501.BC Kashmir/3–2248
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes of the United States Mission to the United Nations
| Participants: | Mr. Ayyangar, Indian Delegation |
| Mr. Bajpai, Indian Delegation | |
| Mr. Velodi, Indian Delegation | |
| Ambassador Austin, United States Mission | |
| Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission |
After a short discussion on Palestine and a few remarks regarding Korea in which Bajpai noted that we had asked their Government to support us on the Korean case, we got down to a discussion of the Kashmir question. Ambassador Austin told them that we thought the Chinese proposals with a certain number of amendments to strengthen it up might form the basis of a settlement of the case, which we were very anxious to see happen. He referred to the four points in the telegram of March 221 as points in which we would like to see a strengthening of the resolution. The Indians agreed to point a without any difficulty. As regards item b in respect to forces being constituted locally, there were several objections. The Indians raised the difficulty of anything which would give any recognition to the provisional Azad Government or which would in any way give authority to such a Government or its forces. Bajpai said this was like asking the poacher to turn into the gamekeeper. He repeated several times that after law and order had been established, the Indian forces would be perfectly agreeable to withdrawing from the areas concerned and making appropriate arrangements so as not to interfere with the Plebiscite. He [Page 315] stated that they were making plans to reorganize the State troops and that of course they would be made up, as they had been, of elements all over the State. He also referred in this connection to the desirability of the police in the State taking over the responsibility in local areas for law and order. Ambassador Austin indicated that we had two things in mind on this point:
First: That elements from outside the Azad area might not be welcome if they came in there and attempted to maintain law and order; and
Second: That the Plebiscite Director should have the powers with regard to the maintenance of law and order. (Item c in our list.)
Not much headway was made on the first point. On the second, however, many protestations were made that the Indians were quite willing that the Plebiscite Administrator should have certain functions with relation to law and order. They said that of course if he requested the Indians to help him maintain law and order they would be very glad to make their troops available to him. Ayyangar also made it quite clear that they would not wish to use their troops in any way which the Plebiscite Administrator felt amounted to action adversely affecting the fairness of the Plebiscite. I do not recall that any specific reference was made to the Plebiscite Administrator’s powers over the police or the State troops. This may well have been implicit in the Indian remarks.
Bajpai did, however, to my mind, water down the value of Ayyangar’s remarks by referring to the fact that if the Plebiscite Director needed an additional staff to observe—in addition to the eight regional directors—the Indians would of course have no difficulty whatever in agreeing to his having as large a staff of observers as he required. My impression was that he made a clear distinction between a regular staff to run the Plebiscite and to control the police, and simply observers who would report what was happening.
As far as our item d was concerned, there was no difficulty. They agreed entirely.
Ambassador Austin asked them about the position when they first brought up this case. Ayyangar indicated that there might well have been real trouble between India and Pakistan if the Security Council had not been available. Ayyangar also referred in this connection to the present situation, saying that the Indian Army was fighting and that it was of the greatest importance that a political settlement should be reached before any substantial change in the military situation could take place. He intimated that the fighting could result in a clinching crisis which might settle the issue.
- Telegram 158, supra.↩