845.00/7–2348
The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State
No. 842
Subject: Conversation Regarding Hyderabad and Kashmir With Secretary of the Ministry of State.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 577 dated July 16, 19481 quoting excerpts from a speech made by the States Minister, Sardar Patel, on July 15 on the occasion of the inauguration of the [Page 354] Patiala and East Punjab States Union in which he touched upon Indo-Hyderabad Relations.
The Department will recall from this telegram that Sardar Patel stated that the Government of India had now withdrawn its recent offer to Hyderabad2 and that the State must now accede to the Indian Union under the same conditions as all the other Indian States. One of the officers of the Embassy called upon Mr. V. P. Menon, Secretary of the Ministry of States, on July 17 in order to ascertain definitely if the Government of India had officially withdrawn the terms recently offered to the Nizam. Mr. Menon stated that the offer had been withdrawn because it had been rejected by the Nizam, and the Government of India did not feel that it could hold its offer open for an indefinite period. Mr. Menon added however that if the Government of India considered it advisable it might offer the Nizam equally advantageous terms in the future. It is the belief of the Embassy that Mr. Menon’s remark can be interpreted only as an indication that the Government of India will not insist that the Nizam must accede on precisely the same terms as that of the other Princely States.
Mr. Menon divulged some significant information regarding the negotiations which took place in connection with the offer made to the Nizam, the text of which was transmitted to the Department with my despatch no. 702 dated June 19, 19483 on the subject “Breakdown of Indo-Hyderabad Negotiations”. In the first place Menon said that he did not “honestly approve” of the terms offered to the Nizam. He also said that the Governor-General at that time, Earl Mountbatten, had obtained Sardar Patel’s approval of the draft agreement before he (Menon) had had an opportunity to discuss it with Sardar Patel. Mr. Menon had planned to reach Dehra Dun, where Sardar Patel was then staying, for the purpose of discussing the draft agreement before Earl Mountbatten arrived. Mr. Menon’s plane was delayed, however, and Earl Mountbatten was able to obtain the Sardar’s approval after stating that Menon concurred in offering such terms to the Nizam. Mr. Menon said that if he had been able to reach Sardar Patel first and inform the Sardar that he did not “honestly approve” of the plan he was certain that the Sardar would have refused to approve it.
Mr. Menon said that he had told Mountbatten that, although he did not object to Mountbatten “obtaining another feather in his cap” by settling the Hyderabad problem, he doubted very much that the Nizam would accept the terms of the offer, favorable as they were to Hyderabad. Mr. Menon also stated that Sir Walter Monckton had been [Page 355] genuinely eager to arrive at an agreement. He said that Sir Walter had personally drafted every provision of the offer made to Hyderabad and that he himself “had not touched a pen” to the paper. According to Mr. Menon, Sir Walter considered the terms offered as most generous and told Earl Mountbatten and Mr. Menon that in his opinion India was entitled to demand accession and the establishment of responsible government in the State.
It is the firm view of Mr. Menon that Razvi4 exerts a controlling influence over the Nizam and consequently over the policy of the Hyderabad Government. Mr. Menon said that during the course of the Indo-Hyderabad negotiations the Government of India had intercepted a letter from Razvi to a “Pakistan authority” informing the latter that he did not have to worry about the possible conclusion of an agreement with India as Razvi would always “remain loyal” to Pakistan. When this letter was shown to Mountbatten he expressed doubts regarding its authenticity. Mr. Menon believes, however, that the refusal of the Nizam to accept terms drafted by his adviser is clear evidence of a close relationship between Pakistan policy and Hyderabad intransigence. Another evidence which Mr. Menon cited of the dependence of the Nizam on the counsel of Razvi was the fact that Sir Walter had been unable to see the Nizam alone for the past four months. According to Mr. Menon either Razvi or one of his followers was present at all interviews between the Nizam and Sir Walter.
With reference to the future trend of Indo-Hyderabad relations Mr. Menon expressed the opinion that the economic sanctions now being applied by the Government of India against Hyderabad would not be effective in compelling the Nizam to come to an agreement with India. Mr. Menon believes that economic sanctions are effective only when they are applied against a modern industrial state and not against a feudal unit such as Hyderabad in which the standard of living is extremely low; food resources are adequate; and the average inhabitant is almost self-sufficient from the economic point of view. As reported to the Department, Mr. Menon stated that although he felt that military action against the State would afford the only solution to the Hyderabad problem, his Government still believes that a peaceful settlement may be achieved and is working towards that end.
Mr. Menon then began on his own initiative to discuss the Kashmir problem. He expressed the hope that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan would be able to achieve a peaceful settlement of this problem. Mr. Menon believes that the Indian psychology must be taken into consideration by the Commission in solving the Kashmir problem. According to him the Indian Government and people are [Page 356] convinced that their action in going into Kashmir to defend the people of the State against depredations of the raiders was morally right. They feel that their motives have been impugned and that the United Nations has refused to take this aspect of the problem into consideration in its deliberations, and has deliberately refused to recognize an obvious fact, namely, that the Pakistan Government has been actively assisting the raiders even if it did not directly instigate the invasion. Consequently, Mr. Menon feels that unless the United Nations Commission makes some gesture to recognize the moral motives behind the Kashmir policy of India as well as the complicity of Pakistan in the invasion, there is no chance of acceptance by the Government of India of any settlement terms submitted by the Commission.
Mr. Menon feels that once such recognition is made the Government of India will be willing to accept a solution based upon partition of the State. Mr. Menon requested that this information be treated in the strictest confidence as it would greatly weaken the Indian position vis-à-vis Pakistan if the latter Government discovered that India would accept partition. According to him, the Government of India will accept a settlement based on the cession of Mirpur, Poonch, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit to Pakistan. He also said that the Government of India would accept the results of a plebiscite held in the Vale of Kashmir to determine whether that area would go to India or Pakistan and that it would be willing to withdraw all Indian troops from the Vale during the time that the plebiscite was being held. The only qualification which Mr. Menon made to the acceptance of such a settlement by the Government of India was that the United Nations must ensure the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and the raiders from the areas which they now occupy before any cease-fire is issued. He said that the Government of India would not take advantage of such a withdrawal by sending Indian troops into the areas concerned and that, if the cease-fire order should break down, Indian troops would not take advantage of the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops to enter the area.
In the evaluation of Mr. Menon’s statement it should be taken into consideration that, in opinion of the Embassy, Mr. Menon, along with Sardar Patel, is much more interested in Hyderabad than in Kashmir. Consequently, it is likely that he would be more conciliatory—as the foregoing statements would appear to substantiate—than would certain other Government of India leaders, particularly Pandit Nehru. Nevertheless, the Embassy has been advised by various other key officials in the Government of India, including Mr. M. K. Vellodi, General Bucher and others, that they favor a solution of the Kashmir problem predicated on the partition of the State and the Embassy is therefore inclined to believe that such a solution is the most feasible one at present.
[Page 357]The information contained in this despatch has been brought to the attention of the United States Delegate on the Commission.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Reference here is to the terms of settlement worked out during the preceding month between Hyderabad and the former Governor-General of India, Earl Mountbatten, who relinquished that position to Shri Chakravarti Rajagopalachari on June 21.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Syed Mohamed Kasim Razvi, President of a politico-religious organization of Muslims in Hyderabad.↩