and exhibits, could readily be provided for.
In order to secure the best possible result in this country and be completely understood in all quarters as to our purpose in making such a proposal I would think that it would be wise to explain the proposal not only to the Military Establishment but also to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy whose concurrence would be desirable if not essential.
Respectfully,