Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

711.94/9–1648: Telegram

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper)¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, June 12, 1948.

C 61433. Reurad W 83364 and W 83408.²

Section 1. The peace treaty.

1. No comment.

2. No comment.

Section 2. Security matters.

1. These measures are in full force and effect at the present time and have guided the occupation from its inception. My views as to the dangerously low level of force now available are on file with the Department of the Army. Any inference which might be drawn from this paragraph that our forces can be safely reduced is entirely unrealistic and fallacious.

2. No comment.

3. The Ryukyu Islands. There is no more important step in the development of a western Pacific defensive frontier for the protection of the United States than is embodied in this proposed policy provision. The delay which heretofore has retarded the firm American resolution of this matter should give way at once to the positive statement of policy so excellently expressed in this provision and the vigorous implementation thereof.

4. No comment.

5. The Japanese police establishment. The present modest police force designed to meet the minimum requirements in the preservation of internal peace and order and enforcement of Japanese law has already been severely criticized by other allied governments both in the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission. Any further expansion of this force can be expected to have very explosive international reactions and expansion clearly beyond actual police necessity would be most difficult to defend without Far Eastern Commission concurrence.

Section 3. The regime of control.

1. The general concept of leaving to the Japanese people a maximum of freedom in the administration of the internal affairs of their government has long guided the occupation. Many of the major measures taken in the reformation of the political economic and social structure of Japan to conform to allied objectives have been taken without direct compulsion and with increasing evidence of Japanese initiative and resourcefulness, and steady strides are being made toward the ultimate pre-treaty objective stated in this provision. It must be borne in mind, however, that so long as the American people continue to bear the burden of covering the Japanese indigenous food deficit and the partial rehabilitation of its economy, a continuing responsibility will devolve upon the occupation to insure by vigilant inspection and observation at all levels of governmental and private activity that every practical effort is made by the Japanese themselves to minimize that burden. This demands at least the minimum of requisite personnel.

2 and 3. The Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan. While perhaps impossible of realization, I believe that the policy herein proposed should be a preliminary step toward the complete elimination of these two agencies from the control of Japan. They were created to cover a period now completed, under present conditions have outlived their usefulness, and are clearly outmoded. The surrender terms conforming to the Potsdam Declaration have been substantially implemented and the policy making functions of the Far Eastern Commission have in effect been substantially carried out. This was the mission of the commission and its continued existence now actually hampers the accepted processes of diplomatic coordination. Such matters as reparations, level of industrial output, etc. have been hopelessly bogged down in international disagreement and the commission’s existence merely handicaps the normal diplomatic efforts of solution. The Allied Council for Japan, never a constructive agency in the occupation, has now, in the light of an operating Japanese Government, become so unrealistic that it rarely carries a single item of business on the agenda of its meetings.

Section 4. Occupational policy.

2. The requirement “after consultation with the United States Government whenever the exigencies of the situation so permit” would so hamper the Supreme Commander as to render impossible the orderly and effective exercise of his executive authority. Furthermore, despite existing policy which already confines to a minimum compulsion upon the Japanese Government in its enforcement of basic reforms required under the surrender terms, the details involved in the execution of his mission should properly continue to lie within the sound discretion of the Supreme Commander.

3. The administration of the purge program has now been completed, except insofar as concerns the screening of future applicants for public service and direct action where material falsehood, concealment or fraud has been disclosed. The purge policy is drawn from the first condition of the Potsdam Declaration which reads as follows: “There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest …”. This condition was among those, accepted by the Japanese in the terms of surrender. It was first translated into the basic directive from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander (JCS 1380/15)³ and thereafter on 19 June 1947 confirmed by the Far Eastern Commission as part of the allied post-surrender policy for Japan.⁴ The directives issued by the Supreme Commander in implementation of that policy (SCAP ins 548 and 550 of January 4, 1946)⁵ were as mild as action of this sort conceivably could be. Punitive action required by the American and allied policy directives was never resorted to, all implementing action having for its sole purpose a shift in the leadership of Japanese political, economic and social life. Such implementing action has been a responsibility of the Japanese Government, under careful SCAP observation, and has been inherently just throughout. The Supreme Commander, as a matter of fact, has been bitterly attacked by Russia, China, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and in sections of the American and British press for the excessive mildness in the administration of the purge program. The directive of the Far Eastern Commission is explicit in this matter and I question the authenticity of SCAP action in positive derogation thereof until the commission has altered its directive accordingly.

4. Occupation costs. A complete misconception exists concerning the nature and extent of the occupation burden upon the Japanese economy. Detailed explanatory reports have been made to Department of the Army representatives, demonstrating that the occupation costs have largely been confined to the category of a public works program under which little of resource is permanently removed from the Japanese economy. Such facilities as have been constructed to house the garrison are greatly inferior to those made available in the Zone of the Interior and upon termination of the occupation will revert to the Japanese as much needed additional housing units. Furthermore, those who have criticized this phase of the occupation, from ignorance or bias, have greatly exaggerated conditions actually existing, and the implication that an unnecessary burden has been placed upon the Japanese economy is entirely fallacious and devoid of factual basis.

The program construction of necessary operational facilities and housing essential or maintenance of the forces is practically finished. In the field of supply, labor and service, procurement is restricted to minimum essentials with controls as closely parallel as practicable to those employed in the ZI for similar requirements, with constantly increasing application of restriction and control being applied.

5. Economic recovery. No comment.

7. Property matters. This problem is an enormously complicated one which is almost insoluble with the limited personnel available. Everything possible is ‘being done in this respect with present forces. The final disposal of property of UN members and their nationals will involve the release of such property now utilized by occupation forces. Positive and continuing measures are in effect to reduce such use to the absolute minimum and to accomplish releases as rapidly as possible. Present estimates are that the residual requirements for use of such properties by occupation forces as of 1 July 1949 will not be substantial.

8, A, B and C. No comment.

8, D. The Japanese Government is not now and never has been restricted in the proportion of the budget it may allocate to educational purposes. The only requirement of the Supreme Commander therein has been that provision be made for the revenue to cover this as well as any other item of governmental disbursement. This matter was thoroughly discussed in my recent message C 60956 dated 26 May 1948.⁶

9. War crimes trials. The conclusion of the trial of the war crimes “A” suspects must await the judgment of the international court which has been hearing the cases. It is impossible to bring pressure upon the court for greater expedition in this matter. Action with respect to class “B” and “C” suspects is now being expedited as much as is possible.

10. No comment.

Section 5. State Department representation.

An independent State Department representative reporting directly to Washington would introduce into Japan a divided command responsibility. This would not only vitiate the firmly established principle limiting the executive and administrative authority to the Supreme Commander—a status which repeatedly and successfully has been used to prevent interference by other powers in the executive administration of Japan—but could only result in friction and unsettlement of the coordinated balance heretofore existing between the several executive departments in the orientation of American policy. The inference that the proposal finds justification in the fact that other nations have ambassadors assigned to Tokyo is misleading. Other nations merely have missions assigned here, the heads of which in some cases, as was the case of the American Mr. George Atcheson, have been given the personal rank of ambassador. They do not, however, exercise any of the normal ambassadorial functions nor deal directly with officials of the Japanese Government. The proposal that a United States ambassador be assigned here to act directly under the State Department and yet work with SCAP in a secondary capacity would in my opinion do much to undermine that efficiency in operation which heretofore has resulted from application of the principle of unity of command. The Japanese would play the ambassador against the Supreme Commander, and vice versa, until the present orderly administration yielded to disorder and intrigue. The present organizational setup integrating the office of the political advisor among the other sections of general headquarters has functioned admirably. No change therein should be effected until a treaty of peace has restored to the Japanese Government normal diplomatic relations with the chancellories of the world.

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MacArthur

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1. Received by the Department from the Department of the Army.
2. Neither printed; they concerned PPS/28/2, May 26 (NSC 13, June 2).
3. November 3, 1945, Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 428.
4. Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, 1st report, p. 49.
5. Political Reorientation of Japan, pp 479, 482.
6. Not found in Department files.