817.00/2–748
The Chargé in Nicaragua ( Bernbaum ) to the Secretary of State
Sir: With reference to previous communications from this Embassy regarding conversations with Drs. Luis Manuel DeBayle and Carlos Cuadra Pasos,1 I have the honor to report that both gentlemen visited [Page 100] my home at Las Piedrecitas this afternoon by appointment made at their request. The subject of the conversation was political conciliation and its effect on possible recognition.
Foreseeing what was coming, I immediately made it clear in courteous but none the less decisive terms that I could not in any manner exceed the limits of my instructions on our non-intervention policy. I pointed out that whatever importance I might have was due entirely to my representative character and that any deviation from my instructions could only be counter-productive in the sense of encouraging them to believe that the Department would do something that its nonintervention policy would prevent it from doing. With this point clear, both gentlemen initiated a discussion of their respective viewpoints regarding the possibilities of averting a revolution through conciliation followed by recognition.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At this point of stalemate, Dr. DeBayle asked that I convey the viewpoints expressed to the Department. I answered that their viewpoints were already well known to the Department and that I would be glad to repeat them. In the course of the ensuing conversation, I made the observation that the situation appeared to be so critical as to render necessary immediate and effective action to avert what appeared to be an impending civil war which threatened to spread beyond Nicaragua’s borders. I made clear our preoccupation over recent developments involving, in Nicaragua, the clandestine arrival of surplus four-motored bombers, as well as of many tons of munitions from sources other than the United States, and referred in the same vein to the bellicose preparations reportedly being made by the Nicaraguan opposition. These developments, I stated had tended to place the decisions in the hands of the military, and rendered all the more necessary prompt action to bring about a political agreement which might effectively remove the danger. Upon Dr. DeBayle’s statement that Somoza had often expressed his willingness to come to an agreement with General Chamorro,2 I stated that the situation was obviously difficult and required the greatest exercise of good faith and sacrifice by all, in the interests of Nicaraguan peace. I added that the foregoing represented only my personal appraisal of the situation, and did not in any way signify the expression of any departmental policy or conditions for recognition. I repeated, in this regard, that the problem was Nicaragua’s, as was the solution.
This interview served only to highlight the apparently irreconcilable conflict which is rapidly leading Nicaragua to a possibly bloody civil war. Although well aware of the dangers inherent in the situation and of the remedies which are necessary to avert the looming catastrophe, [Page 101] Dr. DeBayle continues to concentrate his attention on what may charitably be termed a token agreement with recognition, rather than political conciliation, as its objective. Clearly desperately anxious for any solution which might avert a revolution, Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos sees himself in the hopeless position of working with the progressively limited means offered him by Somoza to convince his Party to give up its warlike plans.
The essence of the problem is that the final decisions are today, more than ever, in the hands of the military, represented by Generals Somoza and Chamorro. As seen from Managua, and subject to any unforeseen developments in Guatemala, recourse to arms can be averted only by Somoza’s willingness to offer concessions considerably more generous to the opposition than those within DeBayle’s power to grant. The possibilities of such action appear to have been rendered remote by the lift to Somoza’s morale from receipt of the two surplus Liberator bombers and of large stocks of munitions (probably from the Dominican Republic). The unforeseen developments mentioned above relate to the possibility that the revolution may, at least for the moment, be canceled by the last-minute withdrawal of assistance by the Guatemalan government and utilization of its territory as a base of operations.
Respectfully yours,