Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/11–148: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

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Batavia, November 1, 1948—8 p. m.

962. Gocus 425. Greeted Stikker and Blom upon arrival Batavia October 31, 9 p. m. Schuurman telephoned today 9 a. m. asking me meet alone with Stikker 11 a. m.

Meeting one hour with Stikker entirely cordial. He thought Indonesian situation so critical he should come personally to see what could be done although this ordinarily not considered within field Netherlands Foreign Minister. I expressed pleasure and relief that responsible Cabinet officer had arrived since I felt conditions had deteriorated during my three months here and crisis approaching. Stikker recalled my visit to Hague. I reviewed developments since then and summarized my own steps in language similar that used in second paragraph Gocus 406.¹

In answer Stikker’s question as to how relations had been with Schuurman, I replied they were cordial in spite of fact I did not hesitate to be frankly critical when press was carrying material attributed official or “reliable” sources which contributed to aggravation of situation and endangered success of negotiations such as Aneta report of this morning in regard to his own mission. Stikker said he had not seen this. I gave him my copy and stressed implication therein of his trip giving Republic choice of peace or war. (This report being cabled in clear as Gocus 426.²)

Stikker reacted violently to this report and asked whether it was official. I said it had all appearances of being issued by local government to Renter and others. He said this put him at disadvantage immediately. I told him that material such as this has appeared at every critical point in our attempts to negotiate. Stikker expressed concern lest this report would make it difficult for Hatta to meet with him.

I reviewed recent steps in attempts resume negotiations. I said my final visit to Republic had not been easy but I was extremely anxious get Stikker and Hatta together. I said Hatta reacted favorably and desires meet soonest in spite objections of certain political elements to negotiations and of advisors to his going Batavia after incidents involving immunities, evictees, etc.

I told Stikker Department had informed me (Usgoc 145³) of his visit to Washington and of his statement of his government’s firm desire to strengthen Hatta and thereby create conditions for eliminating communism in Indonesia. I said Hatta had done good job in crushing Moscow inspired Communists with poor means at his disposal and had only last Saturday told me he would similarly crush Tan Malakka Communists if they should follow Muso’s example.⁴ I said Hatta was best hope for Republican Government with which negotiations could succeed. I said I had been happy to convey to him invitation to meet since I was convinced Stikker was not coming to issue ultimatum.

Stikker said off record there were divisions within his own government. Admitted Catholic and rightist elements thought only military action would suffice while labor opposed military action in any circumstances. He said he was from center and had come to seek peaceful solution. I said I was convinced he could find peaceful solution if he would disregard prejudiced elements and genuinely try for basis understanding with Hatta. He thought meeting with Hatta might be decisive.

Referring to press conference he was to have in afternoon, he began jotting down phrases he might use to indicate purpose his trip is to find peaceful solution and that he desires to meet with Hatta toward this end. I urged speed in getting word to Hatta that latter’s travel plans are approved and that conference can begin Thursday evening or Friday. Stikker said Schuurman had raised question with him about Hatta bringing to Batavia with him group not needed in conference here but desired for Sumatra trip. Schuurman evidently was suggesting arrangement to bring Hatta here alone to be followed by advisors later. I said I could guarantee GOC plane for Hatta and any party he might desire to have accompany him to Batavia and thought it wrong for receiving government to question composition his suite. I further doubted Hatta could accept different arrangement. I strongly urged Stikker overrule this local opposition as I assured him he would have to overrule many similar moves toward complicating his negotiations. He said he would discuss this at lunch with Schuurman and perhaps ask me to facilitate getting message to Hatta later in day. I said I would gladly help Schuurman pass arrangements through Sukarno to Hatta.

Stikker said he felt I might have had opinion in recent weeks that Netherlands were being overly stubborn. I said their stubbornness did not worry me but I was concerned lest confusion of issues and accumulation of conditions precedent might make resumption negotiations impossible or futile. I said I had criticized Netherlands position to Schuurman when. I thought it unnecessarily delaying or unreasonably demanding. I felt crisis inevitable unless Netherlands delegation revealed better faith in resuming negotiations. Stikker said he had always understood my position. Added that only point which worried him was that Department of State said it approved my plan and would support it before UN. I reminded him that I had intervened repeatedly to prevent Indonesian question reaching UN. I said my plan had been what I felt fair middle course and that way had been left open both sides submit amendments for negotiations. I was still confident honorable agreement thereon could be reached. I thought it vital however that Stikker and Hatta clear up in their conference issues on implementation of truce so that negotiations before GOC will be on USDel plan and amendments. He said he would do his best to achieve this. At same time he showed me chart revealing rise of “incidents” during past few months from low level reached just after Renville. I said some improvement could be expected if negotiations resumed but little likelihood thereof prior negotiations if atmosphere poisoned by press. I assured him chart would show heavy decline if Netherlands would accept Republic’s willingness negotiate on my plan and if both parties then moved toward speedy agreement Stikker said he felt solution must be reached in November and he was as anxious as I that it be a peaceful one. He felt, however, that US proclaim support my plan amounted to pressure. I repeated my assurances that I was most anxious to help in every way to reach solution locally and avoid possibility or need for Indonesia question to go back to SC. I reminded him of great pleasure I had in negotiating with Netherlands Government on tripartite monetary pact in 1936 and cooperating with them over several years on monetary questions.⁵ Just as we had found common ground then in difficult financial times I was sure that if two of us worked together now we could find peaceful and honorable way out of present political impasse. Stikker said Indonesian question was a vital one for Netherlands, even more important for his country than Berlin is for United States. I said Netherlands could enjoy happy and profitable relations with Indonesia in future if it could agree now to peaceful settlement even though not one hundred percent Netherlands. I said costly chaos will result if peaceful settlement not reached soon. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 962; Department pass Hague.⁶

Livengood

1. Telegram 898, October 10, p. 402.
2. Infra.
3. Telegram 438, September 21, 5 p. m., not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 347.
4. Telegram 978, November 5, from Batavia, not printed, reported the execution of the veteran Communist leader Alimin on November 2 (856e.00B/11–548).
5. See Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. i, pp. 535–565.
6. This was done the same day.