Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

800.014 Antarctic/5–2449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Thompson)

confidential

[Washington,] May 24, 1949.

Participants:	Admiral Richard E. Byrd1
	Dr. Dana Coman, Research and Development Board Consultant2
	Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Deputy Director, EUR
	Mr. Merriam, S/P3
	Mr. Boggs, OIR/GE4
	Mr. Davis, NWC5
	Mr. Mills, NWC6
	General Snow, L/P7
	Mr. Shullaw, BC8
	Mr. Hulley, NOE
	Mr. Green, NOE

The above group met with Admiral Richard E. Byrd at 3:30 this afternoon. Admiral Byrd had indicated that he felt he might be able to be helpful in connection with the request to New Zealand for landing and port facilities for the proposed naval expedition, High Jump II.⁹ I had suggested that this occasion might afford an opportunity for those in the Department who are concerned with the problem to hear Admiral Byrd’s views on Antarctica.

Admiral Byrd led off by speaking at some length on the general subject of Antarctica, stressing its significance as an area where cold weather tests and training could be carried out to develop knowledge and techniques useful in the strategic Arctic area, especially in Northern Canada and Greenland. He indicated that in his opinion High Jump II would also be of importance in furtherance of U.S. claims.

He outlined the proposed plan of operation of High Jump II. Two special planes will take off from a carrier at a point on the other side of the pole opposite New Zealand and as near in to Antarctica as the carrier can safely approach. The planes will fly to New Zealand where they will be equipped with skis. Should an emergency develop during this initial flight, the planes might have to put in at Punta Arenas, Chile. From New Zealand they will fly to Little America where a base will have been prepared by a party with icebreakers. From Little America these special planes and possibly others will make flights designed to cross and photograph the unexplored portions of the Antarctic continent. In this connection Admiral Byrd referred to the problem of ground control points for these flights and for purposes of utilizing for mapping photographs taken by previous expeditions, but made no mention of how the problem would be met.

Admiral Byrd wondered whether it would be appropriate for him to address a personal letter to the New Zealand Prime Minister¹⁰ concerning the request for facilities in New Zealand. I said that I did not see why there should be objection to his writing such a letter on a personal basis. However, I did not make a direct reply to his suggestion that he be given a copy of our note to the New Zealanders.¹¹ General Snow suggested that since there was a chance that the New Zealand reply to our note would be a simple yes, it might well be better for Admiral Byrd to delay writing a letter to the New Zealand Prime Minister until a reply was received, since his letter might possibly result in confusing rather than helping New Zealand consideration of the request.

Approaching the general aspects of the Antarctic problem Admiral Byrd stated frankly that he had been angry at the Department’s failure to consult him last year before its decision to suggest to the claimant countries that an Antarctic solution be discussed on the basis of internationalization. He said that he was a believer in and staunch supporter of international cooperation, as evidenced by his support and sponsorship of a number of organizations and movements, but that he believed that Antarctica is an untapped reservoir of mineral resources and that the U.S. should not give away its right to the largest portion of that continent until real international cooperation and peace are assured. He repeated that 50 years is a short period in the life of a nation and that no one knows what resources may be discovered in Antarctica or what resources the U.S. may badly need. I said that there appeared now no chance of our proposal being accepted and asked Mr. Green to outline briefly the Chilean proposal¹² which I said we were now considering tentatively as a possible alternative. Admiral Byrd thought that this would be a very good approach. I noted that the U.S. would have to enter such understanding as a claimant and also that there would in any case probably be no prospect of arriving at an understanding before next spring. Admiral Byrd thought that this would be a decided advantage since High Jump II should produce an important expansion of the area which the U.S. could claim. He was decidedly of the opinion that the U.S. had been wise in postponing making an official claim and that the announcement of a U.S. claim should be delayed until after this expedition.

Dr. Dana Coman came into the meeting very late. He remarked that he did not know what had been said before his arrival but that he would like to say that it was his conviction that Antarctica should be made the first “international park”, that no nation would be giving up anything of real value in foregoing national claims in favor of such a park. The value of Antarctica is scientific, he said. Admiral Byrd said that he had said much the same thing to the group with a slightly different emphasis. General Snow remarked that he gathered that Admiral Byrd would favor internationalization “among friends”. Admiral Byrd agreed.

I said that we would keep in close touch with Admiral Byrd with regard to the request to the New Zealanders and the development of the situation.

Admiral Byrd lent me a copy of the Navy orders setting up the proposed expedition which show that he will be in charge of the High Jump II task force.

Llewellyn E. Thompson

1. Rear Admiral Byrd, in retirement since the last previous American expedition in the Antarctic in 1946 (Operation High Jump I), was scheduled to be returned to active duty to command the U.S. Navy’s proposed 1949–50 Antarctic exercise (Operation High Jump II). Planning for the operation was abandoned in August 1949.
2. Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Research and Development Board was responsible for developing and coordinating programs of research and development for military purposes and advising with regards to trends in scientific research relating to national security. Dr. Coman was President of the American Polar Society.
3. Gordon P. Merriam, member of the Policy Planning Staff.
4. Samuel W. Boggs, Special Adviser on Geography, Office of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.
5. Bainbridge C. Davis of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Office of American Republic Affairs.
6. Sheldon T. Mills, Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Office of American Republic Affairs.
7. Conrad E. Snow, Brig. Gen. Ret, U.S. Army; Assistant Legal Adviser for Public Affairs.
8. J. Harold Shullaw, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, Office of European Affairs.
9. Regarding Operation High Jump II, see footnote 1 to Koehler’s letter to Acheson, supra.
10. Peter Fraser.
11. Regarding the note under reference here, see footnote 1 to Koehler’s letter of May 3 to Acheson, supra.
12. Regarding the Chilean (Escudero) proposal of 1948 under reference here, see footnote 2 to Hulley’s memorandum of conversation of March 23, p. 795.