Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff on the International Control of Atomic Energy¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 14, 1949.

Present:

• Paul Nitze
• Robert Hooker
• Carlton Savage
• Gordon Arneson, U
• Henry Smyth, Commissioner, AEC
• Carroll Wilson, General Manager, AEC
• Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer, Director, Division of Research, AEC
• Dr. Ralph Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Research. AEC

During this meeting with representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, the following points were developed:

1. Since the Acheson–Lilienthal Report and the presentation of the Baruch Plan, the following principal changes have taken place:

(a) The possibility of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes is further away than was envisaged in 1946 and 1947. However, if all resources now used in the production of atomic weapons were devoted to peaceful purposes, it is possible that atomic energy for those purposes could be developed in a very few years.

(b) The idea of denaturing nuclear fuel seems much less probable now than it did a few years ago.

(c) It now seems possible that low-grade uranium ore can be utilized in producing atomic energy. This would complicate the inspection problem. It also means that the Russians can produce greater quantities of bombs.

2. As the nature of the Russian police state is not likely soon to change, there seems little possibility that the Russians will accept the majority U.N. plan for the international control of atomic energy with its requirement for (1) ownership and operation of some parts of the atomic process and (2) a comprehensive system of inspection, and anything less would probably not be safe for the rest of the world. One possible change which might be made in the present U.N. plan would be on phasing, now that the Russians have the bomb. It might be worthwhile suggesting this change for propaganda purposes even though it would not likely assure acceptance of the plan by the Russians.

3. The proposal for the Atomic Development Authority in the U.N. plan should be reexamined. As now formulated it is unacceptable to the Russians as it leaves control of the ADA in western hands; if Russia and her satellites should gain control, it would be unacceptable to us.

4. We should consider whether we could accept an international agreement to outlaw the atomic bomb. In this connection, we should study the question whether we could make an agreement not to use the atomic bomb first in the case of war.

5. It was generally agreed that regardless of what happened, we should inaugurate a program for civilian defense.

6. The rate of production of atomic bombs in the United States could be increased if we were willing to devote the required funds to that purpose. The representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission were concerned that some military authorities were expecting that a complete stockpile for war purposes should be prepared before war begins and that we should not figure on producing any after that date; the military authorities therefore were not planning to take steps to make atomic plants more defensible.

1. At the Secretary of State’s daily administrative meeting with certain operating officers of the Department, October 18, Nitze reported on the conversations being held by the Policy Planning Staff on international control of atomic energy. The summary record of the October 18 meeting indicates, without reference to substance, that a long discussion on the subject occurred. (Secretary’s Daily Meetings: Lot 58D609)