Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/6–748: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent
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Batavia, June 7, 1948—3 p. m.

477. Gocus 300. ReDeptel 245, June 5, to Consulate General, just received. My criticism Vredenburch, with whom my personal relations unimpaired, based entirely his views and principles regarding essential problems and his method dealing with Republican Delegation. Personal equation is not a factor in my appraisal situation or in course recommended by US Delegation.

We convinced future task must follow one of two courses:

1. Creation USI according US Delegation plan (Gocus Numbers 275, 292 and 297¹), of which essentials are: (a) earliest convening of Constituent Assembly on basis Indonesia-wide internationally observed elections. (b) Constituent Assembly to act as Provisional Parliament and form provisional government, (c) Full powers internal self-government to be transferred provisional government by Netherlands and Republic to transfer to provisional government all federal functions it now exercises, (d) Constituent Assembly to draft and ratify constitution and ratify Union statute (USI incorporated Netherlands-Republic political agreement) assuring full cooperation and concert of policies Netherlands and USI and full protection Netherlands economic interests so far as consonant full sovereignty both nations, (e) USI then to be regarded formed as sovereign state.

2. Creation USI according Netherlands plan, of which essentials: (a) insistence on demands on political agreement which would re-institute full authority NEI Government over all Indonesia and be followed by employment Dutch forces for suppression all dissident elements and, partly through provisions indicated Union statute and partly through elimination Republican political force by above means, give Netherlands opportunity control USI politically. In event Republic refusal accept demands, alternative would be: (b) reporting of Indonesian dispute back to SC, basing case for dropping it from agenda on grounds Republican non-compliance to Renville principles. Formation USI out of puppet states on basis Bandung conference without Republic. Continuation economic stranglehold on Republic, already long employed as political weapon, in effort undermine popular support Republican Government. Military mop-up of Republic as truce crumbles either from political strains or through action Republican elements seeking in desperation break economic stranglehold.

Between alternatives 1 and 2 US Delegation considers no real compromise possible. Powers of government cannot in last analysis be divided. Regardless questions sovereignty, actual Government Indonesia must be in hands Dutch or Indonesians. At present, Dutch govern three-fifths Indonesia, Indonesians two-fifths. Republic will recognize Netherlands sovereignty interim period but will not surrender powers self-government it has exercised almost three years except to true Indonesian Government which really governs and in which it has fair representation, and frankly we do not see why it should.

We convinced Netherlands plan based dangerous misconception true state Indonesian feeling and that arguments advanced are in part consciously misleading and in part result autointoxication.

Van Kleffens statements that Bandung conference planned by non-Republicans and not by Dutch would be dismissed as nonsense by any neutral observer here.² His statement that it is purely consultative in character is quite at variance with statements chairman Netherlands Delegation cited Gocus 283³ and statement NEI Government Information Service that “whatever will be place Republic on January 1, 1949 is matter that does not even need discussion here. Matter of greatest importance is that which Federalists are to set up in Bandung.” Fact is, non-Republican Indonesians are element minor importance Indonesian situation. After nearly three years Netherlands promises, Netherlands military successes, Netherlands distribution of commodities, and increasing physical hardships Republican areas (now becoming cruel as result blockade), Dutch have not yet succeeded attracting single one cleared [clearly?] of consequence to their side or prompting one demonstration popular enthusiasm for their cause.

We convinced if Netherlands plan pushed, attainment economic and political stability Indonesia will be postponed until time when Indonesians able throw Dutch out of islands, either because economic drain on Dutch arising chronic disorders and destruction productive facilities becomes unsupportable or because western powers will be involved with powerful enemy giving Indonesians chance successful revolt under aegis that enemy. We believe there strong chance that if Netherlands allowed carry through its plan, Holland will prove sink without stopper so far as US economic and financial assistance concerned.

Other hand, US Delegation believes wholehearted acceptance its plan by Dutch would result speedy formation self-respect, orderly and by no means incompetent Indonesian Government strongly disposed cooperate with Dutch and rely heavily Dutch assistance. We further believe USI formed under these conditions would tend exert strong pro-western influence throughout Southeast Asia and represent vitally important achievement eastern powers in giving lie to Communist propaganda throughout Far East. Chill reception accorded Soviet recognition by Republican Government gives west an opportunity we would make grave error to reject.

Conversely, if US Delegation plan dropped, we convinced US prestige Southeast Asia will plumb new low in case events certain develop here.

Opportunity that now offers will not recur. Moreover, time running short and we believe every day counts. Dutch efforts take dispute out of hands GOC by arranging direct meetings Netherlands Delegation and Republican Delegation under Van Mook and Hatta respectively has been checkmated for moment (see following telegram⁴). Further Dutch efforts stave off presentation US Delegation plan at all costs and ease GOC out of dispute should GOC continue show signs of life are certain and we not sure we shall have means combat them.

US Delegation has already presented its plan to Australian Delegation and Belgian Delegation and arranged discuss plan in detail tonight having already convinced Herremans, in face his initial strong opposition, of necessity GOC plan if situation to be saved and UN not to suffer damaging blow. US Delegation has construed Usgoc 101, May 27 as expressing favorable impression essentials US Delegation plan set forth Gocus 275, and accordingly has taken position in GOC and in informal talks parties from which withdrawal might well critically impair position both US Delegation and GOC.

Unless Department can subscribe essentials US Delegation plan, on which compromise would render whole plan worthless, I believe my usefulness and that of the US Delegation here will be completely nullified. Therefore Department should give earliest consideration to means extricating GOC from Indonesia. Signed Dubois.

Department pass Hague.⁵

Livengood

1. Telegrams 418, May 21, p. 178; 459, June 1, p. 203; and 466, June 3, p. 210. For text of delegation’s plan, see draft by the US Representative, p. 218.
2. For GOC report on the Bandung conference to the Security Council, June 4, see SC, 3rd yr., Suppl. (June), p. 91.
3. Telegram 439, May 28, p. 189.
4. Gocus 301 in telegram 486, June 8, p. 232.
5. This was done on June 8.