501.BC Kashmir/11–1048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Sir Alexander Cadogan—United Kingdom Delegation |
| Mr. B. R. Curson | |
| Secretary Marshall—United States Delegation | |
| Mr. Ray L. Thurston | |
| Mr. James N. Hyde |
Sir Alexander opened the conversation by saying that he had been instructed by his Government to convey to me its latest views with respect to the Kashmir situation. He said that his Government had decided, on the basis of recent information from the area, that the [Page 446] Security Council should, in the immediate future, issue an immediate and unconditional cease fire order to the Governments of India and Pakistan. Sir Alexander stated that the information reaching his Government indicated: (1) That Indian and Pakistani troops were lined up in close proximity and that there was danger of an incident which might bring about open warfare; and (2) that his Government had reason to believe that on a high political level in both India and Pakistan such a cease fire order by the Security Council would be welcomed.
Sir Alexander then stated that as a second step his Government believed that a high-powered and prominent “mediator” should be sent to the sub-continent to attempt to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir issue. He said that since it was obviously inadvisable to send someone from the British Commonwealth, and since it was doubtful that a suitable person was available in such areas as Latin America, his Government had come to the conclusion that an American citizen with a nationally known name should be selected for this task. He then added that he had been requested to approach me regarding the availability of General Eisenhower.
As to the basis on which a “mediator” might now be sent to the subcontinent, Sir Alexander said that to avoid the possibility of a Soviet veto, his Government believed that the Secretary-General could, under certain provisions of the Security Council Resolution of April 21, send a “mediator” to the sub-continent in the guise of the “Plebiscite Administrator” provided for in that resolution.
In my reply I made several observations with regard to the difficulties of administering a cease fire order on the basis of my experience in China and added that I had been particularly disturbed to hear from Ambassador Huddle, our Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, that it might take at least three years before a plebiscite could be held in Kashmir. I then referred to the presence of British Officers in both the Indian and Pakistani armies and inquired whether the interest of the two parties alluded to in respect of a cease fire originated with them. I was asked what disposition would be made of UNCIP under the British plan.
With reference to the availability of General Eisenhower, I referred to recent offers to interest him in taking some relatively routine obligations outside the sphere of his university position, and General Eisenhower’s strongly expressed feelings that he wanted to dig into his present highly responsible job.
In their reply to the foregoing, Sir Alexander and Mr. Curson gave somewhat different versions of the reasons which prompted the British to believe that a cease fire would be successful. Sir Alexander stressed his belief that it was high political leaders on both sides who [Page 447] wanted the cease fire; whereas Mr. Curson stated that owing to the presence of British officers in each army, it would be easier to administer the cease fire than otherwise. In a somewhat general discussion of the actual military position, about which no one present appeared to be fully informed, Sir Alexander referred to recent discussions relating to the Negeb and Palestine and the possibility of establishing neutral or demilitarized zones rather than a clear-cut truce or cease fire line. In connection with the timing of the plebiscite, Mr. Curson thought that although an ideal plebiscite might require some delay, he thought that a simple one could be held much earlier than three years from now.
With regard to the relationship between the “mediator” and UNCIP, Sir Alexander stated that his people were not quite clear on this. He indicated that on the basis of recent conversations between the British and Mr. Colban, Secretary-General of UNCIP, the impression had been created that the Commission did not wish to return to the sub-continent, Mr. Colban had apparently expressed great interest in his own return to India as a kind of rump commission and had mentioned that Ambassador Huddle would be only six air hours away in Rangoon.
Mr. Thurston inquired of Sir Alexander concerning the technical basis on which it would be possible to send a “mediator” out to India in view of the language of the Security Council Resolution of April 21 which presumably requires the consent of the Government of India to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator, and added that neither India nor Pakistan had ever accepted the recommendations contained in the April 21 resolution with respect to a plebiscite.
Mr. Thurston also expressed the thought that perhaps the new American Ambassador to India who would be arriving in New Delhi shortly might be able to be of some assistance in connection with this difficult problem.
In the course of the conversation, Sir Alexander read from the instructions which he had in hand several sentences regarding the urgent need for stabilization in Southeast Asia because of the spread of Communism, the Soviet threat to the Northwest frontier, the effect of the inflation caused by India’s large military budget in delaying economic recovery, and the threat of war as a retarding factor in the development of the country by private capital.
Reference was also made in Sir Alexander’s instructions to the present serious difficulties in China which make it all the more important that the situation in South Asia be stabilized.
I then referred to Nehru’s recent speech before the General Assembly in which he had so strongly stressed his belief in the settlement of all disputes by non-violent means and speculated whether in view of [Page 448] this it might be useful for me to speak to Mrs. Pandit1 with regard to the inconsistency between such facts and the Indian attitude in Kashmir. Sir Alexander then interpolated—”and in Hyderabad too”—and with respect to the question of my talking with Mrs. Pandit asked me to refrain from saying anything about the present conversation. At this juncture, I alluded to recent conversations which I had had with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan who, although “speaking the same language” and who, although stressing the Communist threat and the need for stability, did not seem to be willing to suit action to their words. I stated that in my conversation with the Pakistan Prime Minister, he had indicated great interest in the Palestine question and had said that we were not giving sufficient attention to the Middle East. I mentioned that Nehru had not mentioned Palestine. I added that I had told the Pakistan Prime Minister that I was up to my neck in Palestine.
After a general discussion of the serious block to economic and political progress the Palestine and Kashmir problems represent, I referred to the delicate position in which Americans are likely to be placed in India and the fact that India and Pakistan would no doubt like to play the United States and the United Kingdom off against each other. I referred to the many generations of British experience in the area and to our role as newcomers. Sir Alexander quickly replied that perhaps our being newcomers was a great advantage.
At the end of the conversation, I assured Sir Alexander that we would give careful consideration to his Government’s views and made no comment when he pressed me on the possibility of getting some other American if Eisenhower were not available.
- Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit.↩