856e.01/9–348: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
570. Embassy offers following comments on Deptel 410, August 31, to Livengood and Cochran:
Once constitutional amendments have been passed by newly elected States General (second chamber approved amendments August 19 and first chamber approval expected this week with promulgation next week), definitive legislation will still have to be approved for creation interim federal government and Netherlands-Indonesian Union (Embtel 325 June 1). According to Foreign Office, proposed draft legislation or project of law for interim federal government which is combination of Enthoven-Van Mook plan (Embtel 462 July 241) and views of non-Republican Indonesians as expressed in Bandoeng resolutions was sent Batavia for communication to Bandoeng conference and GOC and latter was asked send note summarizing legislation to Republic.
As regards charge Netherlands Government pushing interim period legislation, government believes that Bandoeng group represents important federalist movement and deserves at least as much if not more consideration than Republic. Dutch do not feel that proposal for institution interim federal government contained in draft legislation can jeopardize negotiations for political agreement with Republic but on contrary proposal should prove to Republic good intentions and efforts of new Dutch Government reasonably to meet all sincere Indonesian aspirations.
According to Boon, observations of Bandoeng conference and pre-federal government on draft legislation expected shortly with arrival in Hague of non-Republican delegates and Van Mook. Replying to query he could not say whether legislation for interim federal government would be introduced in Parliament without further reference to Republic for comments inasmuch as it depends on developments which could not now be foreseen. This connection he said reports of fusion of Socialist Party led by Sjarifoeddin with Communists was extremely disturbing. Reason why Dutch have not acted more energetically against Communism in NEI, according to Boon, was fear such action might precipitate fall of Hatta government. Certainly it is not Netherlands intention to cause fall Hatta government inasmuch as Dutch entertain same fears as Department that successor likely to be [Page 317] Communist controlled. Developing situation in Republic, Boon thought, was somewhat analogous to that in Burma.
Department’s attention is called to Prime Minister conversation (Embtel 508 August 12) in which he stated his government proposed offer best possible terms in accordance Renville Agreement to Republic and he hoped Republic would acquiesce inasmuch as Netherlands could not wait forever. In government’s announced program August 12 (Embassy despatch 455 August 162), Prime Minister reiterated government’s intention do everything possible to obtain speedy solution to Indonesian problem, declared it is of great importance for Republic assume its place in USI and Netherlands fully prepared adhere its promises but at same time expects similar attitude from Republic.
While it is true Prime Minister recently expressed concern over possibility reaching agreement with Republic (Embtel 539 August 242) he expressed hope Bandoeng non-Republicans might succeed bridging gap between Dutch and Republic. In this connection draft overall agreement with Republic, sent Batavia August 27 which Foreign Office hopes with modification might serve as basis for resuming negotiations with Republic under auspices GOC (Embtel 557 August 28; 560 August 303).
Embassy has had no cabled reports on GOC activities since arrival Cochran and respectfully suggests it might continue serve useful purpose to repeat messages from Batavia for information this mission.
Department may wish pass Batavia.4