740.00119 FEAC/4–3048

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), to Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton

top secret

Subject: Army Department Amendments on Kennan Report

I have had an opportunity to read over only hurriedly the Army recommendations,1 but there are one or two observations I would like to make at this time. I should think that the State Department might be able to go along with the Army in its amendment in almost all cases with the exception of the addition to the paragraph on “Post [Page 743] Treaty Arrangements”, at the top of page 22 of the document attached, and with the paragraph on the Far Eastern Commission.

With respect to the Army’s addition to the paragraph on post treaty arrangements. I feel that it would be most unwise for such a statement to appear in an official government recommendation at this time, no matter how secret it is to be kept. While I have considerable sympathy with the desire of the Army to include this statement, and while I have always felt that the provision in the Japanese Constitution that Japan would have no defense forces of any sort is unrealistic, nevertheless I do not feel that such a bald statement as desired by the Army can now be made. It seems to me that the realities of the situation are adequately taken care of by the wording in the original recommendation, which certainly provides for a degree of flexibility and makes it possible for us to decide, when the appropriate time comes, what the best course may be.

I do not wish to treat at length now the paragraph on the Far Eastern Commission, as I have been thinking very seriously about this question recently and hope to come up with a more detailed recommendation in a short time. However, it seems to me that this Government can not adopt a completely negative attitude, such as displayed in the Army’s recommendation, if we wish to retain the cooperation and friendship of our natural allies in the Pacific. Before any agreement on such a statement as the Army proposes, we should give very serious consideration to all the implications involved.

  1. See Brigadier General Schuyler’s memorandum of April 28, p. 740.