711.94/10–2848
The Acting Secretary of
State to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Souers)
top secret
Washington, October 28,
1948.
Dear Admiral Souers: You will recall that
it is provided in NSC 13/2,
“Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan”, approved
by the President on October 9, that recommendations on the subject
of the Far Eastern Commission are to be submitted separately.
Omission of the section on this subject from NSC 13/2 was necessitated by the inability of the State
and Army Departments to reach complete agreement on certain language
in the pertinent section in NSC
13/1.
I am now able to inform you that the enclosed draft paragraph on this
subject proposed by the Department of the Army has been accepted by
the Department of State. It is accordingly requested that
[Page 880]
appropriate steps be taken
to secure the Council’s approval for the paragraph and to
incorporate it in NSC 13/2.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
top secret
Agreed State-Army Draft for Incorporation
in
NSC 13/2
9. Far Eastern Commission. The United
States Government should ensure for its own part, and urge upon
other FEC member Governments,
that policy proposals considered
by the FEC be confined strictly to policy
matters directly related to the fulfillment by Japan of its
obligations under the Terms of Surrender, and be couched in
broad terms leaving questions of implementation and administration to SCAP. The position of the United
States should further be based upon the fact that inasmuch
as these surrender terms, as
envisaged by the Potsdam Declaration, have been substantially
implemented ,
the
policy
making
functions
of
the
FEC
have
in
effect
been
substantially
carried
out. On matters still within the
purview of the FEC, such as
civil aviation policy in Japan, the United States Government
should seek to establish as promptly as possible firm United
States positions and then adopt an aggressive and positive
attitude, by direct discussions with FEC member Governments and by forceful backing in
the FEC of policies desired by
the United States. In matters of urgency, where it has become
evident that, after efforts to achieve maximum international
support, agreement cannot be promptly reached, we should not
hesitate to use the interim directive. SCAP should also be encouraged to make greater use
of his authority as sole executive for the Allied Powers, asking
where necessary for the United States Government’s views. On the
other hand, the United States Government should not hesitate to
render assistance to SCAP by
elucidating its interpretation of previous directives and
general policies, notably those appearing in the “Basic
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”.2
