856d.00/12–2048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Mr. Norman J. O. Makin, Australian Ambassador |
| Mr. R. L. Harry, First Secretary of the Australian Embassy | |
| Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Charles S. Reed II, Chief, SEA |
The Ambassador reviewed his conversation of December 19 with Mr. Reed and Mr. Lacy1 and, in reiterating his deep concern over developments in Indonesia, stated the desire of his government to associate itself with the United States in bringing about an end to the present hostilities there. He said that the primary objectives of his government were to stop hostilities, to fix the blame for those hostilities, and to make the Netherlands forces withdraw behind the status quo lines. He then asked what the United States was prepared to do in this connection, mentioning that he had noted that the Security Council meeting had been postponed from Monday to Wednesday owing to the lack of a quorum in the Security Council on the first day.
I said that the United States was prepared, as a member of the United Nations, “to associate itself wholeheartedly with the actions of that international body. Other than that I said that he must be aware that the United States delegate at Paris had asked that the Security Council be convened in an emergency session to consider the situation in Indonesia but that until I had further information regarding the course of events leading up to the present “police action” by the Netherlands forces the precise course of the United States could not be mapped out in clear-cut lines, although the most serious consideration was being given to this matter. In this connection I said that I would like (1) information regarding the circumstances of the ending of the truce—whether or not the Republic had been notified in fact of the Netherlands determination to end the truce, and (2) a full report by the GOC of the course of events.
At this point, as regards the desire of his government to associate itself with the United States in attempting to solve the Indonesian problem, I said I should inform him that this government could not accept the statements made in Canberra by Mr. Burton, Secretary for the Australian Ministry of External Affairs, to a representative of our Embassy there and I read to him pertinent sections of Canberra’s telegram [Page 590] no. 277, December 20.2 I continued that Mr. Burton must be badly informed of what the United States Government had already done to deter the Netherlands action in Indonesia, making mention of our aide-mémoire to the Netherlands Government, and that Mr. Burton’s attempt to place blame upon this Government was entirely unfounded in fact and unwarranted under the circumstances. The United States Government had done everything possible to avert a breaking off of negotiations in Indonesia and to prevent the outbreak of the present hostilities.
In reply to the Ambassador’s inquiry as to the possibility of invoking sanctions against the Netherlands Government under Chapter VII, I pointed out that the invoking of such sanctions would be a matter for determination by the Security Council and that the United States Government is giving its most serious consideration to that action in the event that the Security Council should find that sanctions were in order. The Ambassador then inquired whether consideration had been given to the withholding of ERP aid to the Netherlands as a deterrent to further hostilities in Indonesia and to force the Netherlands to resume negotiations with the Republic under GOC auspices. To this I replied that the United States was contemplating the withholding of those ECA allotments to the Netherlands which are for the procurement of materials for Indonesia and I said that decision in this matter would shortly be reached.
As regards the GOC the Ambassador stated that he believed that the GOC could continue to serve a useful purpose by keeping on the spot a neutral body which could report upon developments.
I said that while keeping the GOC active had certain good features I felt that the GOC had been so disregarded that it appeared to me that the better course was to terminate our membership in the GOC and thus regain our freedom of action vis-à-vis the Netherlands Government, either in terms of Security Council action or independently.
In taking leave the Ambassador repeated the desire of his government to work with the United States in bringing an end to this sorry situation and in placing the blame where it belonged. I said that this government shared the same views.