501.BC/4–648: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret

388. At a meeting today called by the President1 in his office at which representatives of the UK, China, Belgium and Canada were also present, the President reviewed the position in the Kashmir case. He had talked separately with each of the two delegations. He had received a letter from the Indian delegation containing a statement of their position together with changes which they stated would be required in the March 30 Chinese revised draft resolution before they could accept it.2 In this letter which he read, the Indians stated their position very flatly and seemed to have withdrawn certain concessions which they previously made. The delegate of Pakistan had also submitted to the President a redraft of the Chinese proposal, a copy of which has been forwarded to the Department.3 The President thought the parties’ positions were further apart at this time than previously and he was very pessimistic. This view was shared by several other members present. The consensus of opinion was that the Indians over the weekend had substantially hardened their position. They were no longer talking about acquiescing in a SC recommendation.

There was a discussion as to what should be done and the following decisions were reached:

(1).
The President would ask Pakistan, which had not seen a copy of the Indian letter, to provide the President with a similar letter4 indicating the changes it required in the March 30 Chinese draft.
(2).
The President would circulate to those delegations present both the Indian letter and the Pakistan letter.
(3).
The President would meet with both parties and show them each other’s draft.
(4).
The President would state to the parties that it was his view that the stage of negotiations between the parties should be brought to an end in view of their inability to reach agreement and that he would recommend to the SC that the Council should start a new stage of preparing a recommendation to the parties (presumably under Article 37).
(5).
The President stated that there was no commitment as to what action those present should take after that point.

The Chinese representative stated that he would be unable under his present instructions to propose the March 30 redraft of his resolution by himself. It would be necessary that other delegations join in sponsoring this draft resolution. No other delegations offered to sponsor the resolution. I said that all the other delegations present should consider this question of sponsorship and should be ready at an early date to inform their colleagues whether they were or were not in a position to sponsor this resolution or some modification of it. The British representative, Noel-Baker, said that if the parties did not agree this would place his government in a peculiarly delicate position. He already had, however, asked for instructions on this point.

The Chinese representative seemed to be expressing the consensus of opinion when he said that the March 30 draft seems to be about halfway between the positions of the two parties and that from that point of view it was an excellent draft to be placed before the Council as a basis for its proposed action.

There was also agreement that time was an important factor; that the parties seemed to be drifting apart and with the spring weather it was quite possible that they would turn to other solutions of the problem. The Chinese delegate urged strongly that the Indians might well give up hope very soon that they could get any solution from the Council, and turn to unilateral measures. The President expressed his view that time was on the side of India because she, so to speak, had possession. It was unanimously agreed that some decision before April 16 when the special session5 on Palestine starts was essential. Noel-Baker said that if it was not done, it would be impossible to hold a plebiscite before the snow falls in October.

The Chinese suggested that it would be necessary in undertaking this new course for the members of the SC to do some real missionary work not only with the delegations of the parties here in New York but also through diplomatic channels in India and Pakistan in order to persuade the two governments to acquiesce in any recommendation which the Council makes. He suggested that we should not finally pass a resolution in the Council until we had through these channels satisfied ourselves that the two parties would be likely to acquiesce in a specific recommendation.

It was also agreed that the parties should not be asked at this stage to come before the SC to state their positions publicly as this might commit them to fixed positions.

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In our view we must now proceed with a recommendation under Article 37 of the Charter. For this purpose it will be important to reach agreement on the introduction of a resolution along the lines of the March 30 Chinese draft. I believe it likely that if the US indicates its willingness to be a co-sponsor of this draft, the British, Canadians and Belgians will do so as well. This may mean some difficult negotiation, particularly with the British. I therefore recommend that I be authorized to be a co-sponsor of the March 30 draft. My intention would be to use this authority to obtain the agreement of the other three, also to be co-sponsors. I have in mind taking a particularly strong line with the British on the ground that this is their problem and that they must face up to the responsibilities involved.

Austin
  1. President of the Security Council, Alfonso López.
  2. This letter, and one of similar import from the Pakistan delegation, was referred to by López in the 285th meeting of the Council on April 19. López informed the Council that he had received them on April 5 and 7, respectively. For his remarks, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 60, p. 51. The Indian letter, not printed, is not found in Department of State files. However, Indian thinking on the latest Chinese draft was presented by Ayyangar at the 285th meeting of the Council, ibid., pp. 2–19. For presentation of Pakistan’s letter of April 7 at the same meeting, see ibid., pp. 43–47.
  3. Not found in Department of State files.
  4. See footnote 2 above.
  5. Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.