501.BB Korea/2–848: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
secret
Seoul, February 8,
1948.
61. Cite Zpol 154. Reference Seoul
PolAd 57, February 6, my comments on action taken by Temporary
Commission on Korea are as follows:
- “1. It is regrettable that the Commission has failed
to take bold realistic view of its job (only Chinese and
French delegates have approximated that view) and has
thrown matter back to interim committee. Clearly what is
needed is an election at earliest possible date
(realizing without further shedding of tears that such
election cannot be perfect and that for time being at
least north Korea is lost) so that there can be set up
in south Korea a government to speak with authority for
the 20,000,000 Koreans in south Korea. This having been
accomplished the time and energy now being misspent by
Korean leaders in bickerings, self-advancement,
criticism of military government, can be devoted to
better purposes. In addition to being able to begin
constructive handling of south Korean problems, a south
Korean government established under UN auspices would be in
strong position to treat with north Korean leaders
whenever the Soviets permit or Soviet control in north
Korea relaxes or is relaxed.
- 2. Delay is what the Soviets want. Delay suits their
purposes. Have already mentioned in Seoul PolAd 43,
February 2, that Communist
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saboteurs are here. This is in
keeping with Soviet and north Korean Communist plans
revealed to us last autumn by deserters from the north.
We now have further proof of their presence as the
Commanding General received yesterday afternoon notice
of a strike by labor groups, text of which is being
transmitted in next PolAd telegram. Acts of sabotage
already committed will be reported in a separate
telegram.1 As tempo of sabotage increases,
Rightists will begin to retaliate and terrorism increase
as spectacle for UN
Commission. Only action, quick action to hold elections
can put this development in its proper perspective, viz:
in a position to be handled by an elected south Korean
Government working in cooperation with the United States
and UN
authorities.
- 3. The question which the Commission is referring back
to the Interim Committee is simple, viz: shall the
Commission proceed with observance of elections in south
Korea alone regardless of whether resulting government
is called a south Korean government or a national
government for all Korea (in the hope that north Korea
will join later). The only answer is yes. While Kim Koo,
Kimm Kiusik and some other Korean leaders prattle about
necessity for election for an all Korean government,
they will jump on the band wagon as fast if not faster
than any other leaders once they know that UN is determined to go ahead
with elections in south Korea.
- 4. Accordingly recommend that Department exercise its
best efforts to persuade (if such be possible) Secretary
General Lie and the Interim Committee to instruct the
Commission here that the presence of Chairman Menon and
Victor Hoo is not needed to enable Interim Committee to
reach decision on the question raised. I am sure that if
Menon and Hoo return, especially Menon, extraneous
questions will be raised of no pertinence to the major
issue of early elections and the establishment of a
government. Some of these extraneous questions are:
charge that south Korea is a police state; suggestion
that south Korean leaders must be consulted first;
suggestion that police chiefs be removed and neutral
aliens installed; suggestion that elections be held to
obtain consultative representatives rather than for
assemblement to establish a government; etc. These
questions, if allowed an airing at UN, will merely becloud the
main issue and befuddle the interim committee with
resulting delays. It may even mean the breaking up of
the Commission here as Victor Hoo will probably try to
get out of coming back to Korea, the Syrian Djabi is
talking of going back to New York on his own in the hope
that he can proceed to his prospective post at Buenos
Aires, Paul-Boncour will not continue to stay here long
while the Interim Committee deliberates and Salvadoreans
already restless.
- 5. I also want to mention again as I did in Seoul
PolAd No. 55, February 5, that the Commission’s decision
to bring up in the Interim Committee the aforementioned
extraneous questions is based on testimony which did not
take into account the views of any American official
here speaking officially. Few officials including myself
have been able to get word in now and then during
courtesy calls and at parties but such incoherent and
incomplete statements are woefully unsatisfactory. Only
after several strong efforts by us were high American
and Korean officials heard. The Commission called
General Hodge morning February 7, but his testimony,
which was favorably commented upon, came after decision
to refer back to Interim Committee. Reliable information
is that Commission had no intention of hearing any
Americans until after decision was made.
- 6. If Menon and Hoo do actually return to Lake
Success, General Hodge and I feel that I should also
return to be on hand in the event extraneous questions
mentioned above are introduced by them and lead in the
ensuing debate to a complete reconsideration of the
Korean problem.2 From attitude and positions taken by the
Australian, Canadian and Indian delegates, we feel that
such development may be sought by their governments and
Great Britain.
- 7. If Department can keep debate to essential facts,
all that is needed is simple directive to UN Commission to proceed
with elections in south Korea for the purpose of
establishing either a south Korean government or a
“national government” which will necessarily be
incomplete until the north Koreans can join. The
language of this directive should be emphatic but simple
so as to avoid ambiguities that exist in two present
UN resolutions on
Korea.”
