Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/AC.31/219

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas F. Power, Jr., Deputy Secretary-General, United States Mission at the United Nations

confidential

[New York,] November 10, 1949.

When I spoke with General Romulo on other matters at his request, he referred to his appeal on atomic energy saying how pleased he was that as of the middle of the afternoon he had already received 223 congratulatory telegrams from all over the United States.

General Romulo said sadly that he regretted that the United States had been first to pour cold water on his atomic energy appeal. He said he would never have made it except that President Truman had said that we were ready to examine any suggestions for an improvement on the Assembly-approved atomic energy resolution. He recalled that he had not only accepted but had fought strongly for the Assembly’s resolution on atomic energy control. He was disappointed, therefore, that the United States had been the first to indicate opposition in our press statement of November 5th.¹ We should have let the Russians pour cold water on his proposal first. He observed that so far he had not had any reaction from the Russians.

I explained to General Romulo that our statement to the press had not been intended to squelch his resolution nor to reject it out of hand. We still maintained the position that if a better plan for atomic energy control could be devised, we were ready to listen.

General Romulo, in remarking on the lack of Russian comment on his proposal (Mr. Vishinsky was just starting his speech at the moment),² said that they were so terribly suspicious that he was quite certain they would not react favorably to his suggestion. He said he knew they considered him to be a stooge and would doubtless roundly berate him as a tool of the Americans.

General Romulo expounded at some length on the world’s need for effective atomic energy control and the reasons he had made his appeal. While the world had no fears as long as only the United States possessed the bomb, there were now real grounds for fear that the Russians would use the bomb in a sudden attack. Everyone knew that the United States would never launch an aggressive war and that there would be no sneak attacks from us. However, Stalin had nothing to hinder him from launching a sneak attack on New York or any other city. As long as this possibility existed, the world would fear an atomic war. He commented that the Americans said that it had always been expected that the Russians would develop the atomic bomb sooner or later. However, the fact that they now had it actually changed the situation by increasing men’s fears. He said that every possible avenue must be explored to find the means of forestalling atomic warfare.

I observed that the whole difficulty rested in the Russian refusal to accept reasonable and adequate safeguards and that there was no indication from them that they were willing to make the necessary concessions. General Romulo agreed. I said it must be perfectly clear to the whole world that it was the Russians who rejected every effort to achieve adequate protection against atomic warfare. In whatever action the Assembly took it was most important that this should be made clear to the world in language which the man in the street could understand. General Romulo agreed heartily and said that if the Russians continue to reject his and other proposals for atomic energy control, he himself would put the blame squarely on the Russians in a way which everyone would understand.

1. On November 5, a United States Delegation spokesman declined to indicate whether a letter had been received from Romulo or what the United States attitude might be on such a communication (New York Times, November 6, 1949, p. 1). On November 6, a USDel spokesman said that serious and objective consideration was being given to the Romulo proposal. The New York Times described the tone of the American announcement as cool. The New York Times also noted that the Soviet, British, French, Canadian, and Chinese Delegations had not yet commented on the subject. (Ibid., November 7, 1949, p. 16)
2. For the record of the 33rd Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, during which Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky delivered a major address, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 185.