856d.00/12–2048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State1
Dr. Soemitro opened the conversation by expressing his appreciation for my willingness to receive him. He continued to say that he had [Page 591] two requests which he wished to make of the United States Government, which he made in view of the Netherlands resort to police action in Indonesia: (a) that the United States Government would accord the Indonesian Republic both political and economic support, and (b) that the United States Government abrogate all economic assistance to the Netherlands, particularly assistance under ECA. Dr. Soemitro added that he realized that these requests would be difficult for the United States Government to meet.
I told Dr. Soemitro that I was very pleased to receive him and to discuss the Indonesian situation with complete frankness. In reply to his requests, I advised him: (a) that the United States Government profoundly regretted the turn of events in Indonesia; (b) that the United States representative on the Security Council had already requested the Council to meet in emergency session to consider events in Indonesia in the hope that hostilities could be stopped and perhaps the way prepared for some sort of conversations between the disputants. In this connection, I observed that we had learned with great regret that the USSR had seen fit to request the Security Council to postpone such a meeting for two days; and (c) that this Government would conduct itself in strict accordance with Security Council action in the matter, not only because the United States was a member of the Security Council, but also because it was the neutral member of the Security Council’s Committee of Good Offices. I pointed out that it was essential that the Council meet as soon as possible, not only to direct a cease-fire order at the hostile parties, but also to request and act upon authoritative reports from the Committee of Good Offices. I said that with respect to abrogating ECA assistance, Dr. Soemitro should bear in mind that the ECA program was predicated upon an act of Congress and that changes in ECA operations must be interpreted in light of the legislation and the intent of Congress. I told him that the matter of the continuance of ECA assistance to Indonesia was receiving our most earnest consideration. I said that any discussions with Netherlands representatives on further loans of any sort would, of course, cease at once.
Dr. Soemitro asked if it were possible that the United States Government would offer a resolution invoking sanctions under Chapter Seven of the Charter. I replied that since that was a hypothetical question, I could not give an answer to it but that Mr. Jessup was discussing this, as well as related matters, with his colleagues on the Security Council. In this connection, I remarked again that it seemed to me essential that the three powers represented on the Committee of Good Offices act with unanimity in this matter. Again I assured Dr. Soemitro of the extremely serious view that my Government took of the entire situation and that he could be certain that my Government [Page 592] would set its course in accordance with the facts as reported to the Security Council.
At this point the conversation became somewhat general. Dr. Soemitro remarked that he realized how difficult the position of the United States had been and was in this matter; that he expected the action of the USSR in postponing the Security Council meeting was calculated to provide an opportunity for the escape of those Communists whom his Government had imprisoned. I agreed that this was very likely, adding that it was common practice on the part of the USSR to foment and to create and maintain disturbances and violence everywhere in the world. Dr. Soemitro agreed.
I said that it sometimes seemed incredible to me that the parties had been unable to compose their differences when the rewards for cooperation in Indonesia were so great to all interested parties. I said that it was not for me to assess blame in this matter but that I rather suspected it rested pretty equally on both parties, up until these recent unfortunate developments. Dr. Soemitro agreed. He said that he realized that his Government had made great mistakes in the past and he felt most of them had arisen from a too great concern for its prestige and from a certain political hypersensitivity on the part of the Indonesian people.
Dr. Soemitro said that he felt he must continue to make appeals to the American public in whatever ways he thought appropriate. I made it very clear to him that our conversation was entirely confidential. He said he thoroughly understood the confidential character of the conversation and would not refer to it in any way in conversations with members of the press.
He handed me the attached memorandum.2