Office of the Historian

Policy Planning Staff Files

Minutes of the First Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff on the International Control of Atomic Energy

top secret
[Washington,] October 12, 1949.

Present:

  • George Kennan1
  • Paul Nitze2
  • Gordon Arneson, U
  • Col. Don Z. Zimmerman, Plans and Operations, Department of the Army
  • Lieut. Col. George W. Beeler, Plans and Operations, Department of the Army
  • Lieut. Col. F. W. Gibb, Plans and Operations, Department of the Army
  • Dr. Paul Fine, Atomic Energy Commission
  • Robert Hooker3
  • Carlton Savage4

Mr. Kennan explained that at the request of the Secretary we were undertaking to reassess the U.S. position on international control of atomic energy. In this connection we would of course examine the military implications of the atomic explosion in Russia.

Colonel Zimmerman explained that he and his associates did not speak for the JCS or the NME. He also explained that he and his associates had always considered the problem of atomic warfare on the assumption that the U.S. and its antagonist would each have a stockpile of bombs.

Col. Zimmerman and Col. Beeler then made statements to the following effect:

1.
If the U.S.S.R. should occupy Western Europe, the United States would not be able to develop the superiority necessary to take the continent, in view of the advantages which would be with the defensive in such an operation, given the use of ABC. The U.S. would then be faced with a military stalemate during which it could not be assumed that time would be running in our favor. To win a war against the U.S.S.R. therefore, it would be essential for the U.S. to hold Western Europe. The United States could not hold Western Europe by means of conventional armaments. With ABC built into balanced military forces we could defend it, assuming we had air superiority.
2.
The knowledge of the existence in the U.S. of ABC potential with balanced military forces would be the best deterrent to war.
3.
The U.K. would probably not “cave in” as a result of atomic attack or threat of attack.
4.
Russia would use the atomic bomb in war if she found that it would be desirable and effective; the threat of retaliation would not deter Russia from using it.
5.
Although no explicit decision has been made as to whether the U.S. would use the bomb in war, the fact that our military establishment is being built around it makes the nature of the decision almost a foregone conclusion.
6.
The subject of general disarmament has never been properly approached and it may be possible to devise a plan which would be both workable and acceptable to the U.S.S.R.
7.
This is the worst possible time for us to have the majority U.N. plan accepted as we now have such a tremendous superiority in our stockpile of atomic weapons.
8.
It seems likely that the Russians from now on will develop atomic weapons rapidly and make more efficient use of raw materials than we have up to this point.
9.
In summary, the U.S. should continue the development of a balanced military force and ABC, including the modernizing of our atomic production facilities; we should immediately go in for a program for civilian defense; we should plan for the defense of Western Europe; and simultaneously we should work up a program for general disarmament.

  1. Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Counselor of the Department of State.↩
  2. Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff.↩
  3. Associate Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs; Member of the Policy Planning Staff from January 23, 1950.↩
  4. Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff; Member of the Policy Planning Staff from October 16, 1949.↩