740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–3048
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 5.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 231 of April 16, 19481 and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as enclosures2 five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the fifty-seventh meeting of the Council held on April 28, 1948. As there were neither official nor procedural matters on the agenda, the meeting was adjourned after approval of the corrected verbatim minutes of the fifty-sixth meeting.
[Page 744]Immediately after the fifty-seventh meeting was adjourned, the fifty-eighth special meeting was held. Five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of this meeting are enclosed. The special meeting was called for the purpose of a discussion of the Maritime Safety Authorities. Bill, a subject proposed by the Member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Five copies of this bill (in translation), which was enacted into law by the Japanese Diet on April 15, 1948,3 are enclosed.
A copy of a letter dated April 23, 1948 and sent to me by Mr. Patrick Shaw, the British Commonwealth Member, requesting that the day upon which this law should come into effect be delayed and that the matter be discussed at a meeting of the Allied Council, is also enclosed. In response, I called the special meeting and placed this subject on the agenda; I also pointed out to Mr. Shaw before the meeting that since the law had been duly passed by the Japanese Diet and provided by its terms (Article 34) that it was to become effective not later than May 1, 1948, this Headquarters was not in a position to delay the effective date of the law as requested. It was informally arranged, however, that the necessary Cabinet Order would not be promulgated until May 1, 1948, a procedure which appeared to satisfy Mr. Shaw.
In his opening statement, Mr. Shaw declared that he had no wish to make a detailed examination of the act and that the Far Eastern Commission, which now has the legislation before it, is a more appropriate place to consider the technical aspects involved. He emphasized the importance of the law and stated that a perusal of the bill had indicated to him that the more sensational details of earlier press reports as to its contents were inaccurate. He concluded, however, by saying that the principles involved in the legislation were important enough to have warranted some prior advice either to members of the Council or the Far Eastern Commission.
In answer I stated that there seemed to be an implication in the statement of the British Commonwealth Member that the Supreme Commander had acted beyond his authority in this case. I then described the view of the United States Government that the Supreme Commander’s authority is derived from four sources: United States directives issued to him before the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission, directives based on Far Eastern Commission policy decisions, interim directives issued by the United States Government, and the general authority of the Supreme Commander as “the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan.” I stated that the Supreme Commander’s general authority empowered him to act when the administrative necessities of the occasion required even though he [Page 745] had received no applicable directive. There is a somewhat wide area in which the Supreme Commander and the Far Eastern Commission both have jurisdiction; a Far Eastern Commission policy decision is controlling, but where there is no applicable policy, the Supreme Commander can act pending a Far Eastern Commission policy decision. In this instance the Supreme Commander was acting to meet the administrative necessities of the Occupation of Japan and was therefore within his authority in permitting passage of this law by the Japanese Diet.
I said there was nothing in the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council making it mandatory or necessarily desirable that the Supreme Commander give prior advice to the Council in cases of this sort. I noted that no directive had been issued to the Japanese Government to provide for the establishment of a Maritime Safety Authority, and that the function of General Headquarters was in this case confined to consultative assistance with a view to carrying out an obviously necessary administrative measure. I pointed out that the law under discussion had been sent to the Far Eastern Commission as a matter of routine and had been circulated to the Commission on April 9, 1948, and added that it was now the prerogative of the Far Eastern Commission to consider the problem and not that of the Allied Council.
As for the law itself, I observed that its purpose was to fill a hiatus in the Japanese police system caused by the abolition of the former Japanese water police, and that police measures to control illegal traffic in near-by Japanese waters were obviously necessary.
In conclusion I stated that there had been no transgression in fact or in spirit of any policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission and that it was inappropriate for the Allied Council, a subordinate and consultative body, to enter upon a parallel discussion with the Far Eastern Commission, the ultimate policymaking authority.
The Chinese Member emphasized the importance of the law in assuring maritime safety and stated that in accordance with the primary objective of the Occupation to ensure that Japan be a peaceful nation, great care should be taken to guard against an abuse of power by the Japanese leading to a resurgence of their naval strength. Supervision of the technical details of the law, in his opinion, should be left to Headquarters.
The Soviet Member opened a formal statement by asserting that there was no necessity for the Supreme Commander to act unilaterally, without consultation, and prior to a decision of the Far Eastern Commission on this matter. He could not agree that the Supreme Commander had authority to ignore the Allied Council, for this was in [Page 746] violation of paragraphs one, five and six of the Terms of Reference of the Council. In contrast to his usual procedure of pausing at the end of each sentence for a translation into English, the Soviet Member then proceeded to complete a rather lengthy statement in Russian.
He said first, that it was necessary to point out other unilateral acts by the Supreme Commander and instances where the Supreme Commander unilaterally allowed the Japanese to act. I interrupted the interpreter and insisted that the Soviet Member confine himself to the subject on the agenda. The Soviet statement then described the expansion of the Japanese police force, referring to special armed, police units and to plans for further strengthening of the police. I again insisted that remarks of the Soviet Member be confined to the subject on the agenda, namely, the Maritime Safety Authority Law. The Soviet statement proceeded by referring to articles in the Japanese press commenting on plans for further police expansion and additional arms, including even cannon. I stated that these reports were not true.
Turning to the law under discussion, the Soviet statement asserted that the wording of Article IV was sufficiently vague to permit armament of these vessels authorized by the provisions of the law. The Soviet Member claimed that the Supreme Commander was helping the Japanese to rearm and pointed to a directive issued to the Japanese Government on April 22, 1947 (Scapin 1622) which authorized the Japanese Government to use thirty-eight disarmed naval small craft for patrol purposes. In conclusion, the Soviet Member recommended that enforcement of the Maritime Safety Authority Law be suspended until the Far Eastern Commission reached a decision on the matter.
I then distributed photographs of one of the twenty-eight submarine chasers to be used as patrol boats and described its specifications; I emphasized that the vessels were not armed and were not capable of being used for military purposes.
The British Commonwealth Member stated that he did not wish to question the authority of the Supreme Commander nor the basic purpose of this legislation, but that the question of how far this law squared with Far Eastern Commission policy decisions was a matter for the Far Eastern Commission to decide. He also stated that there was a considerable difference between the authorization permitted by Scapin 1622 and the authority conferred by the law under discussion. He said that he could not accept the contention that since there had been no order to the Japanese Government, there was no need to consult with the Allied Council, and reiterated that some prior advice would have been appropriate.
I pointed out that the maritime law was designed to cover several activities and hence a seemingly large number of people would be required [Page 747] for its implementation. I adduced statistics as to the number of illegal entrants into Japan actually apprehended during the last two years in order to show the need for a coast guard patrol.
The Chinese Member briefly reiterated the position he had taken earlier and in the absence of further comment, the meeting was adjourned.
Respectfully yours,
Foreign Service Officer