Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–748: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

secret
us urgent
niact

Washington, October 7, 1948—6 p. m.

Telmar 52. ReMartel 32, Oct 5,¹ background material and comments on Foreign Minister Wang’s proposal provided as follows:

1. US Draft Treaty on Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan closely similar to that proposed for Germany was circulated to Governments of China, Soviet Union and UK by former Secretary Byrnes in March 1946 and released to press in June 1946. Draft provided system of inspection by quadripartite Commission of Control acting by majority vote. Proposals welcomed in principle by Chinese and British Governments, went unacknowledged by Soviets. Let drop by US in light Soviet disinterest and virtual rejection by Soviets at Moscow in April 1947 of similar treaty for Germany. British inquired informally in March 1947 whether US still supported Draft Treaty for Japan and expressed view such demilitarization treaty should be concluded prior to conclusion general Peace Treaty. Noncommittal reply given.

2. US is now committed to policy of complete and continuing Japanese disarmament expressed in Potsdam Declaration, FEC Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan and FEC policy decision of February 1948 on Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan. This policy presents no difficulties during the pre-treaty period of continued occupation. It seems clear, however, as stated in Kennan’s report following his Japan trip, that if Russia continues to present threat to world peace which she does today, we must either have no peace treaty at all and retain Allied forces in Japan or we must permit Japan to re-arm at least to extent that it no longer constitutes an open invitation to military aggression. If on other hand Russia’s military-political potential and economic capabilities weaken in relation to those of Western Powers, if it appears that this situation will endure for some time, and if Japanese society is not too vulnerable politically, we might place our reliance for Japanese security on Russia’s self-interest in keeping faith as signatory to a disarmament and demilitarization treaty. Such a treaty without Russian participation would be valueless or positively harmful. Possibility above conditions will be realized appears problematical at this time, however. Desirability of postponing decision oh Japanese long-range security arrangements until more could be known of future course of Soviet policy was therefore recognized in policy paper on Japan approved today by National Security Council,² which provides:

“The Post-Treaty Arrangements. United States tactical forces should be retained in Japan until the entrance into effect of a peace treaty. A final U.S. position concerning the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be formulated until the peace negotiations are upon us. It should then be formulated in the light of the prevailing international situation and of the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan.”

3. Believed here strong possibility Wang’s proposal at least in part due Soviet inspiration and may have been suggested to him by Soviet Ambassador during conversations late August and early September at Nanking, perhaps in return for Soviet compliance 1945 Agreement on Dairen and Manchurian railways. This fits in with Soviet Ambassador’s statement here to FEC on September 23 that no limitations should be placed on peaceful Japanese industry and trade, and that controls to ensure against a revival of Japanese war industry should be exercised “for a period of several years … by those powers most interested in preventing new Japanese aggression”. (Another factor to be considered is that Chinese may hope by means of demilitarization treaty to obtain agreement to many of their desired Japanese levels of industry.) There is reason to believe Soviets have become alarmed over evidences of a shift of US policies in Japan, policies which had previously been sufficiently in accord with their own desires so they could afford to stand aside, and that they are now attempting to bring about new Japan control arrangements in which they can gain effective part. Fearful over evidences of US shift of emphasis from reform to stability and possible later intention to re-arm Japan in our service, they may be seeking to bind us to our 1946 demilitarization proposal before we can successfully withdraw from it. While Soviet preferred position obviously that which would ensure continuing Japanese disarmament while giving them direct share in control machinery, as evidenced by Panyushkin’s statement to FEC, Soviets may hope through Chinese proposal at least to obtain disarmament objective should preferred position prove impossible of attainment. At same time Soviets could remain free themselves to subvert Japan through trade pressures and political penetration.

4. In light of above policy considerations taken in conjunction with fact that present precarious position Chinese Govt is such that risk must be recognized it may be supplanted by other entities before a fraction of proposed duration of such a treaty has passed, and also taking into account the conjectured origin of Wang proposal, it is recommended you personally and orally, and as informally as possible, reject this proposal, pointing out that now is not the time to make decisions on this subject. It is suggested you point out that Japan is already disarmed. In this connection you may wish to refer to speech of Chang Chun³ Sept 28 concerning his recent trip to Japan as personal representative of Gimo⁴ in which he said inter alia “SCAP has done thorough job in disarming Japan the past three years … On strength of her present resources and technical know-how, Japan’s chance of building up adequate military defense to cope with another war is slim indeed.” It can also be indicated that this Govt has of course no plans of re-arming Japan, while at the same time it is quite clear that Soviet Govt does have every intention of gaining as much control in Japan as possible with view of drawing Japan into its orbit, and in present circumstances this Govt can take no action which would merely be exploited by Soviets and redound to their advantage.

Lovett

1. Not printed.
2. Supra.
3. General Chang Chun, former President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier), recently on a visit to Japan.
4. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.