895.01/5–2548
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Legal Adviser (Gross)
Subject: Recognition of New Government
The anticipated formation of a National Government in Korea by July 1 raises the question of the policy to be followed by the U.S. with respect to the recognition of that Government.
[Page 1205]In endeavoring to formulate an answer to this question, it is necessary to take into account the following factors peculiar to the situation existing in Korea:
- 1.
- The special relationship which the U.S. will bear toward the new Korean Government by virtue of the former’s having been (a) a party to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and the Moscow Agreement, (b) the initiator and leading proponent of the UN General Assembly Resolutions within the framework of which the new Government will have come into being, and (c) the occupying Power from whose hands the new Government will take over authority.
- 2.
- The special relationship which the UN will bear toward the new Korean Government by virtue of the fact that the latter will have been established in pursuance of decisions of the UN General Assembly and on the basis of elections held under the observation of an agency of that body.
- 3.
- The fact that the new Korean Government, while established as a national government with jurisdiction over all of Korea, will, in terms of its effective control as well as its electoral basis, be in fact a government only of south Korea.
- 4.
- The related fact that there will be in existence in north Korea a Soviet-sponsored puppet regime which will also claim jurisdiction over the entire country and which may or may not have been recognized by the Soviet bloc as the Government of Korea.
The principal reasons to be adduced against recognition of the new Korean Government immediately upon its formation would seem to be: (1) that we should not accord it recognition until we are satisfied that it is willing and able to assume the obligations of a sovereign government and that it has a reasonable chance of survival as such; and (2) that, in view of UN participation in its establishment, we should not recognize the new Government until the UN General Assembly has had an opportunity to pass judgment on it.
In support of immediate recognition, on the other hand, it may be argued (1) that immediate recognition by the U.S. would significantly Strengthen the new Korean Government vis-à-vis the rival Soviet-sponsored regime in the north and that, conversely, the withholding of such recognition would have the opposite effect, particularly in the event of Soviet recognition of the northern regime; (2) that even without recognition, U.S. influence and prestige will be inextricably linked to the fate of the new Government and that the act of recognition would not commit us any more deeply in that respect; and (3) that the failure of the U.S. to accord recognition to the new Korean Government would, in the event of the latter’s overthrow, be interpreted [Page 1206] throughout the Far East and the world at large as having contributed to that overthrow.
It is the tentative view of this Office, taking into account the considerations set forth above, that the possible risks involved in immediate recognition of the new Korean Government by the U.S. would be outweighed by the adverse effects, in terms of U.S. prestige and the stability of the new Government, of a refusal on the part of the U.S. to accord such recognition. At the same time, we do not necessarily feel that recognition need at the outset be complete and without reservation, and are inclined to believe that a useful purpose might be served by recognizing the new Government on a limited basis pending a review of the Korean situation by the UN General Assembly at its next regular session in the fall, at which time the U.S. might wish to press for a multilateral act of recognition, or at least endorsement, on the part of the UN. A decision with respect to the limitation of recognition would, of course, have to take into account the possible effect of such limitation on the prestige and authority of the new Government vis-à-vis the puppet regime in the north.
Before endeavoring to formulate a recommendation to the President on this subject, we should appreciate the views of the Office of the Legal Adviser with respect to the following questions:
- 1.
- Is the granting of recognition on a limited basis pending subsequent action by the UN a legally tenable proposition?
- 2.
- If so, in what form should such limited recognition be cast?
- 3.
- Would recognition in the form contemplated permit the U.S.: (a) to proceed with the prompt establishment of a diplomatic mission and the accreditation of an Ambassador to the new Government; (b) to negotiate and conclude agreements with the new Government covering the liquidation of the occupation and the extension of economic and other assistance; and (c) at the same time to retain in the hands of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, during the estimated six-month period of withdrawal, jurisdiction over occupation personnel and sufficient controls over transportation and other facilities to ensure the successful execution of the withdrawal plan?
The possibility that the new Korean Government may in fact come into being considerably in advance of the estimated date of July 1—the newly-elected National Assembly being scheduled to convene within a few days—lends considerable urgency to the adoption of a firm Departmental position with respect to the recognition of that Government.