Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

SCI Files

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

top secret

Washington, October 10, 1949.

Memorandum for: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Subject: The Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program

Reference: Letter from the President to the Executive Secretary NSC, Same Subject Dated July 26, 1949

The enclosed report to the President on the above subject in response to the reference letter, in the form approved by you as the Special Committee of the National Security Council, has been submitted on this date to the President for his consideration.

Sidney W. Souers

[Annex]

Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on the Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program

top secret

[Washington,] October 10, 1949.

the problem

1. To prepare a recommendation to the President, as requested in letter dated 26 July 1949, on the proposal to expand the program of the Atomic Energy Commission along the lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

analysis

Considerations Presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Support of Their Recommendation for an Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program

2. Since the detonation of the first atomic bomb, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had the employment of atomic weapons under constant study, with a view to determining their optimum role in warfare. Certain developments and events, together with the results obtained from continuing studies under way, have led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend, in June 1949, an additional acceleration of the atomic energy program. Among the developments, events, and considerations which led to this recommendation were the following:

a. The growing completeness of essential information on the effects and characteristics of atomic weapons which permitted a more realistic operational appraisal of atomic weapons. Many of the necessary answers were provided following the evaluation of the Eniwetok tests (Sandstone).¹ Analyses made in the light of this new information have been revealed additional operational applications of atomic weapons.

b. The completion of preliminary estimates which have indicated that it is probable that atomic bombs may be employed economically in lieu of conventional bombs against relatively small targets.

c. The realization that technical attainments in the plutonium separation process, waste recovery, and in the U–235 process probably will permit more efficient utilization of raw materials. This fact, together with the ability to foresee with greater assurance an adequate raw material supply, makes a limited degree of increased production feasible, in so far as raw materials are concerned.

d. Continued international tension, springing from the continuing refusal of the Soviet Union to become a cooperating member of the world community, the growing United States commitments on a world-wide scale, the growing realization of the necessity to defend Western Europe in the event of Soviet aggression; confirmation in detail of the full extent of the military prostration of our Western European allies as a result of facts developed in the course of negotiations for Western Union Planning, and the Military Aid Program. All these factors indicated that as soon as practicable the element of intrinsic scarcity must be eliminated as the predominant consideration of atomic weapon use in war in order to allow the JCS greater flexibility to plan as desirable the employment of atomic bombs for operations where they could be employed more economically than other military measures. While atomic weapons do not have universal application in war, they do provide swift and tremendous striking power for certain operations at a smaller over-all cost than other means. Accordingly, the JCS consider it in the national interest to have the capability for employing them for those tasks which can be accomplished more effectively and economically by atomic weapons.

e. The vital role of our atomic capability, which led to the conclusion that it would be unsound to rely on accelerating production in time of war. The increasing vulnerability of our plants with the advent of modern improved weapons; and the obvious high priority of their destruction or sabotage in the plans of an enemy; and the significant advantages accruing from large-scale use of atomic weapons early in the period of hostilities; led to the conclusion that it was in the national interest to possess on D-Day the fissionable material necessary to give us the desired flexibility to carry out our strategic plans. This consideration recommends production on a maximum basis for the clearly foreseeable future. Fortunately, fissionable material does not deteriorate or become obsolete with the passage of time, and can be stored indefinitely.

f. The failure of our proposals in the United Nations on the control of atomic energy, coupled with the fact that the time was approaching when the United States would lose its monopoly position in the atomic weapon field. By 1956, when it was estimated that the USSR probably would have achieved a significant stockpile of atomic weapons, the JCS consider it vital to the security of this nation that we possess an overwhelming superiority in these weapons for psychological and counter atomic offensive purposes, as well as for the achievement of our strategic objectives. As regards counter atomic offensive purposes, it is the view of the JCS that the U.S. can well afford to expend several times the number of bombs in the Soviet stockpile to counter atomic attacks against the United States if such targets present themselves.

g. The indication that the development of a smaller, lighter bomb may significantly improve the deliverability of these weapons and that military considerations may lay great emphasis on this development. However, it is to be noted that a smaller, lighter bomb and applications to guided missiles will be less efficient in the utilization of fissionable material. This fact, together with the increased flexibility of employment and new concepts for the use of smaller weapons, will tend to increase the requirements for fissionable material.

3. In view of the above considerations, a restudy of the military requirements for fissionable material was initiated. Because of the inevitable 3–4 year construction time lag before appreciable results could be realized from an acceleration, the year 1956 was selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the earliest practicable target date for the attainment of a sizable increase in production rate and stockpile objective. In the calculations, wherever a minimum and maximum bracket existed for quantities of material required, the minimum figure was favored and only those military uses firmly developed or anticipated by 1956 were included, in order to stay within a production rate considered practicable of attainment in the light of known raw material limitations. Periodically the JCS will review the adequacy of the recommended production rate in the light of possible new developments in raw material availability, in the international situation, in the fields of radioactive warfare, nuclear propulsion for aircraft and submarines, new types of weapons and missiles or concepts for their use, new military uses for nuclear energy, and new intelligence on the atomic progress of the USSR.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the gain from the military standpoint of the proposed accelerated program over that which can be obtained from a continuation at the present level appears very significant in terms of lower unit cost of weapons; probable shortening of a war; increased military effectiveness; decreased logistical and manpower requirements for the prosecution of certain tasks in war; and increased flexibility in the conduct of the war, which is extremely important in view of the many imponderables now facing our planners. Furthermore, when the USSR attains a stockpile of atomic weapons, overwhelming superiority of our own stockpile and production rate will be necessary if our atomic weapon posture is to continue to act as a deterrent to war. Moreover, and from a military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the recent atomic explosion in the USSR underlines the military necessity of increased weapon production, and thus strongly reinforces and supports the justification and urgency of their previous recommendations.

Feasibility of Meeting Proposed Increased Military Requirements as Assessed by the Atomic Energy Commission

5. The Atomic Energy Commission has carefully studied the recommended program only from the viewpoint of its feasibility, and has concluded that the program is feasible.

It appears that the increase in plant necessary to meet the accelerated program would so round out the AEC production cycle as to increase production greatly in excess of the proportionate increase in capital investment and additional annual operating costs; thus enabling additional reduction of the unit cost of fissionable material.

It is evident that action which prepares the United States for the conversion of ore into fissionable material is to our national economic advantage. The refining of ore and production of fissionable material accounts for the major cost of atomic weapons. Should it develop in the future that a large amount of fissionable material is no longer necessary for the military security of this nation, the fissionable material, which does not deteriorate with age, may be relatively easily and economically refabricated for peaceful uses as these uses are developed, thus contributing to the national economy. In short, national investment in military security as derived from fissionable material is not expended, unless actually consumed in war.

The estimated costs involved call for a capital cost of about $319 million and additional annual operating costs reaching about $54 million per year when the accelerated program attains equilibrium. It is estimated that obligations will be incurred for the capital additions in accordance with the schedule contained in the Appendix² hereto.

The Commission is of the view that the increase should be handled as part of the Atomic Energy Commission’s budget, and that the purpose of the increase should be clearly explained to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Most of the construction involved is an extension and a rounding out of currently planned expansion and existing plants. Therefore there will be no appreciable delay concerning design and other engineering considerations. However, delay in initating this extension may mean added cost of construction and a greater increase in delay in achieving the proposed objective.

Examination of the raw material sources available to the United States and the Western Powers and the technological developments which will increase their utilization indicates that if the sources are developed as expected and the CPC allocates material generally in accord with the proposed atomic energy policy with respect to the U.K. and Canada, we shall have sufficient raw material to satisfy the proposed program. However, it cannot at this time be guaranteed that our exploratory conversations with the U.K. and Canada will be entirely successful in this regard. If our negotiations are not entirely successful, or if the ore available to the U.S. is curtailed for some other and unforeseen reason, the expanded plant facilities will permit greater production from such ore as is available than the present facilities.

International Political Considerations as Assessed by the Department of State

6. It may be assumed that some information concerning the expansion will become publicly known, particularly in the course of Congressional hearings thereon. The psychological effect at home and abroad of such knowledge is difficult to judge. On balance, however, the proposed expansion is not considered untimely from the point of view of possible international repercussions, particularly in view of the recent atomic explosion in the USSR, for the following reasons:

a. It is consistent with our announced determination to maintain our leadership in the field of atomic weapons in the absence of effective international control. This policy is well-known to the world, including the Soviet Union.

b. Other nations, in all probability, assume that we are producing atomic weapons to the full extent of our capabilities.

c. Recent construction activities at Hanford, representing a comparable visible increase of effort, did not produce any significant unfavorable domestic or international reaction.

d. In the light of the North Atlantic Pact and the Military Aid Program, it appears likely that Western Europe would consider an expansion of our program not only a desirable development but also positive evidence of our intent to increase our military strength for the security of all.

e. Approval of the proposed expansion would strengthen our position in the exploratory conversations with the United Kingdom and Canada, these conversations having as their objective the attaining of that allocation of effort which will bring about the most effective use of joint resources, specifically raw materials and effort.

conclusions

7. The Special Committee of the National Security Council considers that the proposed acceleration of the atomic energy program is necessary in the interests of national security based upon the following considerations:

a. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this accelerated program will constitute a net improvement in our military posture both as a deterrent to war and as preparation for war should it prove unavoidable.

b. The views of the Atomic Energy Commission that it is feasible to meet the requirements of the proposed program.

c. The views of the Department of State that the proposed expansion is not untimely from the viewpoint of possible international repercussions, particularly in view of the recent atomic explosion in the USSR.

d. The proposed program is consonant with paragraph 21-a of NSC 20/4,³ which states that as a requirement toward the attainment of our national aims vis-à-vis the USSR, we should develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

8. The Special Committee further concludes that the recent atomic explosion in the USSR increases the urgency with which this proposed program should be undertaken and executed, but this acceleration should be clearly, understood to be a projection of previous plans based upon our own capabilities, rather than as a counter-development to the Soviet explosion.

9. The Special Committee believes that, in view of the conclusions reached by the NSC in NSC 52/3,⁴ any increase in expenditures by the Atomic Energy Commission required for this proposed program should not be at the expense of other areas of the national defense program.

1. Reference is to the atomic tests conducted by the United States in April and May of 1948; the operation is described in Hewlett and Duncan, pp. 161–165.
2. The Appendix, a chart titled “Supplemental Estimate for the Atomic Energy Commission, Fiscal Year 1950: Schedule ‘A’—Summary of Capital Costs,” is not printed.
3. Dated November 23, 1948, a report to the President by the National Security Council titled “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.
4. Dated September 29, p. 385.