Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon
Arneson to the Secretary of
State
1
top secret
[Washington,] August 18, 1949.
In the course of the MAP hearings, Senator
McMahon has raised various questions with Mr. Gross concerning the
relationship of NAP and MAP to our forthcoming talks with the British
and Canadians on atomic energy (see Tabs A and B2
[Page 517]
I have followed up Mr. Gross’ recommendation that a policy statement be
prepared on this matter. The attached draft (Tab C), for your approval, has
been worked out with and cleared by Mr. Fisher and Mr. Gross of State and
Mr. Webster, Mr. Ohly, Mr. Leva3
and General Lemnitzer4 of Defense. As of the moment,
Secretary Johnson’s personal concurrence has not been obtained. Mr. Ohly,
however, in Mr. Webster’s absence, recommends that we go ahead.
If you approve, I will get the attached statement to Mr. Gross, who will
probably need it for the executive session which I understand will be held
tomorrow on MAP.
[Annex—Tab C]
Policy Statement Prepared for the Assistant Secretary
of State for Congressional Relations (Gross)
top secret
[Washington,] August 18, 1949.
In the course of the hearings on the MAP,
questions have been raised concerning the relationship between the North
Atlantic Pact and the Military Assistance Program on the one hand, and,
on the other, the forthcoming exploratory conversations to be held with
the British and Canadians on future relations in the field of atomic
energy. It is the view of the Department of State and the Department of
Defense that although the North Atlantic Pact and the MAP have an imporant bearing on the
question, the future atomic relations between the United States, the
United Kingdom and Canada can best be handled through procedures and
mechanisms other than those to be set up under the North Atlantic Pact
and the MAP.
Relations between the three countries in this field had their inception
in the wartime period of collaboration. These relations involve certain
problems unique to these three countries, which require handling through
already established channels, namely, the Combined Policy Committee.
These problems cannot be effectively dealt with through an organization
in which all members of the North Atlantic community participate.
It is fully appreciated that the collaboration and the integration of
collective defense measures which will be developed under the North
Atlantic Pact and the MAP will have an
important bearing on the
[Page 518]
exploratory talks with the British and the Canadians that are to be held
in the future. If the Military Aid Program is authorized, this may have
a very favorable bearing on our ability to work out a mutually
satisfactory arrangement for the future with the British and the
Canadians in the field of atomic energy. If the Military Aid Program
does not come into being or is authorized on an inadequate basis, one
result would be to make the working out of a mutually satisfactory
arrangement much more difficult. The U.S. Government, in conducting the
exploratory talks, should be in a position to lay great stress on the
fact that the MAP provides a new measure
of assurance not only to the British but to other members of the North
Atlantic community. Since the collective defensive strength would be
greatly enhanced by the North Atlantic Pact and by an adequate MAP, we could make clear that this has a
direct bearing on the shape of future relationships in the atomic energy
field and on the allocation of effort among the three countries.
Although the procedural mechanisms may be different, the basic
assumptions of a unified defense program under the North Atlantic Pact
are equally applicable to the tripartite questions of relationships in
the field of atomic energy. The exploratory talks will be carried out on
similar assumptions involving the most economical and efficient total
allocation of effort among the three countries. We would, of course,
insist that the British agree to measures consistent with the principle
of allocation of effort on their part in such a manner as to make the
most efficient contribution to the total program. Whether this would
require the British to terminate or curtail their present atomic energy
program would of course depend upon the technical facts which can be
developed only through the projected exploratory conversations.
Many complex problems lie ahead in considering the atomic energy matter,
problems which will require some months of study and effort to resolve.
It is the view of the executive branch of the Government that the
Military Aid Program should not and cannot safely await the completion
of these talks but should be authorized and implemented as quickly as
possible. It was with this consideration in mind that the MAP bill was drawn in such a way as to
exclude specifically atomic energy matters and to contain precise
language to the effect that
“Sec. 407. (a) Nothing in this Act shall
alter, amend, revoke, repeal, or otherwise affect the provisions of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 755).”
