Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

894.628/5–448

The Department of State to the Australian Embassy ¹

Aide-Mémoire

The Department of State has considered the aide-mémoire of the Australian Embassy dated May 4, 1948,² in which it is stated that the Australian Government is concerned over certain recent developments considered indicative of a tendency on the part of the occupation authorities in Japan to resolve unilaterally matters properly within the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission.

Before commenting seriatim on the matters raised in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire, the Department of State wishes to clarify its understanding of the proper functions and responsibilities of the Far Eastern Commission and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, respectively, in the occupation of Japan.

It is provided in the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, that the functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

• “1. To formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished.
• “2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.”

The Supreme Commander is to “issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto”, and is to act as “the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan.”

It is the clear sense of these provisions—indeed the effective supervision and control of a nation of the size and complexity of Japan permits of no other interpretation—that the FEC is to determine the general policies and principles according to which Japan is to carry out its obligations under the Terms of Surrender, but that the Supreme Commander is to bear continuing, direct responsibility, guided by directives of the FEC in all matters on which such directives have been issued to him, for the effectuation by Japan of the Terms of Surrender, with all that that responsibility entails for the supervision of Japanese political, economic and social affairs and the advancement of Allied interests and purposes in Japan generally. It would be manifestly undesirable and impracticable for an eleven-nation body in Washington to attempt to do more than set the broad framework within which the Japanese occupation should proceed, and, conversely, it is necessary that the Supreme Commander should have broad discretionary powers to take action with regard to problems arising in Japan which must be promptly and decisively dealt with if the occupation purposes are to be successfully accomplished.

As the United States Representative on the Far Eastern Commission stated to the Commission on March 18, 1948, it is the view of this Government that the authority of the Supreme Commander is derived from several sources:

(1) The directives of the United States Government issued before the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission;

(2) The policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission;

(3) The interim directives issued by the United States Government in accordance with the Terms of Reference; and

(4) The general authority of the Supreme Commander as “the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan”.

As the United States Representative also indicated, it is the view of this Government that the Supreme Commander’s status as “the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan” empowers him, pending a policy decision of the FEC, to take action in many instances when the administrative necessities of the occupation require it, although he has received no controlling directive expressing a policy decision. The Supreme Commander is not only within his rights in taking action in such circumstances, but it is incumbent on him as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to do so.

Turning, in the light of these considerations, to the specific matters referred to in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire, the Department of State desires to comment as follows:

Japanese Whaling

The views of the United States Government on this question have been conveyed in a separate communication³ responding to the Embassy’s other aide-mémoire of May 4, 1948, dealing specifically with this matter.

The Supreme Commanders Press Release of March 31

It is assumed from the Australian Ambassador’s remarks before the Far Eastern Commission on April 15 that the Embassy has reference to the Supreme Commander’s statement that

“… we should while progress toward the restoration of formal peace is stalemated, unilaterally or with other Allied Governments similarly inclined, release, as far as possible, existing restrictions upon trade and commerce and restore to the normal limits of diplomatic privilege the right to the Japanese citizenry to journey abroad and mingle with that of other lands …”.⁴

It should be pointed out that this release, which was originally a message from the Supreme Commander to the Secretary of the Army and which has never been released in Washington as a statement of United States policy, was for use in the presentation by the Army Department of its budgetary requirements for Japan and the Ryukyus for the fiscal year 1949. As the Australian Government is aware, the United States Government is in a unique position in the matter of the revival of Japanese trade, since the entire burden of Japan’s support unobtainable from the proceeds of trade is borne by the American people. The Department of State is confident that it is not the view of the Supreme Commander, as it is not the view of the United States Government, that the FEC should be deprived of opportunity to exercise its proper functions and responsibilities respecting the occupation of Japan as defined in its terms of reference, or that the United States Government or the Supreme Commander should take actions contrary to the provisions of the Moscow Agreement. What the Supreme Commander doubtless did have in mind was the continued failure of the FEC to adopt a policy decision governing the travel of Japanese commercial representatives abroad, of vital importance for the restoration of Japanese trade, and the possible necessity, if FEC action to remove this restriction was not soon forthcoming, of his acting on his own authority to permit such travel, a possibility of which the FEC had already been formally advised.

Japanese Coastal Patrol

The position of the United States Government on this question, which compels it to reject the Australian Government’s contention that the Supreme Commander acted without due regard for the authority of the Far Eastern Commission, has been made clear by the United States Representative on the Far Eastern Commission. The United States Representative has pointed out, on instructions from his Government, that careful examination of the text of the Japanese Maritime Safety Authorities Law reveals no provisions in the Law in conflict with any policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission; that the Law meets a direct and manifest need in Japan; and that a coastal patrol constitutes a logical and proper extension of the authority of the Japanese civil police to coastal law enforcement functions.

Travel of Japanese Abroad

The Department of State is compelled, also to reject the suggestion that the United States Government or the Supreme Commander has acted without due regard for the authority of the FEC on the question of the travel of Japanese abroad. As the Australian Government is aware, the United States Government as early as June 26, 1947, presented a draft policy paper to the FEC on the subject of the Interchange of Persons between Japan and Other Countries. On March 12,. 1948, the United States Member of Committee 4 of the FEC stated to the Committee that the Supreme Commander had informed the United States Government that because of the long delay by the FEC in reaching a decision on this paper, and because of repeated requests; of certain countries for visits by Japanese nationals, he might find it desirable to conclude bilateral arrangements with interested countries for Japanese nationals to travel abroad for cultural purposes where such travel would further the objectives of the occupation. It was stated that SCAP had further informed the United States Government of his view, in which the United States Government concurred, that further delay in permitting Japanese nationals to go abroad for cultural purposes would militate against the continued progress of the Japanese reorientation program. The United States Member of the Steering Committee had previously informed that Committee on January 13, 1948, that it was the view of the United States Government that SCAP had ample authority to take the proposed action. On February 5, 1948 the United States Member of Committee 2 urged speedy consideration of a policy proposal before the Committee concerning travel outside Japan of Japanese commercial representatives, and stated that until such a policy was adopted SCAP might find it necessary to negotiate bilateral travel arrangements under his general authority as described by the United States Member of the Steering Committee on January 13. The Australian Government has, therefore, been fully apprised of the United States position on this matter, namely, that the Supreme Commander has both the right and duty, under previous broad policy decisions of the FEC, and in light of the administrative necessities of the occupation, pending a policy decision of the FEC, to permit Japanese to travel to countries desirous of receiving them for cultural or commercial purposes.

Regarding the second point raised in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire on this subject, the fact that the United States submitted three proposals in the matter to the FEC is in no sense grounds for assumption that the United States considered that the matter was one requiring FEC approval before Japanese could be permitted to go abroad. These proposals were submitted because of the United States Government’s and the Supreme Commander’s desire to work with and through the Far Eastern Commission. Submission of the proposals to the FEC was not inconsistent with the United States’ view that tinder previous broad policy decisions of the FEC, and in light of the administrative necessities of the occupation, SCAP had full authority as “the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan” to act pending adoption by the FEC of these or similar proposals.

As regards the Australian Government’s third point repeating its position maintained in the FEC that the travel of Japanese nationals abroad should in each case receive the approval of the Far Eastern Commission, the United States Government considers this proposal an invasion of the administrative responsibilities of SCAP and likely so to obstruct and retard the carrying out of the exchange program as greatly to reduce the benefits which may otherwise be expected to flow from it. In view of the special interest of the Australian and other Governments in this matter, the United States Government has already instituted appropriate procedures for keeping the Governments of the nations represented on the FEC adequately informed regarding the travel of Japanese abroad.

Japanese Fishing

The United States position on this issue has been made clear in the FEC and need not be repeated here. In its original directive to the Supreme Commander on the subject, before the establishment of the FEC, the United States took the position that the Japanese should not be permitted to fish near the coasts of any Allied country without that country’s consent. The same provision is contained in the fishing paper introduced informally into the FEC by the United States some time ago and now under discussion there. The United States Government cannot, however, accept the Australian proposal that FEC approval, in addition to the approval of the country or countries particularly concerned, be required for every extension of the authorized fishing area. The United States is currently bearing the full burden of expenditures for the Japanese food deficit, which could be materially reduced by enlargement of the Japanese fishing catch. The United States does not consider it necessary or practicable to make the question of the extension of the fishing area, in cases where such an extension is acceptable to the Supreme Commander and to the country near whose shores the extension is to be made, a matter of decision by the Far Eastern Commission.

In respect to the second point raised in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire on this subject, it will be recalled that it was the Australian Government which originally proposed that the scope of the fishing paper be extended to include pearl fishing. As far as is known to the United States Government in Washington, the Japanese are not now conducting any pearl fishing operations outside of Japanese waters, all fishing vessels and other facilities being reserved for the acquisition of food products. The United States Government can perceive no adequate reason, however, why the Japanese should not be permitted to pearl fish outside Japanese waters in the area permitted for the catching of food fish.

Regarding the reported presence of Japanese fishing expeditions near the Australian mandated territory, and the discovery of one vessel south of the authorized fishing area, the Australian Government may be assured that Japanese fishing vessels going outside of the permitted fishing area are severely dealt with. The Australian Government has already been informed by the Supreme Commander through its Mission in Tokyo that disciplinary action has been taken by the Japanese Government against the captain of the offending vessel and that the vessel’s license has been revoked.

As regards reports that the Japanese may be permitted to fish in the vicinity of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, the fishing area delineated in the draft policy paper now before the FEC specifically includes the Trust Territory of the Pacific. The Government of the United States is fully mindful of its own responsibilities with regard to the security of the Pacific areas, but considers that as the administering authority for the Trust Territory it is in a position to determine whether the presence of Japanese fishing vessels in the area is undesirable for security reasons.

Importation of Bauxite

The Department of State desires to point out in connection with the points raised in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire on this subject that, although the Far Eastern Commission’s policy decision on Interim Reparations Removals from the Japanese light metals industry permits the removal of all primary aluminum production capacity, this decision relates purely to the availability of aluminum production capacity for reparations, and it is wholly in accord with existing directives that the Supreme Commander should now be allowing certain of these facilities to be operated for the purposes of the occupation.

The unique position of the United States in the matter of Japanese economic revival, due to the burden of Japan’s support on the American taxpayer, and the Supreme Commander’s responsibilities in this field, have already been mentioned. In the case of the Japanese aluminum industry the broad purposes of the occupation, dependent on a revival of Japanese productive ‘activity, the interests of the American taxpayer, and alleviation of the present acute world shortage of aluminum products all dictate the necessity of utilizing idle aluminum capacity in Japan pending final decision regarding its removal for reparations. It is anticipated that approximately half of the aluminum produced from the imported bauxite will be exported in response to specific requests which have been received from several western nations, thus helping to meet their requirements and to provide needed foreign exchange for the purchase of essential imports for Japan. Technological developments of recent years make it clear that aluminum is destined to play an increasingly vital role in the peacetime economies of modern industrial nations.

In conclusion, the Government of the United States hopes that the Australian Government will, in the light of the considerations set forth in this reply, be able to move with the United States toward solution of the problems discussed herein in the manner which this Government has outlined, which it firmly believes is in accord with the Moscow Agreement and conducive to the success of the occupation in which both Australia and the United States are so greatly interested.

Washington, June 12, 1948.

1. Notation: “Delivered personally to Australian Ambassador at 12:00 noon June 12, 1948 by C. E. Saltzman.”
2. Not printed, but see memorandum of May 4, p. 747.
3. June 8, p. 810.
4. Omissions as indicated in original.