501.BC Indonesia/6–648: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
467. Gocus No. 298. 1. Dubois June 2 had frank talk with Vredenburch, expressing total lack sympathy Vredenburch’s tactics. Vredenburch vigorously opposed any GOC suggestion for political agreement and departed stating Dubois would be responsible ensuing “massacre of millions”. Connection not clear.
2. Neher and Vredenburch June 3 handed Hatta aide-mémoire, stating gravity situation and rendered “more explicit” by agreement representatives USSR and Republic, that Netherlands of opinion continuation discussions on basis 18 Renville principles can be successful only if identical conceptions exist on part Netherlands and Republic with regard means and consequences Netherlands sovereignty throughout Netherlands Indies and that Netherlands expects Republic disavow activities Suripno by making public its decision agreement deemed not to have been concluded as far as Republic concerned.
3. Vredenburch immediately following meeting with GOC discussed aide-mémoire, stating he had made clear Republic had ample time consider this serious decision. He assured GOC Netherlands intended only issue press statement saying message delivered Hatta [Page 224] concerned manner in which, according Netherlands, negotiations could best be continued. He emphasized necessity calm and restraint, on part GOC also.
4. Notwithstanding Vredenburch, Aneta June 4 gave leading place Reuters dispatch quoting “authoritat[iv]e” source Hague for statement negotiations threatened with breakdown if Republic fails give early satisfactory reply “two clear cut questions” (for example, consular exchange with USSR and when and where plebiscite to be held. USDel unable guess how latter question got involved). Article states “although it premature talk of actual breakdown negotiations, there seems be growing feeling here that situation becoming acute”. While perfectly calculated increases strain on truce, article observed truce agreements would not be affected by breakdown negotiations.
5. Leimena and Colonel Simatupang inform us public opinion in Republic now considers resumption police action only question time and that Batavia full rumors date will be July 4 or 6, which they insist traceable NEFIS. Asked how rumors could be combatted and strain eased, Simatupang said announcement reduction Dutch troop strength would be major help. He said Dutch officers had told him Netherlands Army could round up 1000 top Republic leaders in year and thus end Republic movement. Simatupang thought “experiment would be interesting watch”.
6. Powerful FDR (coalition leftist Republic parties) in statement probably calculated primarily embarrass Right wing government rather than express FDR real attitude toward USSR, terms Soviet Russia pioneer in struggle against imperialism and state which aims at everlasting and democratic peace and hails Suripno’s work, achieving recognition by great and powerful industrial state with which opportunity now exists open commercial relations, as diplomatic victory for Republic. Rejection this victory represents capitulation Republic Government to Dutch imperialism. Statement contends Republic foreign relations justified by GOC January 17 statement clarifying Renville Agreement which gives GOC understanding that parties acceptance 6 principles can in no way change or modify status parties (Graham telegram 1011). (Roem takes same position. Little doubt GOC in making statement, without which Republic would probably not have signed truce, helped prepare ground for present mess.)
7. On basis wide contacts, Brackman reports average Indos deeply worried by Soviet recognition. Soviet involvement has postponed cabinet reshuffle.
8. General Sudirman reported calling for immediate mobilization to oppose imminent Dutch aggression. In violent speech he stated that [Page 225] while TNI would join Indo Army under Indo leaders it will fight before submitting disbandment. Republic Minister Information quotes Hatta as saying speech reflects fears all people Republic but that Republic was reducing army strength and would continue do so.
9. Dubois will see Hatta June 6 at latter’s request and help if possible draft statement satisfying demands Netherlands aide-mémoire but not putting Hatta in impossible position. While unimpressed quality Masjumi leadership, USDel believes any weakening present Masjumi-Nationalist group, including Hatta, would be disadvantageous US interests, particularly while Socialists leagued with Communists in FDE. Conversely, strengthening US prestige will probably benefit Masjumi-Nationalist coalition. Dutch appear totally uninterested effect their actions on Republic political complex.
10. Regardless merits Dutch case respect USSR recognition, USDel suspects Netherlands may long have planned breakdown negotiations by forcing Republic unequivocally accept or reject full implementation Netherlands sovereignty. Technique of forcing choice alternatives on Republic, either of which likely prove fatal, was tried by Dutch in presentation truce ultimatum last January and would have worked had interposition 6 additional principles not enabled Republic swallow truce. Herremans, while believing Dutch do not intend police action, considers Dutch plan is force breakdown negotiations and quickly report back to SC, charging Republic non-compliance Renville Agreement with prospect having case dropped.
11. Stuyt June 5 delivered letter from Van Mook stating his government attaches greatest importance discussions with Republic and that he trusts GOC will appreciate greatest reserve and restraint should be shown by all concerned to avoid prejudicing negotiations. Letter encloses copy letter to Hatta expressing concern over divergence Netherlands and Republic views and inviting Hatta and advisers visit him informally Batavia June 14 in order discuss with him and royal commissioners foreign relations, defense and internal security, delineation and formation states, interim government, and main points union. Move appears clearly designed forestall presentation GOC suggestion for political agreement.
12. In talk Stuyt we covered whole ground our serious misgivings respect Netherlands objectives and tactics and great alarm at growing tension Republic. Stuyt reaction one of pained bewilderment, stating Netherlands intention was solely to transfer sovereignty to orderly government with no thought exercising continued political control USI, that Republic fears were derived thin air, that Netherlands forces were in fact being reduced and members Netherlands delegation wished publish fact but NEI authorities refused owing panic [Page 226] likely be occasioned among non-Republic Indos. Stuyt stated Netherlands will deny Reuters story on note to Republic (paragraph 4 above).
13. USDel has completed 20 page draft suggestion for outline political settlement and submitted it AusDel and BelDel in hope GOC early agreement possible. Text being airmailed Department.2
Department pass Hague.3