[Enclosure]
Mr. Joseph B.
Keenan to the Secretary General of the Far
Eastern Commission (Johnson)
restricted
Washington, July 16,
1948.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Inquiries have
been made concerning the release of certain Class A suspects in
Japan.
These inquiries, as I understand, were four in number:
- (a)
- Why were Class A suspects released in August of 1947
and February 1948?
- (b)
- What inter-Allied consultations, if any, took place
prior to the release of these suspects?
- (c)
- What further trial, if any, is contemplated for these
released suspects?
- (d)
- What were the original charges filed against the
suspects released in August 1947 and February
1948?
The Class A suspects included, of course, 27 of the 28 defendants
indicted and put on trial before the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East. Admiral Nagano, now deceased, was
selected as one of the accused, although he was not one of the
suspects originally.
The Investigating Division of the International Prosecution
Section of SCAP undertook the
task of unearthing such evidence as might be available against
all of these suspects. Since this Investigating Division was not
instituted until the early part of 1946, and since there were
many duties to be performed in preparing the necessary data for
the trial of the 28 indicted, there was some delay required in
completing the investigations of the suspects already in
custody. By August of 1947 the Investigating Division had
completed all of the work with reference to some Class A
suspects and had obtained all the information that they felt, in
a practical sense, they would be so able to obtain. In those
instances where the investigation was completed and where
examination of the data available to the legal staff of the
International Prosecution Section demonstrated that there was
not sufficient evidence to justify prosecution, recommendations
were made that these suspects
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be released. Most of them were in Sugamo
Prison. Some who were aged and infirm were under house arrest.
They were released from prison because it was not compatible
with the principles of justice to keep them for a prolonged
period of time as suspects without specific charges being
presented before some tribunal indicating the precise nature of
their claimed guilty conduct. As a matter of fact, there was
some criticism voiced by reason of the fact that they were held
for a long period of time without formal specific charges by way
of indictment being lodged against them. Exigencies of the
moment, however, made it most impractical if not impossible to
act upon their cases before the time that such action was taken
in releasing them.
Those released were so released because in the judgment of the
International Prosecution Section the interests of justice did
not justify their being held in prison for a longer period. Of
course, the fact that they were so released would not prevent
any of them being accused and tried in any appropriate court at
any later date, should any evidence appear subsequently to
justify such action.
Answering interrogatory (b), the dossiers
on these were forwarded to the War Crimes Office in Washington.
There they were examined and certain recommendations were made,
although prior and subsequent thereto, the data in the file of
each suspect was examined by members of the legal staff of the
International Prosecution Section. The cases were divided among
the staff and assigned to individual members thereof for
examination and recommendation. Among those examining such files
were legal representatives of Allied Nations on the staff of the
International Prosecution Section. In such instances, as lawyers
and members of the International Prosecution Staff, these
representatives of Allied Governments made their recommendations
as to apparent guilt or innocence and ultimately whether or not
the suspect should be released or held for trial on Class A
charges. However, no one of the legal representatives of Allied
Nations attempted to speak for his own Government. In such
instances, reservations were made by Allied prosecutors in
submitting their recommendations as to release, these
reservations being that such Allied prosecutors were acting only
as aids on the staff of the International Prosecution and not as
representatives of their Government in determining its policy in
the premises.
The decision on releasing the suspects was based solely on
available data and the judgment of the lawyers as to whether or
not there was evidence to conclude that the cases were
susceptible of successful prosecution; in some instances it was
felt that while there was slight
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evidence of participation, such
participation was of a minor nature, or after the declaration of
war. Where the suspects fell in the latter category, it was felt
that there was no warrant for prosecution. The ultimate
responsibility for recommending their release was taken by
myself as Chief of the International Prosecution Section in
carrying out my duties as outlined in the Charter establishing
the International Military Tribunal.
It was felt that it would be utterly impractical to submit all of
the data contained in these files to the Governments of the 11
nations and await the delay that most surely would occur. Such
procedure would have required a continuance of the imprisonment
of the suspects without formal, specific charges being lodged
before a proper tribunal, which was considered to be in gross
violation of the existing rules of enforcement of criminal law
among civilized nations. The decision to release, under the
circumstances above outlined, was made in view of the fact that
the release involved no adjudication of the issues and, as
stated before, nothing would prevent subsequent prosecution if
the facts and circumstances later were to so justify it.
With respect to (c), there is no further
trial contemplated for these released suspects by the
International Prosecution Section. There is no further trial
contemplated for any of the suspects on charges of planning,
negotiating and waging aggressive warfare in violation of
treaties, assurances, or international law.
In view of the greatly prolonged proceedings before the present
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, it will
undoubtedly be well understood that no reasonable estimate of
the time involved in such subsequent proceedings could be safely
made.
In regard to (d)—reference to the original
charges filed against the suspects—other than the fact that they
were suspected of being violators of Class A crimes of planning,
negotiating and waging aggressive wars, no further
specifications were alleged against them. There were no formal
charges made against them other than as suspects whose actions
should be investigated and weighed in determining whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted against them for such
Class A offenses.
Most of these suspects were well along in years and although many
of them had taken some part in the aggressive wars, or in some
cases, propaganda, in no instance was evidence available to
justify the conclusion that they should be indicted and brought
to trial before the International Military Tribunal
representative of all the nations.
Very truly yours,
