501.BB Korea/6–2048: Telegram
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State
priority
Zgcg 919. Seoul PolAd 477 and 478, June 19 and 201 are tied to this and amplify and expand it.
Latest trends in the UNTCOK indicate more foot-dragging and vacillation tactics, wherein the Australian-Canadian-Syrian stand has apparently been joined at least in part by the French and Indian [Page 1220] delegates. The commission gives a bare tacit de facto recognition to the National Assembly as it now exists, but still hedges strongly on any commitments as to its official attitude toward the validity of the 10 May elections or to carrying out the provisions of paragraph 4 of United Nations resolution of 14 November 1947 prior to the September meeting of the General Assembly. Except for China, Philippines and El Salvador, they seem to take the stand that execution of paragraph 4 would be in effect UN recognition of able [a] national government that they are not empowered to give, and that when the National Assembly reports the formation of the government as indicated in paragraph three of the resolution, the commission can only make its report and recommendations to the General Assembly, which will then determine the status of the new Korean government.
I consider there is a strong probability that we will wind up here in the next few weeks with able [a”] Korean “national” government on our hands, brought into being by the 14 November UN resolution and the presence of the UNTCOK in Korea, but without the blessing or legal christening by the UNTCOK. If this situation arises, we will be forced to revise or at least delay the implementation of current plans for withdrawal under provisions of the UN resolution. It will also create hostility toward the UNTCOK and its failures on the part of the Koreans and add fuel to the Communists’ propaganda line as well as the Soviet pressure for UN withdrawal from the scene and for troop withdrawal as the solution for the Korean problem.
Regardless of UN attitude, we are in a position where we must give the new government at least a de facto recognition very soon after its formation, turn over to it the affairs of south Korea, and nurse it through its early stages. Recognition at the same time by China and Great Britain may be possible, would greatly strengthen our hand here and would help to placate the Koreans, who have been subject to one disappointment after another since VJ day.
The attitude of the UNTCOK comes from a composite of several factors, official and personal, with the personal angle rating high.
There has never been any really high powered individual in the delegations and no strong delegate leadership has developed. Therefore, obstructionists have been able, frequently and effectively to divert the attention and actions of the commission from its basic mission.
Three leftists members of the secretariat in key positions: Schmidt, principal secretary, Milner and Engers, assistants, have also been able to cause considerable confusion among a weak delegation. (Milner, still here, is carrying on the same work.) Reliable informants say that this group has carefully gathered in, put into plausible format and forwarded to Lake Success for the record every Communist and Communist [Page 1221] front protest and threat they can obtain, in order to build up a case against the United States in Korea and to prevent successful completion of the UNTCOK’s mission under the 14 November resolution through supplying maximum ammunition to the Soviet block in the General Assembly.
Instructions from home governments apparently are based almost entirely upon their current international relationship with the United States and Soviet Russia, without any concern whatever for the future of the Koreans. With the exception of China, and possibly the Philippines, these instructions are motivated by an all out desire not to become involved in or to accept any responsibility for any part of the new Korean government.
Personality clashes and personal controversies arising within and outside of sessions have had considerable effect upon the outcome of decisions, resolutions and reports made by the commission.…
Personal desires for home life, luxurious living, bright lights, new scenes, varied entertainment, etc., etc. play a great part in their morale and individual desire to get out of Korea, and influences them strongly in any decisions for action that might keep them here in consultation. The different nationalities also desire contacts with their own people.…
Fear of incurring the ill will of the Russians permeates several of the delegations and all of the secretariat. The term “neutral actions” or “neutral viewpoint” arises frequently in their conversation. In no way, by word or gesture has the commission ever recognized the fact that the Soviets and their Communist stooges in Korea have done everything in their power to prevent any solution of the problem and sabotage the United Nations mission here. This fear of “insulting” the Russians pervades the Canadian, Australian, Indian, French, and Syrian delegates particularly.
The many press reports and editorials from the United States indicating an early withdrawal from Korea under UN resolution II have had and are having an adverse effect. The UNTCOK reasons that resolution II was worded for all of Korea while the resulting election applies only to the United States zone, and that if the United States withdraws before agreements for uniting the two zones are completed the result will be to hand Korea to the Soviet sphere. However, they show little indication of assisting in unification arrangements.
There is growing talk among delegates that the United States policy and actions in Korea have failed to carry out our aim of uniting the country as an independent nation, that we are now trying to get the United Nations pull our chestnuts out of the fire and that we are perfectly willing to abandon Korea to Communism. This idea causes resentment [Page 1222] among the delegates and we get snatches of reference to United States “imperialism” and expressions to the effect that “my nation is not in the business of doing American dirty work”, from reported conversations.
All of the foregoing factors make it extremely difficult to predict what the UNTCOK will do from day to day, except that the commission is certain to continue on a basis of timidity and cautiousness in high degree, and that their reports will be filled with hedging and loopholes which will give UN General Assembly an out to wash its hands of Korea and throw the problem of dealing with Russia back into the lap of the United States.
The overall effect on the Koreans is depressing. The National Assembly, formed as a result of the UN resolutions and of the elections supervised by the commission, now exists as a bastard organization since there is no stated UN approval of the elections. All Koreans know that the Americans and the Koreans did everything humanly possible that was suggested by the UNTCOK, including giving the Communists and dissidents full opportunity to sabotage the elections and that all members of the UNTCOK except Syria have individually expressed satisfaction with the elections. The Koreans cannot understand the current situation and are becoming hesitant in moving forward and more hesitant of approaching the UNTCOK with its problems. The Communists and dissidents are using the “I told you so” line very effectively, following up their earlier claims that the United Nations would not and could not solve the Korean problem. The National Assembly, without the formal approval of the commission, is loosing prestige and can conceivably fail to establish a stable or even a really popular or effective government in the United States zone. If, when the Assembly forms the government, the UNTCOK does not give it a full consultative service and the “face” of at least some sort of open de facto recognition prior to the meeting of the General Assembly in September, the situation here will deteriorate rather than improve as a result of the UN actions to that date. The only counter I know is for the United States to be prepared to “spur it on” in the way of de facto recognition of everything the National Assembly does as developments permit, and to give full assurances that we will recognize the sovereignty of and will give our full backing and support to the new Korean government resulting from the deliberations of the National Assembly.
We here shall continue to do all we can in the way of persuasion of delegates to carry through on the fulfilling of the 14 November resolution, and to help guide the Koreans into consultation.
- Neither printed.↩