501.BB Korea/8–1748
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)1
The purpose of this memorandum is to raise the question of the timing of the withdrawal of US occupation forces from Korea, and to formulate the basis for a Departmental position on this subject.
For planning purposes, September 15 has been designated as the date on which the actual withdrawal of US forces from Korea is to begin. In the light of the fact that the US proposes to base its withdrawal from Korea on the provisions of the UN General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, in pursuance of which the new Korean Government has been brought into being, the immediate question is whether it is in our interest to commence the process of withdrawal before the General Assembly, which is scheduled to convene on September 21, has had an opportunity to consider the extent to [Page 1277] which the new Government constitutes a fulfillment of the aims of those Resolutions.
In his telegram No. 651 of August 12 (copy attached2) Political Adviser Jacobs has recommended against the implementation of withdrawal plans prior to the convening of the General Assembly in the following words:
“Since whole chain of events now taking place in connection with our relationship with Korea is based on General Assembly resolution, we might lose all that we have gained if we initiate withdrawal, with publicity, on any date before General Assembly has considered Korean problem and reached some decision with regard thereto. In addition it seems apparent that number of other matters will be decided, or at least discussed, at next session of General Assembly which will have important bearing on our future relationships with Soviet Union. I feel we should stand firm everywhere on Soviet perimeter, including Korea, until we know more clearly what actions will be taken in General Assembly and what will be outcome of our present negotiations with respect to Berlin and rest of Germany.”
In a separate telegram, No. Zgcg 1266 of August 14 (copy attached3), General Hodge has expressed the following similar views on the same subject:
“I reiterate my recommendation that W–Day not be implemented or announced until events vis-à-vis the UNTCOK and UN General Assembly have moved to the point where withdrawal will not be met by such resistance as to jeopardize the success of our Korean operations and the early phases of stabilizing the new Korean Government. If not carefully handled as to timing, the saving of a few days on withdrawal may result in the three years of work and millions of investment in development of a substitute for Communism in Korea being literally thrown away.”
While the Department of the Army can be expected, on the basis of the views previously expressed by it on this subject, to oppose any further postponement of withdrawal as a reversal of policy, such a postponement would not in fact be inconsistent with the policy approved by the President in National Security Council Paper No. 8 so long as it were determined that withdrawal as presently scheduled would be prejudicial in terms of our long-range objectives in Korea. In its discussions with the Department of the Army on the subject of withdrawal, the Department of State has consistently emphasized the importance of maintaining “sufficient flexibility …4 in the preparation and execution of withdrawal plans to make possible changes in the implementation of such plans which UN action or other developments [Page 1278] may make advisable” (to quote from the Secretary’s letter of June 23, 1948 to the Secretary of the Army). The Department of the Army has, moreover, accepted this point of view to the extent of stipulating that the original withdrawal date of August 15 was established “as a planning convenience and not as target date in the full sense of the term” (WARX 98020 of April 21), and of qualifying the establishment of the revised September 15 date by the statement that “flexibility in implementation of [withdrawal plan] must be maintained, however, providing for either acceleration or deceleration” (WARX 86130 of July 20).
In this connection, it is worth noting that the favorable press and editorial reaction which has been elicited by the statement issued by this Government on August 12 is, in general, premised upon the assumption that the policy evidenced by that statement is one of strength and not of weakness. Were this assumption to be called into question by the announcement of our intention to begin the withdrawal of troops in advance of and without apparent reference to the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly, that support might reasonably be expected to turn to opposition.
Recommendations:
Accordingly, it is recommended:
- 1.
- That the position of the Department of State with respect
to the withdrawal of US occupation forces from Korea be
based on the following points:
- (a)
- No public announcement of the intention of the US to withdraw its occupation forces from Korea should be made until after the General Assembly has completed consideration of the Korean problem at its forthcoming session.
- (b)
- During the same period the actual withdrawal of US occupation forces from Korea should not be initiated except to the extent envisaged in the immediately following paragraph.
- (c)
- Pending public announcement of the intention of the US to withdraw its occupation forces from Korea, and prior to the actual initiation of such withdrawal, the necessary steps may be taken, without publicity, to effect an appropriate reduction and regrouping of such forces with a view to creating a compact garrison susceptible of expeditious withdrawal at an appropriate future time.
- 2.
- If the foregoing recommendation is approved, it is further recommended that an appropriate approach be made to the Secretary of the Army,* and if necessary to the President, with a view to obtaining the acceptance of the foregoing points for appropriate implementation.
The related question of the plan of action which this Government should follow with respect to the Korean problem in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will be the subject of a separate memorandum.
- Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Lovett); concurred in by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber), the Director of United Nations Affairs (Rusk), Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman), and the Counselor (Bohlen).↩
- Ante, p. 1272.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Omission as indicated in the original.↩
- Note: Draft letter to Secretary Royall is attached. [Footnote in the original. Draft letter not attached to file copy, but see letter of August 23, p. 1286.]↩