501.BB Korea/2–1448: Telegram
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State
priority
Zgcg–190. Reference is made to my Zgcg 184, February 13. Jackson, Australian delegate, called on me yesterday afternoon, requesting that no other person be present and that no members of UN Commission be informed of his call. He seemed rather perturbed and confused and informed me that he was making trip to Tokyo at personal expense so he could get in touch with Mr. Evatt to inform him of the situation in Korea and the interior politics of the UN Commission. He expressed desire to talk to me before he left and stated that he was also going to call on General Hoo and talk the situation over with him. Jackson stated that every member of the delegation was acting strictly on instructions of his own government. Discussion brought out his opinion that some of the governments and, he felt, particularly his own, did not know enough about the Korean situation to give the detailed instructions they had given. He stated, in effect, that despite his defeat in his efforts to get Hoo and Menon fully instructed for their trip to Lake Success, that the commission now stands 5 to 3 against holding an election in South Korea alone. His discussion confirmed our belief here that the British bloc and the Syrian delegate definitely do not want to take any action that will allow US troops to withdraw from Korea until the foreseeable future. He stated that Djabi, Syrian delegate, is going back to UN (professedly for personal trip) in order to electioneer among the Moslems in the Little Assembly, and those friendly thereto, and if necessary to block US policy in Korea with hope that it will strengthen the Moslem’s hand in Palestine. He strongly intimated that Syria will sell Korea “down the river” to gain Moslem advantage on the Palestine question.
Jackson displayed little knowledge of developments in Korea, although considerable information has been furnished to the commission on this subject. He seemed quite surprised when I informed him that the Soviets had announced on February 8 the formation of the North Korean Peoples Army and had held large review in Pyongyang of well organized, well equipped, and well armed Korean troops armed with Russian weapons, equipped with Russian transportation [Page 1111] and having considerable in way of heavy weapons and artillery. He had not considered the significance of announcements made by North Korean authorities relative to this army being the army for United Korea and their many announcements pertaining to their new constitution for all of Korea. He had not considered the probability of an early announcement of the North Korean Peoples Government, nor the probability that Soviet troops might withdraw unilaterally following that and leave behind a Korean Communist army capable of invading South Korea, Prior to my statements on this line he had expressed definite opinion that the Russians will soon give in in this area and allow reuniting of Korea. What he based this on beyond his personal opinion I could not find out.
Jackson was quite concerned about an army for South Korea and indicated that he would recommend to the commission that they demand an army of 100,000 in South Korea be formed. This, he admitted, would have to be armed, equipped and trained by the US. Was insistent in demands as to what the US intended to do along this line.
Early in the conference he informed me that even if the Little Assembly directed to commission here to go ahead with elections in South Korea, the members of the present commission under current orders from home would refuse to carry out this directive. He expressed his opinion that the Little Assembly would not give such directive. In brief, his entire attitude was that he and certain other members of the commission will do everything in their power to sabotage US desire to establish anything in South Korea that can take over sovereignty at present. His attitude is never to close the door to Russian cooperation, whatever that may be. Included in his ideas were a permanent set-up from UN here with the protection and security of US troops verging on UN trusteeship as I got it. So far as I can determine, no amount of information makes any impression on him with respect to the psychological need of the Korean people for some type of sovereign representative democratic government around which non-Communists in both South and North can rally.
During the past few days plenary sessions in the commission have been devoted entirely to attempts to get resolutions instructing representatives who would return to Lake Success. The final result, after several bitter fights and filibustering, was that delegates would return uninstructed.
Menon and Hoo called on me last night, ostentatiously to say goodbye before leaving this morning. Their call resulted in about an hour’s conversation concerning the work of the commission and possible action by UN Little Assembly. Winnowed out from many words—mostly by Menon, accompanied by silent acquiescence and head nodding on the [Page 1112] part of Hoo—I gathered that Menon will carry the ball in representing the commission at Lake Success. I gathered also that he has unofficial mandate to favor election in South Korea of representatives of the people to confer with the UN Commission and the General Assembly; in other words, going to the fulfillment only of the first resolution which was passed in the General Assembly to block the Russian attempt to put off settlement for a year. He insisted that such an election would allow US to use these representatives in the formation of an interim government; that this could be carried out and the whole Korean question referred back to the General Assembly when it meets next year. I pointed out also to Menon and Hoo the probability of Soviet announcement of an independent North Korean government, with probable consequences.
My estimate of the situation is that delegates to the UN Commission on Korea, based on instructions from their government, will recommend and attempt to force a line of action that will hold US occupation in Korea indefinitely. In their conferences with Koreans they gathered support for this idea through the wide divergence of opinion of Korean politicians, whom they consulted. In view of the strife within the commission and the fact that delegates are definitely placing their national interests above any thought of the welfare of future of the Korean people, and the terrific impact that failure of positive action by UN will have on the helpless Koreans, I am of the opinion that if nothing positive and constructive comes out of the Little Assembly, it will be better in the long run to let the UN temporary commission on Korea die and withdraw now (even though this is the Soviet demand) than to let it fail of producing something concrete and for us to go ahead with unilateral government of South Korea, backing it fully and firmly. I am positive that if the Korean people get wind of the international horse trading that surrounds UN operations here, they will lose what confidence they have left in the representatives on the Korean Commission. If we further delay positive action in Korea by continuing to mark time strictly within the framework of agreements that are never carried out, as we have done for over two years, we will have no chance to salvage even a part of our Korean aims. If this occurs we will be a party to selling Korea into Communism, which is at present time definitely at its lowest ebb in the United States zone, but which can and will regain a heavy following if we continue to have nothing to offer in the way of popular government.
Jacobs has a good picture of this general situation and left this morning for Washington. His leaving was not preannounced and is reported to have been exciting to members of the commission remaining here.
[Page 1113](Personal to General MacArthur). If Jackson sees you I would greatly appreciate your analysis of his line of thought and your estimate of his future action.