856e.00/2–2048: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
151. Despite Renville Agreement, our earlier estimates situation here with respect divergency Netherlands and Republic aims still sound and prospects achievement pacific settlement should be weighed accordingly.
It apparently generally agreed truce so far more successful than that of October 1946 and Roem states there less opposition in Republic to Renville Agreement than to Linggadjati. However, truce itself not [Page 100] popular. Republic, having lofty conception its virtues and desserts and extent to which it supported by liberal world opinion, is inclined to make much of its sacrifices. Having accepted truce on basis realization it could expect nothing better from SC, it may regard itself as victim power combination. Formation “presidential cabinet” is indication internal difficulties it experiencing. While Dutch obtained in truce everything they asked, they strongly inclined belief delay in SC action last August would have seen their troops Djogja and Republic menace crushed. Undoubtedly some elements both sides hankering fight it out. We believe Republic Government having made choice will do best to carry out truce but lacks power do so completely. While Dutch have ability, it by no means certain they would be greatly disappointed should truce fail under circumstances justifying further action against Republic. This combination not reassuring.
Dutch-Indo relations in psychological impasse created by conviction on part of both that other has not changed materially since 1940. Since Dutch hold major power, pattern immediate future will depend largely their intentions. Dutch attitude appears strongly colored by memory pre-war conditions and former submissiveness Indos and many seem convinced only government thwarts reestablishment traditional relationship with Indos. This relationship, in view of these groups, so exemplary that Republic movement appears not so much nationalist revolt as subversive conspiracy jointly promoted by Japan and Russia. These groups presumably expect formation independent USI would not greatly lessen traditional Indo dependence upon Dutch. Vredenburch states Liberals, of whom he is representative, would never participate reestablishment colonial rule. However, his insistence that there not one honest man in Republic Government (except Leimena) and that only method dealing with Republic is by taking firm negative stand respect its demands seems scarcely more promising than attitude diehards. Elimination Republic as force Indonesia would unquestionably be regarded by Dutch as most favorable possible development. (Lack any mention Republic in Queen’s speech undoubtedly significant.) Should Netherlands delegate, in consequence, prove determined reduce Republic in interim period to completely dependent status other regards, particularly if they insist Republic give up armed forces, truce will collapse. Truce would also probably crumble should Netherlands delegate indefinitely delay conclusion political agreement (which Indo delegate fears) thus depriving Republic of benefits six principles. Nature of Van Mook’s reply to Hatta proposal that Republic enter interim government will probably throw light Netherlands intentions this respect.
Vredenburch states if Republic could swallow truce, it could swallow anything. We believe if Republic convinced it will achieve in long [Page 101] run aim of independent Indonesia in which it will have fair chance play due part, it can indeed make further concessions to Dutch in short run with respect status armed forces, foreign representatives, finances, etc. If Dutch intend create independent USI in which they have guiding role (which is necessary), it is essential in short run period ahead they win confidence and trust Republic since Republic remains main channel expression nationalist forces and, at least in comparison hot house regimes other Indo states, is government capable standing own feet.
For Dutch to succeed in policy conciliation, Republic would require great skill and patience their part dealing with Republic leaders, who noted unrealistic, visionary, demanding and even childish. However, we believe these leaders generally sufficiently impressionable to respond acts genuine friendship by Dutch and courtesies and respect shown them. Republic badly needs reassurance Dutch intentions. If new atmosphere to be created, initiative must come from Dutch since they have the upper hand. In particular Dutch must demonstrate soonest they intend establish conditions free speech, assembly and publication in order give Republic fair chance in plebiscite, on which Republic believed relying heavily. Unquestionably it to Dutch advantage for Republic look to plebiscite as its main defence rather than to maintenance full strength “national” army.
Foreign representatives. Obviously Dutch attitude this question must be based effectiveness truce. However, generous attitude on part Dutch should go far in making truce success.
Greatest immediate danger arises from likelihood Dutch have allowed selves be misled by weakness Republic Government and TNI (which not really an army) into underestimating strength movement behind Republic, which while not yet deeply involving mass Indos cannot be bottled up. While Dutch could win military victory any time, Republic forces even if dispersed would retain capability inflicting continuing critical damage to productive facilities Indonesia and might be able through acts destruction and murder render country indefinitely economic liability to Netherlands. Should such showdown by force eventuate and Netherlands prove unable deal with sabotage and intimidation except through reprisals on pattern ravaged land Losari (ourtel 1302), ground would be prepared for eventual revolt on scale probably precluding further cooperation Dutch and Indos.
Telegram follows on our views concerning methods applicable to settlement dispute.