856e.00/2–2048: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
152. Past month has seen no progress here except in direction implementation truce and establishment procedure for conference. Indo Delegation seems have only vague stand most general notions of steps to be taken for reaching political agreement though is most eager hasten process. Netherlands Delegation has been bogged down in complexities of problem and is now awaiting conclusion Vredenburch’s consultations in Hague. We increasingly concerned and have now concluded negotiations would be endless if dependent upon across the table discussions with parties utilizing intermediacy GOC and starting from scratch.
In place such negotiations, we feel situation calls for formulation by Netherlands of complete plan for interim provisional federal government USI and statement conditions and terms upon which Republic would be admitted participation. Acceptance by Republic and its entry into interim government would be equivalent and take place of political agreement. Role GOC would be (1) assist settlement practical problems arising in period before admission Republic to interim government and (2) assist in discussions between parties on conditions and terms proposed by Netherlands with view obtaining agreement. Our opinion, GOC could have further and extremely important role in assisting parties agree form eventual Netherlands-Indo union, since relationship parties in future will be on this level, not on level of states in USI.
While not intending at present discuss these views with other delegations, USDel has touched on them with Vredenburch and gone fully over whole matter along above lines with Riphagen, pointing out:
- (1)
- USDel wished him realize that in its view issuance Netherlands plan for interim government and terms Republic participation is what entire situation now waiting on;
- (2)
- Netherlands should have anticipated this phase months ago and have been fully prepared;
- (3)
- USDel believed it possible arrive at plan interim government USI and conditions Republic participation which could conform essential interests both parties;
- (4)
- USDel wanted opportunity for detailed consideration Netherlands proposals before their submission GOC and Republic and would state frankly what modifications or revisions it believed would be [Page 103] necessary to make them acceptable Republic, taking account political realities of situation;
- (5)
- Both conditions for initiation political discussion had now been met, in that implementation truce was increasingly effective and procedure for conference had been established, and hence onus any further delay must rest on Netherlands;
- (6)
- USDel considered preposterous Vredenburch’s estimate that political negotiations might take 6 months and we must be able foresee time not too far off when GOC could state to Republic that proposals for interim government and Republic’s entry therein were most favorable obtainable and that Republic would either have to accept or reject and resign itself departure GOC.
Riphagen, while stating Netherlands wished form of Netherlands-Indo union be negotiated concurrently, was obviously encouraged by views expressed although he not yet prepared discuss them. He admitted that Netherlands had failed anticipate truce and had made no preparation for current stage developments, which was why Vredenburch returned Hague.
In connection above, Neher2 in long talk with Dubois February 20, expressed view that quickest way arrive at universally desired objective, namely formation USI, was through inclusion Republic representatives in interim government. Purpose Neher’s visit was clearly to set forth his views this subject. He stated once Republic leaders wholeheartedly accepted idea Republic is Negara without pretensions of sovereignty, they would be welcomed in Cabinet provisional interim government and be accorded 3 places. In reply Dubois query whether 4th place could be offered if essential, Neher stated, “We wouldn’t let plan fail if that necessary”. He indicated Dutch wanted help Indo brains in Republic government and named Hatta, Sjahrir and Leimena as Republic leaders who would be welcome, hinting Dutch would be willing use influence make Sjahrir Foreign Minister. He further offered opinion GOC with its elaborate methods could operate till doomsday without result formation USI and expressed hope Dubois would [act?] as his and Van Mook’s Ambassador in requesting help Republic leaders creation USI in conveying message good will.
Above represents first open Dutch acknowledgment in USDel’s experience that Republic leaders could make valuable contribution to USI and is most hopeful sign. Neher did not touch on status Republic in interim government but indicated he looked forward earliest creation USI. His visit believed unrelated USDel talks with Riphagen. Dubois had impression Neher eager accomplish mission before return Vredenburch who heretofore by no means anxious effect Republic’s early participation interim government.
- Repeated in telegram 64, February 24, 7 p. m., to The Hague. The Department added it “considered precipitous action Vredenburch abrogating political discussions Batavia on basis Aneta press report (Batavia’s 132 Feb 13 to Dept rptd Hague) indicative his disposition to seize upon any event as pretext for delaying implementation Renville agreement.”↩
- Netherlands Minister of Reconstruction.↩