501.BC Kashmir/10–1648: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
Delga 368. For Satterthwaite from Kopper and Parsons.1 Conversation between Secretary Nehru yesterday lasted over two and half hours. Also present Mme. Pandit, Bajpai.
From outset evident Nehru wished use interview obtain Secretary’s [Page 517] views world situation and Soviet motives and objectives. He made no proposals, referred only to those aspects US Indian relations mentioned by Secretary and although he made no general statement on basic position India towards USSR or US, it was clear that Nehru recognizes interaction of Soviet policy and world Communism. Tone of meeting was friendly, even cordial, but on Nehru’s side, at times guarded and occasionally defensive. It unquestionably afforded three Indians present most illuminating and comprehensive recital of American thought and action on virtually all major international problems of post-war period.
Nehru appeared accept thesis rehabilitation Western Europe important Asia as well as Europe but made no comment on our stated objective preventing further spread police states. Instead he questioned Secretary rather insistently on why Soviets deliberately alienated US public opinion and what were their real objectives. He himself suggested USSR was suspicious of US and after eliciting analysis of warmongering charge, even asked Secretary what he thought of reported advocacy of preventive war by some Americans. Except for evident interest he gave no sign his reaction Secretary’s outline importance atomic bomb as deterrent Soviet action.
Nehru spoke at some length on subject Communism in India and Southeast Asia. He developed thesis that British need for popular support when they took India into war led them to support Communists in spite of paradox that Communists condemned war until Soviet entry. British support thus aided Communists to become sizeable group for first time. Then temporary community of interest between nationalists and revolutionary Communists (i.e. to rid India of Britain) aided Communist cause but in general elections Indian voters repudiated Communists because they served Moscow, not India. At present Nehru said government experiencing no difficulty in suppressing Communists in India. Seemingly also he was not deeply concerned re Communists in neighboring areas as he glossed over Burma situation lightly and hazarded view that Indonesia Republic would be able to deal with Communist threat adequately in future. There, he said, situation had been aggravated by Dutch stubbornness and referred to reports of support Dutch received from US, a remark which Secretary later referred to saying we were pressing Dutch most insistently to modify their attitude.
Re Communism, Secretary mentioned dangerous situation Latin America with wealthy crust on top and little else but mass of poor. Nehru seemed to catch parallel with India but preferred dwell on social and economic objectives his Government.
During his initial lengthy review world situation which he said was further complicated by difficult local issues, Secretary referred to [Page 518] Kashmir as one such issue which disturbed US greatly. He expressed hope twice that India and Pakistan would earnestly attempt to settle this matter as quickly as possible. Nehru adverted to this later and after saying that regarding Kashmir he had legitimate grievance, launched into rather gratuitous fifteen minute ex parte review case reminiscent his telegram October 4 to Liaquat. He contrasted non-secular [secular] Democratic Government of India with theocratic reactionary Pakistan illustrating his argument with accounts of mob action against emancipated Moslems as well as threats to march to Delhi. He asserted without qualification that India had accepted UNCIP resolution whereas Pakistan had rejected it. He insisted Indian Government could not have stayed in office week if it had not flown troops Kashmir year ago defend Indian territory. Later on in conversation he reverted to Kashmir case in more moderate vein and said hoped some solution could be worked out.
There was no reference this connection to London or British Commonwealth. We did not gain impression that Nehru contemplating solution by force but he is clearly convinced righteousness Indian position.
Hyderabad mentioned in passing by Nehru along lines Delga 315, October 13.2 He said significant improvement had occurred consequent upon removal of threat to communal relations. When crisis came both religious factions behaved with restraint and consequently both have regained much confidence each other.
Secretary at one time alluded to charges of American imperialism mentioned New Delhi telegram 890, September 29, and later used Latin America again as parallel to point out how under-developed area needing US capital did” not offer favorable conditions because of politicians use of imperialist bogey. Secretary pointed out that government loans much more likely to form basis for charge of imperialism than private. Nehru ascribed charges of imperialism to general impression that as consequence Marshall Plan American dominance in foreign field, already very powerful, constantly growing.
During conversation Secretary alluded several times our support UN. In his reply Nehru struck fairly responsive note despite apparent dissatisfaction with UN action in cases of direct interest to India. However, Nehru said India would support UN though it had weaknesses since it was only hope of world and must be supported. Nehru also said he was in full accord in condemning use of deceit and force but that it was also necessary to be firm but generous. He did recognize that, although another war would be horrible in its consequences, a nation could not sacrifice its interest and principles simply because of [Page 519] fear of the horror. If a nation did so it would simply be sacrificing without contest the honor and principles it should have tried to protect. Towards close of talk he stated he well aware of India’s responsibility to develop its economy and society and that in working for itself India was working for Asia, especially in view tragic situation in China. He also dwelt on close friendly relations India enjoyed with Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and way in which these countries sometimes solicited and accepted Indian advice. Perhaps he did this to counter Pakistan charges India was aggressive neighbor.
Despite its general character, we feel conversation was important step in evolution closer, more understanding relationship US and India and that Indians present were impressed with character, sincerity, and purpose US policy. Moreover, Secretary’s frankness and time he gave to interview must have been very pleasing. Although Nehru was entertaining British delegation at 7:30, he did not take leave of Secretary till 7:45. [Kopper and Parsons.]