Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes on the Ninth Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, October 6, 1949

New York, October 6, 1949

secret

Representatives:

• McNaughton—Canada
• Wei—China
• Chauvel—France
• Hickerson—United States
• Cadogan—United Kingdom
• Malik—USSR

Chauvel, Chairman, opened the meeting and gave the floor to McNaughton.

McNaughton gave a lengthy detailed analysis of how the U.N. plan as approved by the General Assembly had been modified and, in his opinion, improved over the original Baruch proposals. The general approach had been to make security the criterion of what powers were to be taken away from nations and given to an international agency. In the first place, it was agreed by all that mines need not be owned by the agency but they could be licensed and operated by nations or private concerns subject, of course, to appropriate controls. Next, at the suggestion of France, it had been agreed that there would be written into the treaty principles establishing quotas in matters concerning economic and security aspects of the atomic energy industry. This was a great limitation on arbitrary powers of an agency and led to the concept of holding materials and facilities in trust, which must be administered by the agency for the benefit of the signatory states. In the third place, it had been agreed that very careful provisions which would give great protection to nations and individuals against abuses of power on the part of the agency should be written into the treaty. This would make the agency responsible to the peoples of the world within the United Nations. The United Kingdom had proposed that the production of nuclear fuel and its stockpiling be kept to a minimum consistent with proven beneficial uses. Furthermore, there had been a shift in thinking from vetoless sanctions on the part of a powerful control authority to placing more stress and importance on Article 51. The U.N. plan provided for a world cooperative in atomic energy which would give timely warning in case of violation. McNaughton concluded that all these provisions denied the Soviet contention that the United Nations plan was in fact nothing but a monopolistic trust as stated by the Soviet representatives. He stated he did not believe that the confusion on this point which has been apparent in the Soviet mind was entirely the result of a propaganda approach and hoped that his explanation might lead the Soviet representative to a better understanding of what was in the plan. He concluded that if the Soviet representatives really understood the plan, they would realize that its adoption is as much in the interest of the peoples of the Soviet Union as the rest of the world.

Hickerson (US) next spoke, recalling that at the previous meeting, Tsarapkin had presumed that the United States Delegation persisted in maintaining that control over the ultimate phases of production would be delayed indefinitely. Hickerson pointed out that the U.S. had never maintained that position. The U.S. had never taken any position on this point other than by adhering to the statement on stages appearing in the First Report in the U.N.-approved plan and also in point 8 of the British paper. Hickerson then referred to and quoted from a statement made by Mr. Osborn on this point in the 48th meeting of Committee 1 of the Atomic Energy Commission held on June 9, 1949. This made it clear that there must be a series of stages but that in these stages controls and their corresponding prohibitions would go into effect simultaneously. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to spell out stages at this time in the absence of agreement on what the control system should be. Hickerson then pointed out that when we speak of stages, we must have clearly in mind what controls we are talking about. If it were proposed to put the Soviet system of control into effect, then the U.S. would not accept this proposal because these control proposals were woefully inadequate. Their implementation would be a fraud to which the U.S. Government would not be a party.

Hickerson (US) pointed out that under the U.N. plan, it is provided that the agency would take over the ownership and managerial control of the vast atomic enterprises the world over. This could not be done overnight. As the agency recruited its personnel and acquired experience, it would take over more and more of its responsibilities and these would automatically be prohibited to nations until the complete system of prohibition and control went into effect. Prohibition of atomic weapons would then be truly effective because nations would not have the means of producing such weapons. Under such a system we would not only have effective prohibition but also a community of nations cooperating for the common good.

Hickerson (US) pointed out that although we had not spelled out stages for want of agreement on control and the impossibility of spelling them out in advance of knowledge of the development of atomic energy in various countries at the time the treaty would go into effect, this problem had not been ignored. The U.S. Government and the United Nations plan itself agreed that there must be stages, that they would be written into the treaty, and that the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as a continuing body would supervise the transition process. Hickerson recalled that the Atomic Energy Commission operates by majority vote and, therefore, the Soviet charge that the U.S. would be in a position to prolong these stages was completely unfounded.

Malik (USSR) asked McNaughton whether the point the latter had made on the differences between the Baruch–Acheson–Lilienthal Plan¹ and the United Nations Plan were major differences or not.

McNaughton (Canada) replied that he had tried to point out certain features in which the majority plan as developed, differed from the Baruch Plan. However, many important features remained unchanged.

Chauvel (France) remarked that a new fact, namely, an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union, has been commented on outside. He wondered whether we should not take this new factor into account in our discussions.

Cadogan (UK) remarked that he had found it odd that somehow in our discussions we appeared to be avoiding this point. He wondered whether it might not have some bearing on our work. Previously, some delegations had always complained that the technical basis which the other delegates accepted, was evidence that had to be taken on faith. Moreover, they had also denied its accuracy. Perhaps now supporting evidence might be put forth which might give us some technical reasons why it is felt that proposals based on inspection would give effective results. We might then get a clarity in our discussion which had previously been lacking.

Malik (USSR) next spoke, introducing his comments with the observation that he had just returned, had not had time to study in detail the record of the discussion to date, and was not sure that he understood exactly what General McNaughton and Mr. Hickerson had said. However, he had a few brief comments to make. He spoke for about one hour to make three points. The first was that although General McNaughton had spent much time trying to explain the differences between the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the majority plan, there was, in fact, no difference, which even McNaughton had admitted in reply to his previous question. Moreover, he resented the inference that the U.S.S.R. engaged in propaganda.

Malik then accused Hickerson of having refused on behalf of the United States to agree to controls over the final stages of the nuclear industry and, in particular, over the prohibition of atomic weapons. He stated that application of control over these facilities and prohibition of atomic weapons would be postponed to the Greek calends. The whole purpose of the U.S. plan was to control and prevent the development of atomic energy in other countries while the U.S. atomic weapons plants would remain uncontrolled. As far as is known, the United States had the only such plants at this time. It was not known whether other countries such as France, the U.K. and Canada had any such plants. At least, Malik was not aware of them. Therefore, the U.S. proposals were nothing but an attempt to retain for the United States a complete monopoly in this field. He requested that the United States make some concrete proposals on this matter of stages. Malik then read from the General Considerations of Chapter 3 of the Second Report a statement which he interpreted as being the United States position that raw materials sources would be the first thing controlled. He once again rejected the United States proposals which he stated were based on a monopoly in this field when everyone knew that the secret was now gone forever.

Hickerson (US) stated that he was very glad that Malik had introduced his comments by stating that perhaps he did not understand what had gone on or what had been said. Otherwise, he would be forced to conclude that the Soviet Union had either misunderstood, misinterpreted or distorted what had been said by Hickerson. He pointed out that the United States does not refuse controls over its entire nuclear industry. He also challenged the Soviet Delegate to find any place in the United Nations plan as approved by the General Assembly where it is stated that mines would be the first thing controlled by an international agency. Since his remarks had apparently been misunderstood, Hickerson suggested that his statement be reproduced verbatim in the record.

Hickerson recalled that although the statements made by the Soviet representative appeared to confirm the correctness of his assumption that the Soviet Union was not willing to negotiate the control of atomic energy except on the basis of national ownership, operation and management of dangerous materials and facilities in this field, he has not yet received a direct answer to this question. However, he was willing to await the considered reply of the Soviet Government on this important point.

Malik (USSR) requested that Mr. Hickerson give him a copy of the statement, that it need not go into the record verbatim, as this would be contrary to our rules of procedure and it was not necessary as only Malik had misunderstood what was said. Moreover, he was at a disadvantage here because his statement had not been written and therefore it would not be possible to compare texts. After some discussion as to whether a verbatim attachment was permissible or not, with the general consensus being that it was, Hickerson stated that it was only because his remarks had been distorted that he wanted the text reproduced in full. He would be glad to send a copy of his statement to Mr. Malik in the morning. He preferred to have his statement reproduced in full; otherwise, the summary record would be full of distortions. He suggested that perhaps Mr. Malik, after reading what Mr. Hickerson had really said, might wish to strike from the record the remarks based on an incorrect understanding.

Malik (USSR) wanted to know why he couldn’t have a copy that evening.

Hickerson (US) said he was quite agreeable if the Secretariat would type out another copy of the only one he had. This was done by the Secretariat.

Malik (USSR) did not believe that striking his remarks from the record was the thing to do, since it could be interpreted to be a reflection on the translators. He then argued that his interpretation re controls over mines could be justified because it did appear in the Second Report.

Chauvel, Chairman, suggested that perhaps the solution to this question of a verbatim record could come about when we receive our advance copies of the summary which would be susceptible to correction.

Chauvel, Chairman, suggested that perhaps we should begin to consider making an interim report to the General Assembly since various of its committees were about to discuss the problem of atomic energy. He suggested that at the next meeting this might be taken up and perhaps even proposals for the report be submitted.

Malik (USSR) requested the U.K., as author of the Statement of Principles, to spell out in greater detail each of the points as we came to them. He specifically requested that the U.K. make some concrete proposals on stages for the next meeting, including time elements. It was agreed that the first point on the agenda for the next meeting to be held on Thursday, October 13 at 3 p. m. would be the question of an interim report² and also points 8, 2, 3 and 5 of the U.K. paper. The usual communiqué was approved and the meeting adjourned at 7:30 p. m.

(The representatives of the five friendly Sponsoring Powers had a series of meetings on Friday and Saturday, October 7 and 8 to work out an approved interim report to the General Assembly. The conclusion of this report will be that the basic obstacle to agreement at this time is the Soviet insistence on national ownership, operation and management of the dangerous aspects of the atomic energy industry and their refusal to date to negotiate on any other basis. The Sponsors, therefore, will report that no basis for agreement has been found but that the meetings are continuing.)

1. The United States proposals introduced by Bernard M. Baruch at the First Meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, were based on a report prepared under the direction of Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State, and David E. Lilienthal, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority. This document released formally by the Department of State on March 28, 1946, was published as A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, March 16, 1946, Department of State Publication 2498 (Washington, 1946).
2. The representatives of the six Sponsoring Powers discussed the question of a report at their 10th and 11th Meetings, October 13 and 24. At the 11th Meeting, they agreed to submit a brief interim report to the General Assembly transmitting the summary records of the first ten meetings. For the text of the report, document A/1045 and Corr. 1, October 24, see GA (IV), Suppl. No. 15, p. 3.