Under Secretary’s Meetings: Lot 53D250
Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
Antarctica
problem
To decide upon the next steps to be taken for the implementation of policy on Antarctica.
background
In June 1948 a policy paper on Antarctica was prepared by S/P and approved (NSC–21 paper of July 13, 19482). The gist of this was that control of territory in the Antarctic region is not essential to the security of the United States; the potential worth of Antarctica is chiefly scientific; in view of renewed activity and interest in the area and increasingly acute conflicts of interests, a settlement is desirable. The paper recommended that the United States support in principle the establishment of an international status for Antarctica; that upon agreement by the other interested governments to negotiate an international settlement, the United States in order to make its status uniform with that of the other nations concerned, announce a claim. This paper was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment that control of the Antarctic area should be maintained in the hands of friendly powers and that possible enemies of the United States should be excluded from possession of any part of the area and from participation in any international administration.
Identical aide-mémoires were handed on June [August] 9 and 10, 1948 to the missions in Washington of Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Great Britain and Norway suggesting that a solution of the Antarctic territorial problem be discussed on the basis of internationalization (condominium). At the same time it was stated orally and confidentially to these missions that the United States would expect to announce an Antarctic claim in the near future.3
The British accepted our proposal as a basis of discussion. The New Zealanders indicated favorable interest. The Norwegian reply (possibly [Page 801] not a firm position) viewed internationalization as unnecessary and as presenting certain national and international difficulties. French thinking is similar to the Norwegian. The Australians have indicated approval of scientific cooperation, skepticism about the necessity for internationalization but a desire to cooperate in working out a solution. Argentina rejects our proposal even as a basis for discussion, on grounds of national sovereignty, but offers assurances of its desire to cooperate in seeking a solution of the problem.
Chile found our proposal unacceptable on grounds of national sovereignty, alleged inconsistency of the proposal with the Rio Defense Treaty, and doubts as to the wisdom of internationalization. Chile proposed consideration of a modus vivendi, a freeze of the status quo as to claims for a period of 5–10 years, and an agreement for scientific cooperation.
The United States Navy is planning an expedition for the 1949–50 season. (The expedition has not received final Naval approval.) The Department has obtained permission for use by the Navy of port, landing and fuel facilities in New Zealand.
The British appear anxious for the United States to announce its claim, probably because of their interest in placing the United States in a position similar to the British vis-à-vis Argentina and Chile. The British have also said that if the United States does not plan to follow up on its suggestion, they will consider undertaking bilateral settlements with the Argentines and with the Chileans.
proposed course
The positions of the various countries listed above indicate the impossibility of obtaining agreement now on our proposal. EUR and ARA have therefore been studying the possibility for action which might lead to ultimate agreement upon internationalization. The best prospect seems to be offered by the Chilean suggestion, modified in order to bring it more closely into line with the United States proposal and to channel its operation towards a final settlement consistent with the terms proposed by the United States.
Briefly, an interim modus vivendi along the lines of the Chilean proposal, as the United States would desire to modify it, would: Declare the desire of the eight signatories to avoid conflicts in Antarctica; state that they are engaged in conversations looking toward a solution and are disposed to consider and discuss suggestions for methods of settling the territorial problem; that for a period of 5 or 10 years (possibly longer) any activities carried out in the area will not prejudice such territorial rights as now exist [the United States would, of course, make its claim before entering this arrangement]4 [Page 802] and will not be invoked against other signatories as a basis for claims to sovereignty; that the signatories will grant to government and nationals of each of the other signatories permission to conduct exploration and scientific research in the area of its claim; that exchange of scientific information will be carried out amongst the signatories, which signatories will encourage the dispatch of scientific and technical expeditions to the area; and that the signatory governments will create a commission to assist in coordinating plans for expeditions and to have the authority on behalf of the signatory countries to grant permission to countries other than the signatories to conduct explorations and scientific investigations in the area; the signatories will act in cooperation for the advancement of their common interests and protection of their rights in the area; prior to the expiration of the arrangement, the governments will consult regarding the advantages of meeting in an Antarctic conference.
In April 1949, NOE drafted a recommendation, concurred in by ARA, that the United States attempt to obtain an interim arrangement along the above lines (although it is far from certain that the proposal would be accepted by Argentina). In May 1949 this recommendation was reviewed by S/P, which considered that the proposed line of action falls within the general scope of the basic policy decision, and that the details require no further action by S/P.
If this line of action is to be followed, the next steps would be (1) to consult with the British as to their general attitude, and if the British raise no serious objection, (2) consult with the Chileans concerning the manner of bringing the suggestion actively to the attention of the governments concerned. (It seems preferable that this be done by the Chileans if they are agreeable.) For purposes of easing the political tensions which recur annually during the season when expeditions are in the area, it would be desirable to have this suggestion under active consideration this fall.* Moreover, the Chileans have recently taken up their suggestion in its original form with the British, whose reply will be influenced by our attitude. It is therefore desirable that a decision be made.
recommendations
It is recommended that the line of action summarized above be approved.
[Page 803]It is recommended that a letter be addressed to the Secretary of Defense informing him of the proposed step, and the reasons therefor.†
- Neither the source text nor an identical copy included in Executive Secretariat Files, NSC 21 Series, bears any indication of drafting or originating office or officers, but the paper appears to have been prepared in the Division of Northern European Affairs. The source text was circulated to the members of the Under Secretary’s Meeting (top officers of the Department of State who met as often as each week under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State James Webb to consider major policy problems) as document UM D–52, August 1. For the subsequent disposition of this paper, see the memorandum of August 22 by Assistant Secretary of State Perkins to Under Secretary of State Webb, infra.↩
- For text of the policy paper under reference here, PPS 31, June 9, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 977.↩
- For text of the aide-mémoire under reference here, see ibid., p. 996.↩
- Brackets appear in the source text.↩
- Although the principal objectives of the proposed Naval expedition for the 1949–50 season are cold weather training, exploration and scientific research, the planned flights will afford a basis for strengthening and expanding the prospective United States claim. However, in the somewhat unlikely event of an agreement along the above lines being concluded prior to the 1949–50 season, the activities of the expedition could not be used for this latter purpose. (The Department, in its exchange of communications with the Navy on this project, pointed out that an international solution was under discussion and that if a solution were reached before the date of the expedition, the expedition would, naturally, have to conform to its terms.) [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- In view of the S/P opinion cited above that this line of action falls within the scope of the basic policy decision, it is believed that the NME need not be consulted as to this action, especially as it takes full account of the JOS desire that control be retained in friendly hands and that probable enemies be excluded. [Footnote in the source text.]↩