Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Western Hemisphere, Volume IX

817.00/3–348

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Bernbaum) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

confidential
No. 116

Managua, March 3, 1948.

Sir: I have the honor to report on a lengthy conversation held at my home last night with General Anastasio Somoza at his request. The subjects covered were: the political situation, with special emphasis on the conciliation pact recently negotiated by him with Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos; possible participation by the de facto Government in the Bogotá conference and the question of recognition; United States policy with regard to the belligerent utilization abroad of surplus American military equipment and American soldiers of fortune; the origin and character of the munitions landed at Puerto Cabezas during the period January 19–25, 1948; and the Costa Rican situation.

Political Situation

Shortly after his arrival, General Somoza launched upon a long monologue regarding the conciliation pacts and their anticipated effect in bringing about political tranquility.…

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General Somoza repeatedly mentioned his firm desire to guarantee free elections in 1951 in the belief that his moderate and fair handling of the political situation during the intervening period would so settle the political situation as to render it relatively safe for him to relinquish power if required to do so by the elections. He expressed his awareness of the lack of confidence in opposition circles over the ultimate freedom of the elections, and stated that he would even go to the length of jointly requesting this Embassy to guarantee the freedom of the elections if requested by the opposition to do so. He hastily added, however, that the Embassy had, unfortunately, already demonstrated its inability to accept the responsibility for such guarantees (see this Embassy’s despatch No. 104 of February 27, 1948¹). After confirming the inability of this Embassy to make or accept such guarantees in accordance with our non-intervention and non-participation policy, I observed that with both parties apparently ready and eager to abide by the results of free elections, it would be a horrible pity for a civil war to take place, owing only to the lack of guarantees necessary to satisfy one group that such elections would actually be free.

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Possible Participation by the de facto Government in the Bogotá Conference

Referring to indications that the de facto Nicaraguan Government might be invited to the Bogotá Conference, General Somoza expressed some doubts regarding the desirability of subjecting his delegation to the position of a poor relative without a vote and whose only access at the meeting would be to the few countries (Costa Rica and Dominican Republic) to which he had been formally introduced. He expressed the hope that recognition would come before the Bogotá Conference in order that Nicaragua might attend with dignity and be in a position to render its invariable cooperation to the United States.

When asked by him whether an invitation would, in my opinion, signify eventual recognition, I stated that I was naturally not in a position to answer the question but that I could venture the personal opinion that participation in the Bogotá Conference might constitute an opportunity to his Government to put forth its maximum efforts to achieve a durable political compromise satisfactory to the majority of the Nicaraguan people. Such a development, I added, could not help but have a good effect abroad. To his allegation that this constituted a vicious circle in that recognition was the key to political tranquility, I ventured the statement that I had observed a growing political intranquility culminating in revolutionary threats even before the May 26 coup which led to non-recognition, and was forced by my own experience to believe in the strong possibility that such intranquility might exist even after recognition in the absence of a political settlement satisfactory to the majority of the people. I emphasized, however, that this was merely a personal opinion and that events would demonstrate the true state of affairs.

United States Policy With Regard to the Belligerent Utilization Abroad of Surplus American Military Equipment and of American Soldiers of Fortune

Having in mind … repeated unconfirmed reports of the employment by Somoza of numerous American pilots, [I] took the occasion to reiterate to General Somoza our anxiety over the possible utilization against Americans of surplus United States military equipment and citizens. With regard to the former, I expressed to Somoza our appreciation over his cooperation in keeping the two Liberator bombers grounded and my feeling of gratification upon having learned from Dr. Luis Manuel DeBayle that their practice flight recently had been in contravention of his orders (see memorandum of conversation with Luis Manuel DeBayle of February 19, 1948²).…

With regard to the problem of American citizen adventurers, I referred to the Department’s well known and highly publicized call to all Americans living abroad not to take part in the politics of other countries. This was, I stated, the basis of the Embassy’s request to all Americans in Nicaragua not to participate in politics or under any circumstances to engage in military activities for either the government or opposition.…

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To General Somoza’s laughing comment that he would at least desire to use American commercial pilots in the event of emergency, I answered that such utilization would be contrary to our policies and could only serve to place us in a difficult position which I was certain he would not desire.… Without saying so in so many words, I clearly indicated that the Department of State would be most happy if General Somoza were to dispense with the services of any soldiers of fortune of American nationality.

Expressing his desire to cooperate with the United States in every way possible, General Somoza presented the dilemma in which he found himself—deprived of the official services of United States military personnel such as Colonel Greco³ and very much in need of such services, he was forced to turn to disreputable characters … as the only alternatives. To my comment that we would be very much happier if he secured such assistance from non-Americans, he replied that Americans, no matter how disreputable, were the only ones in whom he would have any confidence. I did not comment any further, except to reiterate the deep preoccupation of the Department of State and the difficult position in which it finds itself through the service in the Nicaraguan Air Force and Guardia Nacional of American citizens.

The Origin and Character of the Munitions Landed at Puerto Cabezas

During the course of the conversation mentioned above on the B–24’s, I asked General Somoza whether he would be in a position to give me any pertinent descriptions of the munitions which had been delivered previously at Puerto Cabezas by four flights of C–46 aircraft, which might assist in closing the loopholes which permitted their illegal departure from the United States. After a short pause, General Somoza assured me that none of the munitions, which he conceded had arrived on the C–46’s, were of American manufacture or had come from the United States. He assured me that all of the equipment was of European origin and make. He answered in the affirmative when immediately queried whether they had originally come from Brazil and appeared to be most relieved when I returned to the point that my primary interest was in verifying the illegal export from the United States of military equipment and added that I did not desire to embarrass him. In view of Somoza’s admission that the thirty-odd Venezuelans had arrived on one of the C–46’s with the munitions, and the fact that we both knew where they had come from, it was clear, even if unspoken, that the origin of the planes and of the munitions had been the Dominican Republic.…

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The conversation lasted three hours during which Somoza protested his friendship for and desire to cooperate with the United States at every opportunity. We parted in the most friendly manner possible and with his statement that he would return as soon as permitted by circumstances and my convenience. I told him, as I had previously told Dr. DeBayle, that I would be glad to see him at my home at any time.…

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Comment:

Although impressed by Somoza’s clear desire to make his pact with Cuadra Pasos a success in order to insure recognition, I did not see any indication that he was yet ready to concede enough to the opposition to jeopardize his continuation in power. He was clearly counting on an invitation to the Bogotá Conference as a prelude to general recognition which would solidify his control and permit a trip to the United States for a long overdue operation.

While probable that Somoza would utilize all means at hand to counter a dangerous revolution, I am inclined to believe, in view of his repeated protestations of cooperation and the desire for recognition, that he will minimize utilization of the two surplus Liberator bombers as well as refrain from at least openly employing American adventurers.…

Added to the information previously available regarding the B–24 Venezuelan revolutionary incident⁴ (Somoza’s admissions and attitude leave little doubt of the central part played by the Dominican Republic in the revolutionary plot against Venezuela) is Somoza’s admission that the Dominican Republic was the source of the arms as well as of the Venezuelan revolutionaries landed at Puerto Cabezas during January 19–25.

General Somoza’s careful exposition of his non-intervention policy in Costa Rica⁵ follows repeated assurances of the same nature from de facto Foreign Minister DeBayle and may be attributed to the desire to dissipate any suspicious attitudes regarding his conduct which might jeopardize recognition. Although there have been numerous allegedly reliable reports of Somoza’s military assistance to the Picado–Calderon Guardia faction,⁶ the lack thus far of any confirmatory evidence from Costa Rica would indicate that Somoza has been telling the truth. If so, this may be classified as one of the benefits thus far derived from non-recognition.

Respectfully yours,

Maurice M. Bernbaum

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Lt. Col. John Greco, Chief of the United States Military Ground Mission; the Military Mission was withdrawn in July, 1947. (817.20 Missions/2–1448)
4. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 756 ff.
5. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 488 ff.
6. Teodoro Picado Michalski, Costa Rican President, 1944–48; Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, presidential candidate, defeated by Otilio Ulate, in the presidential election of February 8, 1948.