Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/AC.31/207

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

secret

[New York,] November 9, 1949.

I met Sir B. N. Rau this morning prior to the opening of the Ad Hoc Political Committee and Mr. Hickerson’s address,¹ to explain to him our position in connection with the Indian resolution on Atomic Energy.

I told Sir B. N. Rau that we had given the most thorough and careful consideration to his resolution, and that we had also examined very carefully Mr. Malik’s address of yesterday afternoon.² I said that it was evident to us from Mr. Malik’s address that the Soviet bloc had not moved in any way from its stubborn and unproductive position, and that we had reluctantly concluded that it was not possible for us to support the Indian resolution. I said that we were particularly sorry about this decision because of our great esteem and respect for Sir B. N. Rau and our recognition of the constructive motives which were behind his resolution, but that we felt that any approach to the Atomic Energy question which did not include a complete about-face in the Russian stand would be futile and perhaps even dangerously misleading. I said that because of our great personal respect for Sir B. N. Rau, Mr. Hickerson would refrain from mentioning the Indian resolution in his address this morning, and that we hoped that it would not become necessary for us to actively oppose it.

Sir B. N. Rau said that he understood our position, and that he had not really expected the United States to support the Indian resolution. He said, however, that he was convinced in his own mind that his resolution would not hurt us at all, and that it would actually help us. He said that as he would probably observe later in the debate, it seemed to him that the delegations on this question were divided between those who sought to make whatever headway they could, and those who were unimaginative and opposed to partial headway. He said that in particular he felt that the New Zealand Delegation fell in this last category. I said that I was confident that his observation of the United States in the United Nations as a whole had convinced him that we, at least, did not belong in this category. He said that that was so.

Sir B. N. Rau said that he particularly hoped that the United States would leave other countries alone to make up their minds on this question independently. He referred to an experience which he had last year, in which the Greek Delegation told him on a particular question that they had wanted very much to support it, but were not permitted to do so. I assured Sir B. N. Rau that the United States hoped to be able to avoid anything even approaching a campaign against the Indian resolution, but told him that should we be asked by other delegations what our position was, we would, of course, have to make it perfectly clear that we were in support of the French-Canadian resolution as the only measure which we felt productive at this time. Sir B. N. Rau said that this was agreeable to him, and that he very much appreciated the frankness of our discussion and the basis on which we had determined our position. He said that he had listened most anxiously to the Soviet speech yesterday, as he had been afraid that the USSR might support his resolution. Had they done so, he said that, of course, the resolution would have been killed thereby.

Sir B. N. Rau repeated the statement which he has made several times before in private conversation, that the majority plan, in effect, contemplates a form of world government. He said that as ardent a devotee to the concept of eventual world government as he might be, he was sufficiently realistic to know that world government in any form would not come into existence during his lifetime. It was apparent that our various explanations on this point have made no impression on Sir B. N. Rau and I should be surprised if he did not at least mention this aspect of the problem prior to conclusion of the debate.

1. For the record of the 32nd Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 9, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 179.
2. At the 31st Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 8, Yakov A. Malik, the Soviet Representative, submitted draft resolution A/AC.31/L.28. This proposal specifically assigned responsibility to the United States and the United Kingdom for the failure of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to reach agreement and read in operative part as follows: “[The General Assembly] Instructs the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its work to give effect to the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946 and forthwith to proceed to the preparation of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention for the control of atomic energy, it being understood that both conventions should be concluded and put into effect simultaneously.” For full text, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, vol. i, p. 69. For the record of the 31st Meeting, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 173.