USUN Files
The Alternate British Representative to the Commission for Conventional Armaments ( Shone ) to the Deputy United States Representative ( Nash )
Memorandum
I. The United Kingdom Delegation formed the views set out below after examining both the United States and French Delegation’s working papers2 on an exchange of information on Conventional Armaments. They have submitted their comments on these papers for the consideration of the Foreign Office in London.
- (a)
- The major innovation in the French paper is the suggestion that the armaments industry in each country should be included in a system of reporting. So far as we can see there is no way in which this proposal could be modified so as to bring it into a manageable and useful form and we very much hope that the French Delegation will agree to drop it.
- (b)
- Apart from that, the most important point of difference between the United States and French papers is on the question of verification. On this point the French paper is obviously much closer to the original U.K. suggestions than to the amplified American plan. On reflection, we feel that, by and large, the American paper is a considerable improvement on our own original suggestions and that we could agree to it on tactical political grounds and on the assumption that the verification procedure must be accepted by all, including the Russians, before there could be any question of it being brought into operation. The original United Kingdom proposals for verification are, in our view, inadequate. If we put forward those proposals (or any others drawn up on similarly limited lines), we might be accused of dishonesty in the Assembly, since it could be alleged that the plan has so many loopholes that no State would really be bound by it. In addition, there is the danger, though it is admittedly a fairly remote one, that the Russians might profess themselves ready to accept the plan. We should then find ourselves involved in all the expense and other embarrassments of having to proceed with an admittedly ineffective scheme which the Russians would certainly evade, [Page 58] with the result that we should get no worth while information about their forces. The United States proposals, on the other hand, seem to us to provide for at least a reasonably water-tight system of verification. We should be on stronger ground in presenting a plan on the lines of those proposals to the Assembly and it is even more likely that the Russians would reject it, if only because the verification system would be effective. We should thus secure our main objective of demonstrating that it is they who are obstructing progress on this subject. If by any conceivable chance they were to accept such a plan, we could then go ahead with a reasonable prospect of obtaining information about the Soviet Union, the value of which would surely outweigh anything which we ourselves would have to reveal.
- (c)
- There are also certain other comparatively minor points of
difference between the two papers on which we have the following
comments:
- (i)
- It may be simpler to give strength reports as on any particular date rather than as an average over a period, but the former method would appear to be much more open to evasion.
- (ii)
- We are inclined to agree with the view of the French Delegation that there is no point in including small calibre automatic and non-automatic weapons. The process of verification for these weapons would presumably be extremely difficult.
- (iii)
- The United States idea for the simultaneous submission of reports seems to us attractive if only because it would strengthen the general feeling of confidence in the plan.
- (iv)
- The use in the French paper of the term “avions de guerre” raises an interesting point—are various types of aircraft such as transport planes, etc. to be included in the census? There might be some advantage in including under aircraft “operational training aircraft”, since the Germans before the last war concealed their aircraft strength by placing most of them for record purposes in this category.
- (v)
- The idea of a standard questionnaire as suggested in the French paper seems to have much to commend it.
- (vi)
- The French paper suggests that we should only have to implement the plan when all member states have also agreed to implement it. The United States paper says that the plan would not have to be implemented until all states possessing substantial military resources had accepted it. We are inclined at first sight to prefer the French suggestion. Admittedly this makes it even less likely that the plan could ever come into effect, but there are obvious dangers in suggesting that it would do so as soon as it has been accepted by the Powers possessing substantial military forces. Apart from the difficulty of defining the word “substantial” in this context, the phrase would presumably exclude some at least of the Soviet Satellites and in addition we might suddenly find that Byelorussia and the Ukraine had overnight developed separate armies which were not subject to reporting.
II. The only reply which the United Kingdom Delegation has as yet received from the Foreign Office is to the following effect. The Committee which deals with this question in London will be considering the matter on Friday, the 13th May. There is at present some [Page 59] difference of opinion amongst the Service Departments in London concerning the acceptability of the proposals of the United States Delegation. They will undoubtedly have certain modifications to suggest and they have made it clear that they would wish to examine any final proposals in detail, if a plan is fully worked out. The view held by the Foreign Office, at the official level, is that they dislike the suggestion in the French paper for an exchange of information on armaments production, which they consider to be neither practicable nor necessary. For the rest, they are inclined to feel that the United States paper offers, in general, a more suitable basis for our future work. The U.K. Delegation will not, however, be in a position to give the considered views of the United Kingdom Government until after the meeting in London on the 13th May.