Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes on the Eighth Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, September 29, 1949

New York, September 29, 1949

secret

Representatives:

• McNaughton—Canada
• Wei—China
• Chauvel—France
• Hickerson—United States
• Cadogan—United Kingdom
• Tsarapkin—USSR

Dr. Wei, Chairman, opened the meeting. The agenda was points 6 and 7 of the U.K. Statement of Principles.

Hickerson (U.S.) spoke to the point of national ownership. The U.N. plan provided for international operation and management of atomic energy plants. He recalled that he had asked the representative of the Soviet Union whether he insisted upon national ownership of such plants as a basis for negotiation. It appeared that the answer was in the affirmative. Hickerson also recalled that the Soviet representative had endeavored to allay the anxiety of the U.S. representative that the Soviet proposals for control, based on periodic inspection of declared facilities with a provision for special investigations, would not prevent or detect clandestine activities. He pointed out that the technical facts of the production of atomic energy did not permit of control by such means. Hickerson recalled that scientific and technical experts gave testimony in the summer and fall of 1946 which forced the UNAEC to the conclusion that not only periodic inspection, but even continuous inspection, could not prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels and atomic materials from atomic energy plants. Experience since then has confirmed this testimony. Hickerson drew upon the Sixth Semi-Annual Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, where in pages 130–136, some of the difficulties in accounting for materials are outlined. He pointed out that even before the UNAEC first met, scientists and experts in this field convinced the U.S. Government that no system of control would be effective unless it gave rights of ownership, management and operation of the dangerous aspects of this industry to an international agency acting on behalf of the world community. He repeated that U.S. support for the majority plan would continue until a better or more workable one could be devised.

Wei, Chairman, stated that he himself had read the USAEC Sixth Semi-Annual Report and commended it to his colleagues. He suggested that all might read it with profit and requested that mention be made of it in the Summary Record.

Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that any mention of this report should be made in connection with the statement of Hickerson so that the group as such would not appear to give sanction to the document of a particular government. This was agreed to after Dr. Wei indicated that he wanted his remarks on the report also to be part of the record.

Chauvel (France) then spoke, saying that he had previously given his reasons why nations should renounce management and operation of the dangerous aspects of atomic energy. These were the most important rights of ownership which must belong to the agency. This did not mean that all rights of ownership go to the agency. For example, there was provision made that plants operated by the agency would be subject to local safety laws, that their location must be decided upon in accordance with quotas and by agreement with the nation concerned, etc. Therefore, the agency was subject to international law and a better way of describing its rights of ownership would be to call them rights of trusteeship. The important thing to remember was the effectiveness of control. If any right normally held by nations would impair the effectiveness of control, that right should go to the agency. France had already agreed that the two most important rights to be renounced by nations were those of management and operation. This was the important thing. The remaining questions were juridical. If we could decide on the important thing, we could resolve the remaining ones very easily. Regarding sovereignty, Chauvel pointed out that subject to reciprocity, France will agree to limit its sovereignty in order to ensure peace and save the world. This was part of the present French Constitution. The French looked upon this from an objective point of view with effectiveness as the guiding principle. Infringement of national sovereignty cannot be considered a valid objecton to effective control.

Tsarapkin (USSR) rejected the technical arguments submitted by Hickerson against the effectiveness of inspection. He stated that these arguments were not new, that they had really no basis and were greatly exaggerated. He then referred to the unanimous conclusion of the Scientific and Technical Committee reached in September of 1946, and interpreted the conclusion “We do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible” as supporting the Soviet claim that technical means of control can be made to work. He stated that the U.S. plan was not a plan of control but a plan of ownership which the Soviet Union could not accept. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, were based on technical control, which could be made effective by the adoption of the Soviet proposals. None of the other representatives in these meetings had brought in anything new. They all continued to support the U.S. plan which was based only on ownership rather than on control. Only the Soviet plan was a plan for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and for prohibition of atomic weapons. The U.S. plan was nothing but an attempt at flagrant violation of sovereignty of nations, with an attempt to justify it on the basis of technical considerations, which were exaggerated and even imagined.

Tsarapkin stated that he had at one time asked two questions of the U.S. representative which the latter seemed to be avoiding. He wanted to know whether the U.S. was in favor of two conventions, one on prohibition, the other on control, to go into force simultaneously. He stated he wanted a clear and unambiguous answer. The other question was as follows—was the U.S. in favor of a provision that control should apply simultaneously to all stages of the production of atomic energy from the mines to the installations using or making the finished products, or does the U.S. intend to continue to resist control over the later stages of the nuclear energy industry while the rest of the world was under control? It seemed to him that the U.S. continued to maintain its previous position, which position had, in effect, been destroyed by the cogent arguments of the Soviet Union. He repeated that the U.S. plan provided for the final products of the nuclear industry to remain uncontrolled for some time. This was absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Hickerson (US) stated that he was becoming even more convinced that the Soviet representative did not understand the content of the U.N. plan of control. He was happy to explain it to him and was also happy to answer any and all questions, as this was our purpose here. Regarding the first question, Hickerson stated that control and prohibition were inseparable whether in one treaty or in two and must be solved in a single integrated solution. Hickerson recalled that the second question had been answered in great detail in the debates of the Atomic Energy Commission this year. He pointed out that in the approved plan, each phase of control goes into effect with the corresponding phase of prohibition. This was quite clear in the U.K. Statement of Principles which indicated that both control and prohibition would go into effect by stages. Although Hickerson was proud that the U.S. was the first country to put forward proposals on the control of atomic energy, these proposals had been elaborated upon, improved and finally approved by the United Nations. They were not the U.S. plan, they were the U.N. plan. Hickerson wanted to know whether the clarification of the U.S. position on stages which had been made in the UNAEC was not sufficient, and in what way was it insufficient. He was prepared to go into greater detail in this connection when the U.K. point 8, Stages, was the specific item on the agenda. Hickerson reminded Tsarapkin that he had completely misunderstood the conclusion of the Scientific and Technical Committee Report. If he read them carefully, he would see that this report made it very clear that control is in fact feasible only if the controls included management and operation by an international agency.

Dr. Wei, speaking as representative of China, emphasized that we were here to find agreement. However, we must not appear to agree in words, we must find agreement in reality. He pointed out that the real problem facing us is effective control and that effective control must conform to natural law. We could have no control at all unless we took natural law into consideration. Atomic energy was produced by natural law. A great deal of study had gone into the means of control, and there are real and great dangers to be overcome in this field. He recalled that he had participated as a scientist in the Scientific and Technical Report and in Committee 2. These committees arrived at the conclusion that international operation and management of dangerous facilities such as isotope separation plants and chemical separation plants and large reactors, was imperative for real control. As a scientist, he supported these conclusions. He also recalled that in Committee 2 on December 2, 1946 (Document AEC/C.2/W15)¹ Professor Alexandrov of the Soviet Union and Professor Zlotowsky of Poland both agreed separately that, inasmuch as isotope separation plants handle such dangerous materials, and that, in this field, science has outstripped ordinary means of control, we would be forced to rely upon managerial control.

Dr. Wei pointed out that the reason we had all given up on the Soviet proposals was that they cannot give us the necessary security. He pointed out that whenever we could prove that inspection or a lesser form of control than management and operation was sufficient, then we would accept such a lesser form of control.

Dr. Wei then brought up the question of a letter from the United Nations Press Association and from Kihss and Hamilton of the New York Herald Tribune and Times who wished to be briefed upon the discussions. It was agreed that the usual communiqué would be somewhat longer than others in that it would explain why it was necessary to hold these meetings in closed session. This was approved by all.

It was agreed that the next meeting would take place on Thursday, October 6, 1949 at 3:00 p. m. with points 6, 7 and 8 of the U.K. paper as the agenda. The meeting rose at 5:30 p. m.

1. For the pertinent portion of the record of the meeting under reference, see GA(IV), Suppl. No. 15, p. 24.