Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BB Korea/5–2648: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Seoul, May 26, 1948.
[Received May 31—9:22 a. m.]

394. Cite Zpol 736. Particularly for eyes of Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries Armour and Saltzman and Butterworth. For about two weeks I have been wanting to comment to Department on future work of UNTCOK but due to intransigent and temperamental attitude of that body as a whole, often in my previous telegrams, I have been unable to formulate and phrase to my satisfaction what I wished to say. My feelings about our general Korea policy are somewhat similar. As time is the essence, if anything I can say is to be of any help, it must be said now. Accordingly here are my comments:

1. Of all times and places UNTCOK should have substantive representation here in Seoul on May 31 to attend opening ceremonies of new assembly or at least senior UNTCOK representative here should read on that occasion appropriate message from chairman in Shanghai. If Department agrees, hope it can prod commission into action along this line through representations to Secretariat at Lake Success.¹

2. In connection with foregoing comment, attention is invited to fact that senior UNTCOK representative here is French Consul Costilhes who by some strange arrangement has come to occupy that position. While he is affable young man he is not senior type of person who might appropriately represent United Nations at this important milestone in efforts which have cost struggling Korean people blood and tears.

3. As regards future work of UNTCOK, there is much to be done if delegates have will and courage to do it. There was some indication before they left for Shanghai that some of them had begun realize they had job to do here. However there are reports that Mughir, Vallé, Luna and Singh will not return. Am advised that Secretariat will be almost completely changed. Thus at most critical juncture, if we have UNTCOK at all, it will be reconstituted body lacking in valuable experience. As have already indicated in another telegram, there will be no Americans in Secretariat. So far as is now known, group will be heavily weighted first with French nationals and secondly with Chinese. All this seems necessary since commission could possibly wind up its work at latest in August in time for meeting of General Assembly in September. There is some rumor that UN may be contemplating smaller, residual UN group to remain in Korea during few months before General Assembly convenes and for some time thereafter to carry on any instructions which General Assembly may wish to give. I have no information [this?] should not occur until after UNTCOK as a unit has completed, before General Assembly convenes, all it can do under two resolutions of November 14. Possible it may not be too late for Department to do something in foregoing connection by: making representations at Lake Success?

4. As regards future tasks for delegates, they could perform most useful service by being here to “facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the foregoing programme” (quotation from paragraph 5 Resolution 2) by making themselves available for conferences with Korean leaders in Assembly on various matters leading up to formation of a government. They can be more helpful to American officials: first, because Koreans are likely to take advice with better grace from an international group than from US officials, thereby hoping to gain goodwill of UN; second, because it would be better for UNTCOK delegates rather than US officials to take leading part in such conferences in order avoid giving Soviets fuel for further Communist propaganda that US alone is running the Korean show for its selfish interests and, third, because there is an influential segment of American public which will go along further with Korea program if UN participates.

5. After formation of government there will remain the three specific items mentioned in paragraph 4 of Resolution 2, namely, constitution of future national security force, arrangements for taking: over of functions of government from United States command, and finally proposals or recommendations concerning withdrawal of troops. Since nothing so far as is known now can be done with respect to any of these problems as regards North Korea, commission in consultation with new government may be in position offer some very helpful suggestions for consideration by General Assembly. Three reasons why UNTCOK can be more helpful in this regard than US officials are same as those mentioned in preceding paragraph.

6. While I realize that Assembly may, as result of bickerings among its members, be unable and unwilling to make use of commission at all or to extent which it should, and while I realize limitations inherent in character and constitution of UNTCOK itself, neither US nor UN can afford to miss this opportunity to make this service available to struggling Korean people if their chosen leaders desire to avail themselves of it. As I have said elsewhere, they did nobly during election in face of threats and intimidation (which will continue) and something good (possibly not as good as we should wish) will come of mutual consultative efforts of UN, US and the Assembly if they all remain here to work together in growing appreciation of job to be done coupled with willingness to do it. If all these efforts are to fail, no alternative effort seems possible short of war or abandonment of Korea to USSR and Communism. To thus abandon Korea now could only make a mockery of our pronouncements and steps already taken against Soviet aggressiveness and subversion in other theaters of the world.

7. In connection with last sentence above, I also wish to add some comment on our own US Korea policy. Last September (in Seoul PolAd number 361, September 19²), I commented on that policy in a political atmosphere quite different from that which prevails today, Then we were milling around in spirit of frustration and defeatism. Our military experts were saying that our dwindling army forces could not meet demands made by political exigencies, at least on all fronts. To meet situation they urged “drawing in our horns” as it were and Korea was considered “expendable”. Today that atmosphere has changed and a spirit and a will to meet dangers that face us, consistent with our strength and prestige and with hopes of other peoples who must stand or fall with us, is resurgent. We are strengthening our armed forces, both as regards manpower and equipment, our propaganda has come around to calling a spade a spade, we have set our faces to task of aiding economy of those who are with us, and in certain areas we have all but said “they shall not pass”. True democratic elements have risen to occasion in France, Italy and Korea. But battle has only begun. Accordingly, I feel we cannot, on a basis of decisions which had their genesis last autumn in an atmosphere of frustration and defeatism “let Korea down” and thus belie what we are doing to contrary elsewhere.

8. Hence I have been greatly alarmed over repeated reference in American press of subject of dependent withdrawal (based on official releases) and revelations in American press (for instance article in May 7 issue of US News and World Report) of our policy with respect to Korea which seems almost to have been inspired, or how else could such secret information have gotten to press? I was therefore pleased to note change in other direction in Stewart Henshey’s (UP) article under May 24th dateline which places dependent question and our future policy with respect to Korea, which depends so much for success upon future UN action, in its proper perspective. More and more therefore in implementing our Korea policy, especially during this critical formative period in Korea, we should be on our guard against too many announcements which will upset and bewilder Korean authorities, striving to set their house in order, and give aid and comfort to enemy. Also, in implementing that policy we should keep it in tune, even if changes are required, with tempo and character of our general world-wide policy. In other words, in view of our planned increase in military strength and apparent determination of majority of American people to have firm foreign policy, we can and should give increasing attention to important matter of adjusting policy in light of developments which are entering a rapidly moving transition period.

9. Some unfortunate concrete results of above-mentioned untimely revelation of our plans are:

(A) Some influential members on UNTCOK have been “dragging their feet” because they fear we are merely using UN as tool for United States abandonment of Korea and they do not wish to be so used;

(B) Korean people are beginning to become frightened because they seem to sense we are going to abandon them at very time they are just beginning on their own; and

(C) Most doubtful whether Kimm Kiusic would ever have gone to Pyongyang if he could have had assurance that US would not abandon Korea to Communists and USSR.³

Jacobs

1. Marginal notation to this paragraph: “Tel. not recd until June 1—no action possible.”
2. Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vi, p. 803.
3. In telegram 173, June 7, 6 p. m., to Seoul, the Department reported the delay in receipt of telegram 394 until May 31, a holiday. It added that a circular telegram had been sent at 10 a. m. on June 7 to countries represented on UNTCOK and another to USUN “to serve as basis new representations to SYG”, while paragraphs 7 through 9 of 394 would be considered separately.