PM Files1
The Chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Oppenheimer) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Kennan)
Dear Mr. Kennan: You will hardly need to be told how much I appreciated the opportunity that we had yesterday to talk of the present state of the atomic problem.2 To me, your visit was in all ways inspiriting, not only for the important new points of which you told me, but also for the spirit in which you are approaching the problem [Page 223] and for the sympathetic and nondoctrinaire framework of your own views.
Nevertheless, there was one aspect of our talk which left me with some concern. That concern lies in the fear that we may try to move too fast, and with too much definiteness. Specifically, I feel convinced that it would be a mistake to ask the President to sketch in any detail at all what thoughts we may have about the immediate future of the control problem. On the one hand, to do so may again prejudice whatever discussions with the Soviet could take place within the next months. As an example, your suggestion of a moratorium on industrial power, once made by us, could prove a grave embarrassment in discussions with the Russians, though in itself it is a not unconstructive suggestion. It seems to me that the time for plans, proposals and systems unilaterally offered by our Government is past, if it ever existed; and if we ever again come up with a set of proposals, it should be on the basis of some prior agreement.
My second fear is equally grave. To me, the suggestions that you made seemed reasonable and consistent with the highest national interest.3 They will not seem so to many to whom the notions of safeguards and of effective control have attained a kind of rigid and absolute quality. We must be prepared to meet and overcome the arguments which hold that your proposals are too dangerous. But it appears to me that this cannot possibly be done even within the executive branch of the Government in the present climate of opinion, and in a time short enough to conform to the necessities for a Presidential decision on the “Super”. I therefore very much hope that the good work you have done will serve as an illustration of a course which we might well explore and as a proof that such a course does exist; but that it will not be necessary to formulate it explicitly or commit ourselves to it in a public Presidential proclamation of policy. An indication by the President, that without abandoning our long term objectives of international cooperation and open cooperative development, we were nevertheless interested in more modest and shorter term undertakings having the character of a moratorium would most certainly be appropriate; and there are many other things which the President could and might say to give a generally affirmative character to his remarks. On these, I think, we are in basic agreement.
With every warm good wish,
- Files retained by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.↩
- No record of the conversation under reference has been found in the files of the Department of State.↩
- On January 20, 1950, Kennan submitted an extensive report on the international control of atomic energy to the Secretary of State. This report, which will be treated in a subsequent volume of the Foreign Relations series, is described in George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 471–476.↩