501.BC Kashmir/3–2248
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes of the United States Mission to the United Nations
| Participants: | Zafrullah Kahn, Pakistan Delegation |
| Ambassador Austin, United States Mission | |
| Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission |
Zafrullah Khan said he was very disturbed about the present situation before the Security Council. He said that apart from the substance of the Chinese amendment, he felt he had been very unfairly used in the matter of procedure. On March 11 he had lunch with Tsiang who had discussed generally with him the concept contained in his resolution with respect to the Plebiscite Administrator. Zafrullah Khan had made no substantial comments or commitments. On March 18 he was again asked to see Tsiang at 12:15, to have lunch and drive out with him. This was the first time he had seen the Chinese draft. The placing of this draft before the Council with this background, he thought, was most unfair; was a method different than followed by the previous Presidents who had taken great pains to present a draft to both parties at the same time and to ask for their comments in front of each other. In this case he was convinced that the Indians had had a great deal to do with preparing the draft. Tsiang had told him that he understood the Indians would accept it except for certain minor details. In spite of British protestations, he knew they had been in consultation with Tsiang on the draft. Tsiang had, in front of Zafrullah Khan, told Noel-Baker that one of the provisions was put in at the suggestion of Noel-Baker. He was concerned at the close parallel between the newspaper story which appeared in India early in March and the President’s draft resolution.
Zafrullah was worried about the English position. He said they had changed their tone. He had had a talk with Attlee1 in London who had tried out on him some of the ideas contained in the Chinese draft. He was personally convinced that Mountbatten also had a hand in it and indicated that Mountbatten was concerned that Britain by her previous stand had come close to forcing India to renounce her dominion status.
Zafrullah Kahn handed Ambassador Austin a copy of a telegram from the Azad Government2 to the Security Council. (Copy attached) He said that the Chinese resolution was entirely unacceptable to him as a basis of discussion. He had passed it along to his Government [Page 317] presumably with this comment. He said if his Government felt differently about it he would not resign but would carry on loyally.
He wanted to emphasize one particular aspect of the matter to us. In looking at the map it was quite clear that Kashmir was essential to the strategic defense of Pakistan and was of vital interest to it. From many points of view, the people of Pakistan had a great interest in the State. He suggested there were three possible outcomes of the present situation:
First that an arrangement for a truly fair plebiscite should be agreed upon. Under these circumstances if the plebiscite verdict went to India, the people of Pakistan and the Government would accept it and that would be the end of the issue.
Second that a plebiscite should be held which the people of Pakistan could not accept as fair and that the verdict in such a plebiscite should go to India. Under these circumstances the dispute would remain and the people of Pakistan would be smarting under a feeling of having been done out of what was legitimately theirs. The situation might easily deteriorate to the point of war between the two dominions which might spread and be a danger to other States.
Third that there was no settlement at all. In this case again the situation might deteriorate and result in fighting between the two dominions. However, if Pakistan had to choose between the latter two, Zafrullah Khan intimated that it might well choose the last course since it would have nothing to gain from a plebiscite which it considered would be a farce. He said that a Pakistan which was not satisfied and whose people were thoroughly upset about a situation as vital to them as Kashmir would constitute a serious danger to India not only in itself because Pakistan essentially was the only protection of India from the northwest—meaning the Russians. Zafrullah Khan made a strong statement of the position of Pakistan with relation to the U.S.S.R. He said that Pakistan was not sympathetic with Communism and that their position was taken in the event of any major struggle. They could not go along with the U.S.S.R. If, however, Pakistan lost a plebiscite which it considered unfair, he asked whether the Pakistan people would have any heart to fight against the U.S.S.R. If the U.S.S.R. cross through the Khyber Pass into Kashmir, the Indians would have no defense whatever unless Pakistan was with them. He said that throughout history the Moslems had not cherished luxury. They were not rich people. If a conflict arose between their honor and their desire to obtain their worldly goods, they would undoubtedly choose their honor. However, they did not wish to be driven to that choice.
Zafrullah Khan then came back to the Chinese resolution. He said that the main objective was Abdullah. He pointed out that the main reason for talking about safeguards was that the Chinese resolution allowed Abdullah to remain and therefore placed the entire governmental machinery in the hands of a very partial person. If Abdullah were taken out, very few safeguards, if any, would be necessary, but [Page 318] having made this concession to the Indians it was obvious to everyone that very substantial safeguards would be necessary.
Ambassador Austin then outlined the four points contained in the draft telegram of March 22. Zafrullah Khan said again that the main difficulty was Abdullah and that if he is left in his present position Pakistan would not attempt to persuade the Azad Government that they should enter a coalition with him. If the Azad Government (which he doubted) was able to reach agreement on their own hook with Abdullah on a coalition, Pakistan would not raise any particular objections. Zafrullah Khan also remarked that it would be esssential to keep the Indian, Army out of the situation so that it could not affect the result of the plebiscite.
Zafrullah Khan said that he had received no word from his Government and doubted whether he would receive any in the immediate future as the Governor General was in East Pakistan and was not expected back immediately. He said he had sent him the Chinese draft with the request that they do not issue any wild public statements which might make matters more difficult.
Ambassador Austin said we were working on the case as a whole and we thought we would probably be talking with Zafrullah on details before taking any final position.