501.BB Korea/9–1448
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bond)1
Mr. Allison and I lunched today with Dr. Patterson for the purpose of exchanging views concerning the Korean question in general, with particular reference to the consideration of this question by the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.
Dr. Patterson revealed early in the conversation a fear that north Korea was irretrievably lost to the Communists and that the only way to prevent Communist domination of the entire peninsula would be to give strong support to the government in the south. He indicated, however, that any recognition which his government might be disposed to accord to the latter would be restricted to recognition as the government of south Korea alone.
In reply Dr. Patterson was informed that the U.S. still entertains the hope that the unification of Korea can be brought about on a democratic basis with the new government in the south as a nucleus. In this connection it was pointed out that there are those who believe that the predominantly anti-Communist complexion of the people of north Korea would very definitely manifest itself with the withdrawal of Russian occupation forces from that area, particularly if there were established in south Korea a government to which the north Korean people could with good conscience transfer their allegiance. With this possibility in mind it was suggested to Dr. Patterson that, even if his government did not wish to recognize the new government in south Korea at this time as the national government, it would appear advisable [Page 1301] that it at least cast its recognition in terms which would not preclude the extension of the authority of that government at some future time to those parts of Korea over which it does not presently exercise control. With this Dr. Patterson expressed agreement.
With respect to the position of the U.S. Government in the coming General Assembly, Dr. Patterson was informed that our position, although not yet entirely firm, would be based primarily upon the following points:
- 1.
- advocacy of the view that the new government in south Korea is the only governing authority entitled to be regarded as the Government of Korea envisaged by the GA Resolution of November 14, 1947, and that it functions as such in that part of Korea to which the UN Temporary Commission on Korea had access;
- 2.
- support for efforts on the part of the General Assembly to evolve a formula by which north and south Korea, perhaps with the active assistance of the UN, might be unified, such unification to be premised on a recognition of the legitimacy of the government in the south.
Dr. Patterson indicated that he was relieved to learn that the U.S. did not propose to ram down the throat of the General Assembly the proposition that the government recently established in south Korea be recognized as the “National Government of Korea”, without further reference to the problem of unification. Dr. Patterson also appeared gratified to hear that the U.S. had under consideration plans for giving continuing economic support to the new government in south Korea should it be forced to stand alone.
Toward the end of the luncheon Dr. Patterson referred to the charges which had been made against him in the American press and elsewhere and said that he would like specifically to refute the two principal charges made. He stated that, in the first place, it was not in any sense true that he had encouraged Kim Koo or Kim Kiu Sik to attend the Soviet-sponsored unity conference at Pyongyang. In the second place, and related thereto, he emphasized that he had never held out to Kim Koo or Kim Kiu Sik the hope that separate elections would not be held in south Korea. He added that he feared that much of his reputation as a Communist which had apparently become current in military quarters in Seoul had arisen out of a frank talk which he had had with General Hodge, Colonel Watlington, and several of the younger officers of the XXIV Corps in which he had pointed out that Communism could not be lightly dismissed as a “fly by night affair” but that, on the contrary, it could be combatted successfully only if an attempt were made to understand its nature and its sources of strength and weakness.
- Initialed by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth).↩