Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Draft Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1949.

Senator Johnson’s statement in today’s Washington Post² and the President’s directive to the NSC to come up with a recommendation on the super-bomb project³ may result in your having discussions on the subject over the weekend. With this in mind, I am setting forth some preliminary views for whatever value they may be to you.

The question whether this Government should proceed with the development of the super-bomb is, of course, one of tremendous proportions. There are powerful arguments on both sides of the question. The ultimate decision whether to develop the super-bomb will be made from the point of view of national security in its broadest sense—self-preservation or actual survival.

In order to arrive at a rational decision, some of the questions which will have to be answered are:

1. Would the use of the super-bomb constitute a menace to civilization itself through the possibility that it would pollute the earth’s atmosphere to a dangerous extent?

2. Would our development of this weapon in itself prove a deterrent to war?

3. Assuming the Soviet Union possesses the weapon, would possession of it by the United States deter or impede in their seeking to spread their influence by methods of intimidation.

4. Would our development of this weapon make a foregone conclusion that it would be used in case of war?

5. Would our development of the super-bomb increase our military capacity as compared with increased production of atomic bombs?

6. Would the development of the super-bomb detract significantly from the economic strength of the country?

7. Would our possession of the weapon as a means of creating terror serve the interests of the United States either as a preventive of war or as a means of winning it?

8. What would be the moral effect in the United States and throughout the world of our developing this weapon of mass destruction, the ingredients of which have no peaceful applications whatever?

9. Should our decision on the question be determined by what Russia may or may not do with respect to developing the super-bomb?

In the NSC study now being undertaken, the views of authorities in the State Department, the National Military Establishment, and the Atomic Energy Commission will in normal course be considered. Before a final decision is made, I believe that the Government should have the views of other individuals, scientists and non-scientists, inside and outside the Government who are authorities on this subject.

If the President is questioned on this subject, it is suggested that he confine himself to a statement along the lines indicated below. Public discussion of the desirability of developing the new weapon could probably not be prevented, even if it were desirable to prevent it. The statement below is based on the belief that the President, pending the time when he can say something more definitive, may wish to strike a note that will encourage a rational attitude towards this emotionally-charged subject:

“Research is being carried forward on all phases of nuclear energy, including a line of research which could, although there is no certainty that it will, make possible the release of nuclear energy of an order of magnitude which would justify the description of ‘super’ bomb.

“All the necessary facts about this hypothetical weapon are not in yet, either for the purpose of properly informing the public, or making a decision of policy about it. I am not sure that all of them are even known. One thing is certain and that is that I will have nothing to say and will make no decisions until I have had a chance to consider exhaustively every relevant fact, and every factor, military, psychological, political and ethical that has a bearing on the value of a super bomb both as a deterrent to war, which is the main purpose of our military effort, or as a means of winning one if we are forced into it.”

1. This draft was prepared by Savage and Hooker of the Policy Planning Staff. A handwritten marginal notation on the source text states the following: “This was not sent but the general line was discussed by Mr. Kennan with the Secretary.”
2. In a feature article in the Washington Post on November 18, it was noted that Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, a member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, had mentioned a super-bomb in the course of a television program in New York on November 1.
3. Infra.