817.00/2–1248
The Chargé in Nicaragua ( Bernbaum ) to the Secretary of State
Sir: With reference to this Embassy’s despatch No. 80 of February 7, 1948, and previous communications regarding negotiations for a political agreement, I have the honor to report on conversations held yesterday morning at the Embassy with Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos and Marcial Erasmo Solis and yesterday afternoon at Las Piedrecitas with the de facto Foreign Minister, Dr. Luis Manuel DeBayle.
The gist of all of the conversations was that a definite arrangement, based on Dr. Cuadra Pasos’ original proposal, appeared to have been reached, subject to assurances, or at least reasonably good prospects, of recognition by the United States. As reported in this Embassy’s memorandum of conversation dated January 9, 1948,1 with Dr. Cuadra Pasos, the proposal was for the holding of free elections in two years, various guarantees that the elections would be free, and participation of the Conservative Party in the national and local governments as well as in the judiciary and foreign services. An important feature of [Page 102] the proposal was that General Chamorro be consulted and that in the event of his refusal to adhere, Dr. Cuadra Pasos and his followers would go ahead without him.2
With the pending agreement clearly based on the possibilities of securing United States recognition, both groups were anxious to receive some advance indication from the Embassy that this would actually be the case. To General Somoza, as quoted by Dr. DeBayle, such assurances would be required to convince de facto President, Dr. Victor Román, and the newly formed Congress of the necessity for shortening their terms to the demanded two-year period. As regards the Conservatives who frankly admitted being only a minority group within the Party, advance assurances of recognition were hoped for as a means of either forcing General Chamorro into acceding to the agreement or of forcing him to give up his revolutionary plans after the extension of recognition.
In assuring them that I would be glad to transmit their request to the Department, I reiterated the now well-worn phrases regarding our non-recognition policy as preventing any participation by us in the final solution, as well as any action which might influence any political decisions taken. To their request for an expression of the Department’s thinking on the subject of Nicaragua, I read the following excerpt from Mr. Paul Daniels’ memorandum of conversation of December 10 with Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa:3
“I … suggested that it might be desirable for the Nicaraguans to work out some solution which could permit a transition into more stable political conditions with consequent benefits which should be appreciated by most, if not all, Nicaraguans.”
In leaving my home yesterday afternoon Dr. DeBayle stated that I should anticipate a request from General Somoza in the near future for a meeting to be held at my home. My response was that I would be glad to see General Somoza and that I was certain that Somoza by now understood, as did DeBayle, the limitations of any action which might be taken by the Embassy and by the Department in accordance with our non-intervention policy.
The Department’s comments are respectfully requested.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Chargé Bernbaum reported in despatch 104, February 27, not printed, that the political agreement had been signed the day before by Cuadra Pasos, General Somoza, and de facto President Victor Román y Reyes (817.00/2–2748). In despatch 130, March 8, the Ambassador in Guatemala (Kyle) transmitted the text of public statement dated March 2 (given to the press on March 8) by General Emiliano Chamorro, in his capacity as head of the Conservative Party and President of its national committee, repudiating the political pact negotiated by Carlos Cuadra Pasos with General Somoza and the de facto regime (817.00/3–848).↩
- For memorandum of conversation of the Director for the Office of American Republic Affairs (Daniels) with the Nicaraguan Ambassador (Sevilla Sacasa), see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. viii, p. 879.↩