501.BC/4–248: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
371. For SOA–Thurston from Ross. Referring to our phone conversation this noon, Zafrullah Kahn at his request, came in to see Ambassador Austin at noon today and spent about an hour with us discussing the current situation in the Kashmir case. He allowed us to read two telegrams he had received from Jinnah. The first long telegram he had received two or three days ago on the basis of the first Chinese draft resolution. It was very strongly worded and developed the following line: discussion of this whole matter in SC to date was more than sufficient to indicate all the facts and requirements of the situation. If the Council were to act on the basis of the Chinese resolution, it would be performing a complete about-face. This resolution was the product of a small and willful group instigated by the British. Whenever a situation reached the point of crisis the British abandoned Pakistan in favor of India because they somehow felt that Indian support in the world was more important. Pakistan could not agree to any solution of this problem that did not involve the complete withdrawal of Indian troops and the replacement of Abdullah.
The second very brief telegram of instructions was dated March 31 after the meeting of the Pakistan Cabinet on this question and was received here that night. This telegram in effect repeated what the longer telegram had said but in a somewhat milder language. It was [Page 324] based on consideration not only of the original Chinese draft but also of the first revised draft.1
Zafrullah’s attitude towards these instructions was that they of course stated an extreme position and [if] he in his position here at the moment, reminding us that he had quite wide latitude, was to find a way of dealing with the practical political realities of the situation, some formula must be found to deal with these essential points.
As the situation was developing Pakistan would be obligated to perform three tasks. They must make arrangements for cessation of fighting, they must get the tribesmen out of Jammu-Kashmir, and they must keep them out. In order to get the tribesmen out and keep them out it was essential that Pakistani troops be permitted to go into the Azad-Kashmir area.
The second point Zafrullah made was that any troops in Jammu and Kashmir, whether Pakistani or Indian, must be under the control of the Commission.
As a matter of practical politics, Pakistan could no more expect their view to prevail than the Indian view. They consider that Jammu and Kashmir are economically and strategically far more important to Pakistan than to India. They could not expect the Indians ever to agree to this principle, however, so he was trying to find ways of equalizing the situation. He then went on to discuss some of the specific language of the draft resolution dated March 30.2
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In the course of the discussion with Zafrullah, the Senator asked him how much chance he thought there would be of the Indian Government accepting the changes along the lines of those indicated. Zafrullah replied quite frankly that he thought it might be difficult but that he did not know. Before leaving, Zafrullah repeated that he would send us this afternoon revised language which he also said, in response to my question, he planned to present to President López this afternoon. He did not think any useful purpose would be served in having a Council meeting at this stage. [Ross.]
- This draft, not printed, is the first of many revisions of the March 18 Chinese draft resolution.↩
- The March 30 draft was, according to a summary statement by Tsiang in the 284th meeting of the Security Council on April 17, the third revised draft resolution since the one he had submitted on March 18. (SC, 3rd yr., No. 59, pp. 4–5) A copy of the March 30 draft, not printed, is in Department of State file 501.BC/4–1248. It was followed by further revisions and was not presented in the Security Council.↩